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Abstract
This thesis is based on the critical interpretation of a selected series of 
employment tribunal judgements all of which deal with aspects of standard or 
burden of proof in sex and race discrimination cases. A reflexive approach is 
adopted in an attempt to provide a better understanding of discrimination law 
as an organisational discourse and as a potential force for emancipatory change 
in the workplace. The research examines the conceptual links between 
management, employment relations, discrimination law and everyday social 
processes in an attempt to uncover the influence on employment relationships 
and professional practice of a more thoughtful interpretation of employment 
tribunal texts.
My contributions to knowledge in the domains of research methodology and 
professional practice fall into 3 categories. First, an exploration and synthesis of 
reflexive approaches, hermeneutic understanding and aspects of legal theory to 
develop and embed my subjective epistemic stance within a pluralistic 
conceptual framework. Second, the design and employment of a distinctive 
interpretative analytical framework for discourse analysis drawing on 
established perspectives in the fields of management and legal theory. 
Combining the 2 contributions in an epistemologically consistent way has 
allowed me to bring a methodologically individual dimension to the 
examination of employment tribunal narratives under the banner of discourse 
analysis with a critical edge. My third contribution has been to use the analytical 
framework to detect the storylines of inference drawing, common sense 
interpretations and legal responses to social issues. By exposing the key role 
played by the subjective concept of drawing inferences, I have undermined the 
perception of the employment tribunal as an 'objective industrial court'.
Further, I have shown how 2 of our most prevalent informal social and 
subjective theories -  commonsense and reasonableness - feature heavily in the 
legal arena of the employment tribunal and how legal solutions to social 
problems may present unintended consequences for the employment 
relationship. In so doing, I have disturbed the image of discrimination law as a 
sealed and singular phenomenon operating beyond the social contexts in which 
it impacts and opened up potential avenues of further multi-discipline research 
around subjective interpretations in environments framed by legislation and 
authority.
Finally, I have unearthed some personal dilemmas and opportunities as a 
senior professional working within a large public sector organisation around 
how I engage with my professional practice.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
A stone worth lifting
As I read a newspaper or professional journal or listen to the news on 
television or radio, I continue to be surprised by the prominence given to cases 
involving workplace disputes and the seemingly unquenchable public thirst for 
details of the latest 'outrage'. Increasingly, I detect that this interest is not solely 
about the alleged behaviour of the employer, but also about the employee's 
behaviour in bringing the matter to an employment tribunal. Such widely 
reported cases tend to involve the potential for large cash payouts, the 
involvement of high profile figures and organisations, or both. They represent, 
or course, only a tiny fraction of the 'employment casework industry' and the 
vast majority of workplace disputes are resolved through in-house employment 
relations procedures or mediated agreement before an employment tribunal 
hearing becomes necessary. Even where the hearing stage is reached, the 
remedies are usually of little interest beyond the parties involved, go largely 
unreported and the financial compensations relatively minor.
As an experienced personnel professional, I have been engaged with 
employment practice and work related legal matters for most of my working 
life and it seems to me that the surprise I referred to in the first sentence of this 
introduction needs to be unpacked. Accordingly, this narrative is a personal 
venture into aspects of workplace law and practice and an attempt at 
combining my professional and intellectual interests. I should be clear from the 
outset that my work -  and therefore this narrative - is founded on four 
straightforward principles which at this stage I invite the reader to 
acknowledge. First, to be classified as a worker in 21st Century Britain
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encompasses a very broad definition and for the individual provides access to a 
wide range of employment law statutes. Second, to gain access to the personnel 
profession in 21st Century Britain increasingly involves an understanding of 
these statutes at the technical level and their application in the workplace.
Third, that for anyone involved in the world of work, it is almost impossible to 
be unaffected by the flow of workplace legislation in recent years. Fourth, the 
legal framework is constantly embellished by evolving casework and decisions 
made in the various tribunals and courts which form the practical infrastructure 
of employment law interpretation.
Running alongside this rapid expansion of the legislative framework and 
the creation of an increasingly complex suite of workplace policies has been an 
extensive, but largely inconclusive, debate about whether employment law 
provisions have swung the balance of power in employment relationships in 
favour of the employer or the employee. Daniels (2006) argues much of the 
legislation introduced in the late 1970s was designed to reduce the collective 
strength of trade unions and swing the balance back in favour of the employer. 
By contrast, more recent entries on the statute book focus on individual 
protection and send the needle back in the direction of the employee or worker. 
My focus on sex and race discrimination - born in the 1970s and widely seen as 
an attempt to socially engineer a 'fairer' workplace -  may shed some light on 
this employer/employee balance issue. It should not be assumed at this stage, 
however, that the intended benefits and protections for the employee have all 
emerged in practice. Potentially, something of a double bluff perhaps for the 
critical researcher seeking to emancipate the oppressed.
What appears less evident to most is that many of the original 
employment law provisions -  dating back to the 1970s - remain pretty much 
intact and this is particularly so with regard to sex and race discrimination law.
I recognise that discrimination law now has a much wider application with 
later provisions now covering disability, sexual orientation, religious belief and 
age. That aside, and with the benefit of over 40 years of legislative amendments
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and case law to support and clarify the original sex and race discrimination 
statutes, a student of employment law could be forgiven for making an early 
assumption that most of the "hard cases" would have been determined, that the 
application of the law would be relatively straightforward for managers and 
workers alike and that the scope for alternative interpretations would be at the 
margins of legal debate. What follows is designed to consider this suggestion, 
particularly in the context of how employment tribunal determinations are 
reached and the relationship between employment law, personnel practice and 
individual responses. I seek to examine what lies beneath the surface of 
employment tribunal judgements and what are these texts saying that matters 
to individual employment relationships and professional personnel practice?
To help me achieve these aspirations, I am seeking to indicate the 
emergence of employment legislation as an influential and pervasive discourse 
-  particularly for those employed in the personnel profession - and to illustrate 
how one element of this legislation - discrimination law - has become part of the 
psyche of the workplace. I will be developing the argument that legislative 
provisions are now so embedded within organisation policies and practices that 
it is impossible to escape their reach. What is less clear, to me at least, is an 
understanding of the dynamic between this legislative framework, the 'theatre' 
played out in employment tribunals, the practice of the personnel profession 
and the influence on individual employment relationships. I also seek to 
examine the taken for granted picture of employment tribunals as neutral, 
'discrimination free zones' making legal decisions according to legal rules 
within a legal framework and to consider the impact of such employment 
tribunal decisions. Whilst I recognise that Mansell et al (2004: pl2) have a point 
with their contention that "the law works because the institution itself has 
become a part of our "taken for granted" world", it does raise a question about 
whether we take too much for granted, particularly in the context of the 
interplay between employment law and workplace matters.
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In my view, it is important to lift this stone to see what lies beneath and I 
invite the reader to join me on the research journey outlined in the next section. 
The potential prize is a degree of illumination around my research issue: 
towards a better understanding of the impact of discrimination law as a 
potential force for emancipatory change in the workplace. Underpinning this 
prize, is a potential three part contribution to knowledge; the creation of a 
multi-faceted critical perspective, the design and use of a distinctive 
interpretative analytical framework and the emergence of a set of ideas that add 
value to personnel practice.
Research strategy
This short preamble points in the direction of the raw material and the 
focus for this study and it is important to set out at this early stage how it will 
be used to produce a meaningful research project. Figure 1.1. illustrates my 
route map and is discussed briefly below.
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SUBJECT AREA 
Employment 
Tribunals and the 
employm ent 
relationship
CRITICAL ANALYSIS
^  Interpretative
Framework
BRIEF LITERATURE 
REVIEW 
•Brief review of 
literature in substantive 
area of research 
•Identify research 
considerations4
METHODOLOGICAL 
EXPLANATION AND 
JUSTIFICATION 
•Reflexive approaches 
•Hermeneutic 
understanding 
•Critical interpretation 
•Discourse analysis 
•A model for critical 
interpretation
THEORY
REFLECTION
DATA
Holistic
Interpretation
CRITICAL REFLECTIONS
EMERGENT
PERSPECTIVE
'Synthesis -  
draw chapters 
together'
DATA INTERPRETATION AND 
ANALYSIS 
Interview texts (Employment 
Tribunal Judgements) 
Critical dialogue between data 
and theory 
Emergent themes 
Set of ideas that add value
Figure 1.1 Research Strategy -  Critical interpretations of employment tribunal 
judgements
The opening paragraphs of this chapter provide an indication of my 
subject area of interest and I recognise that the complex area of employment 
relations has been a regular watering hole for researchers. What appears to be a 
far less visited source is the public record of employment tribunal judgements. 
An examination of how these documents might be exposed to alternative 
interpretations might extend our thinking in the employment relations field. 
Drawing together and probing this data field which spans employment law and 
employment relations has the potential to reveal some interesting implications 
for personnel policy and practice.
The literature review is designed to explore and challenge these ideas, to 
provide some theoretical basis to the debate and, most importantly, to identify
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potential research considerations. I will draw on writings around employment 
relations in organisations and the psychological contract at the theoretical level 
to provide a backdrop to my considerations of the influence of discrimination 
law. In an attempt to reflect more practical impacts, I will look to some of the 
key agencies involved in the employment relations arena to add a degree of 
balance to the debate.
The next step along the route involves consideration of my philosophical 
underpinnings and methodological approach and the development of a 
framework for analysis -  what I later term the 'research engine'. My ambition 
here is to provide a pluralistic approach drawing on critical reflexivity and 
hermeneutic understanding 'spiced up' with elements of legal interpretation to 
provide a distinctive interpretative model. The second part of the thesis brings 
the interpretative framework 'face to face' with the employment tribunal texts 
designed to produce a thoughtful discourse analytical debate. All of this 
should allow me to facilitate the reflexive analysis I seek to undertake and to 
generate some emergent themes which may, in turn, elicit a set of ideas that add 
value to the personnel profession.
The research strategy illustrated at Figure 1.1 and the explanatory 
narrative contained in this section of my introduction betray an approach based 
on reference to existing literature to identify research considerations or 
'hunches' followed by a reflective analysis designed to generate tentative ideas 
or theories as an outcome of such analysis. An approach firmly located under 
the 'inductive banner' and in contrast with the deductive approach more closely 
aligned with positivist thinking. The latter recognisable by the development of 
a theory or theories prior to empirical research. (Gill and Johnson, 1997).
Pursuit of a professional and intellectual identity
Moving on, the remainder of this introduction is devoted to setting the 
professional and intellectual scene from a personal perspective, outlining my
approach to critical interpretation through discourse analysis and presenting 
my analytical framework for interpretation. The chapter concludes with a short 
summary of my intended research journey.
As I have already indicated, my professional interest in employment law, 
and specifically, sex and race discrimination law, has developed over 20 years 
of working across a range of appointments in the personnel profession. My 
direct experience is wholly public sector based and often close to the policy 
development arm of Government departments. Any wider understanding of 
legislative influence in the private and voluntary sectors has been gained 
indirectly through interaction with colleagues and engagement with the subject 
through a range of learning opportunities and literary sources.
To some extent, this is a personal and professional story -  from a 
distance and close up. When I came to Thames Valley Police in 1997 as their 
first non-uniform, professionally qualified Head of Human Resources, I joined 
an organisation caught in the headlights of two damaging employment tribunal 
cases. Their first of any real significance to be faced by the organisation.
Having only previously witnessed employment tribunal activity at a 'safe 
distance' -  from a relatively detached policy desk in the Ministry of Defence -  I 
could almost touch the tension created within the organisation by having to 
face the drama of colleague on colleague confrontations played out in public. 
Attempting to influence the appeal stages of the cases 'from the stands' 
certainly brought me closer to the action than I had been previously. As has 
been the experience of many of my contemporary professional colleagues, it 
was not too long before I found myself even closer to the action as a witness for 
the organisation. Involvement in employment tribunals from these three 
vantage points has provided me with a significant experiential perspective. A 
perspective which has, of course, to be recognised in my own pre­
understandings and my approach to this research project.
Within the wider context of sex and race discrimination law, a particular 
aspect of legal interpretation has attracted my intellectual as well as my 
professional interest. New Burden of Proof Regulations, introduced in 2003, 
have sparked a fierce debate and a significant shift in the determination of 
discrimination cases. The employment tribunal cases which represent my data 
field are all drawn from this area of discrimination law.
Remaining at the intellectual level, I am also intrigued by the language, 
legal interpretation and debate around this whole area of the employment 
environment and the opportunities for critical and reflexive study. A language 
that is widely recognised to be power-laden and an effective camouflage 
against the intrusion of the non lawyer (Holland and Webb, 2003). My own 
reading of the situation is that most of this discourse has been confined to legal 
jurisprudence rather than organisational theory and investigated even less as a 
source of multi-disciplinary study. I sense that I have lived through the 
creation of a new workplace discourse with multiple meanings that merit 
further examination.
At this introductory point, I have chosen to make a somewhat artificial 
split between professional and intellectual perspectives to aid my 
understanding and explanation. I recognize that I will need to draw them 
together later as I endeavour to satisfy one of the central tenets of DBA study, 
providing a bridge between theory and management practice. I also note that 
my own experiences -  both social and professional -  will contaminate my work 
to some extent and that part of my task is to harness my contribution as a 
researcher as a positive and illuminating contribution to this discourse. That 
said, I make no apology for seeking to establish in the mind of the reader that 
this professional exposure and experience on the one hand and my intellectual 
interest in employment law and legal interpretation on the other provide my 
starting off point for this thesis.
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A route towards critical interpretation
It seems to me that the routes to critical discovery allow the researcher 
considerable scope for epistemological perspective and methodological choice. 
As far as the former is concerned, I do not intend to pass up this opportunity for 
exploration as I seek to draw on and blend a critical perspective, reflexivity and 
hermeneutic understanding. I am encouraged by such latitude and the 
apparent endorsement given by Cassell and Symon (2004: p2) "qualitative 
methods might be informed by all possible epistemological positions" and the 
assertion by Fournier and Grey (2000) that critical research draws on a number 
of intellectual traditions and is committed to some form of reflexivity. McAuley 
et al (2007: 48) record with elegant simplicity the opportunities provided by a 
critical theoretical perspective, "it enables us to reflect on the ways in which we 
need to constantly question issues of organisational design, leadership and
communication " Equally, I take on board the importance of surfacing my
own philosophical assumptions through reflection to underpin my approach to 
this research project and to help provide the consistency between theory and 
method, thinking and doing. I will comment on methodological choice later in 
this section, but, for now, suffice to say that I will be developing an approach to 
analysis that allows me to exploit the pluralistic epistemological position 
mentioned here.
Johnson and Duberley (2000) categorise and link epistemological 
approaches to reflexivity in a manner that helps to provide the clarity and 
consistency I referred to in the preceding paragraph. In their contention, critical 
research encourages epistemic reflexivity which "entails the researcher 
attempting to think about their own thinking ..." (Johnson and Duberley (2000: 
p i78)). These authors do not deal with hermeneutic approaches substantively 
and this might illustrate a doubt concerning where to place the hermeneutic 
tradition: as a philosophy or as methodological choice. The title of the McAuley 
(1985) article "Hermeneutics as a Practical Research Methodology in 
Management" would appear to leave little room for doubt, but in McAuley
(2004: pl92) he comments "hermeneutics is understood as a philosophical take 
on interpretivist social science". For my part, this apparent lack of certainty 
only serves to provide further encouragement to explore these m uddy waters.
I include this short debate here to illustrate the potential difficulties of 
trying to separate theory and method, but, more importantly, to announce to 
the reader that my own 'philosophical mix' includes a critical epistemology, the 
associated reflection on the process of understanding and the key hermeneutic 
principle of engaging my own pre-understandings. If a label is necessary, 
critical interpretation seems to fit the bill.
Whilst not wishing to complicate this 'mix' still further and risk 
compromising my research by drawing on alternative disciplines and 
underestimating or undermining the distinctive features of each, there is no 
escaping the recognition that my research material and venue are located 
within a legislative framework, subject to legal rules and legal interpretation. It 
seems appropriate, therefore, to consider ideas from legal theory in the critical 
and interpretative dimensions and to import such thinking to inform my 
interpretative lens.
The development of legal theory has progressed along a route not unlike 
the journey undertaken by the social sciences and is characterised by various 
points of departure from the dominant positivist base. By way of example, 
Dworkin (1986: vii) opens his anti-positivist account with the challenging 
statement "that legal reasoning is an exercise in constructive interpretation". In 
a more populist sense, Dominic Carman (2002: 65) describes his father -  George 
Carman QC -  as abiding by the motto that "The life of the law is not logic but 
experience." The issues raised by alternative interpretations in a legal context 
and why it is that some interpretations are deemed to be more authoritative 
than others are central to the debate amongst critical legal thinkers (Mansell et 
al, 2004). The refusal to accept the legal positivists view of law 'as it is' and 
somehow hermetically sealed, protected from other influences -  moral or social
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enquiry, for example -  marks the point where most commentators launch their 
alternative jurisprudence (Wacks, 2005).
Albeit briefly at this stage, I have attempted to show how a critical 
perspective, reflexivity, hermeneutic understanding and legal interpretation can 
form a rich and exiting cocktail: my version of critical interpretation. The 
"philosophical mix' is represented at Figure 1.2. I will develop these thoughts in 
more detail in chapter 4.
A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE REFLEXIVITY
HERMENEUTIC
UNDERSTANDING
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
Figure 1.2 The Philosophical Mix 
Critical interpretation through discourse analysis
At this stage of my opening piece, I seek to harness the fusion of the 
professional, intellectual and epistemological dimensions discussed briefly 
above to inform a methodological approach consistent with this philosophical 
and professional underpinning. In other words, to outline the practical element 
of the research proposition and to provide a brief introduction to the 
methodological considerations that are the focus of Chapter 5. Developing
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these conceptual and methodological considerations into a practical 
interpretative analytical framework is a substantive part of my research project 
and the focus of Chapter 7.
In turning to discourse analysis as a methodology, I am recognising that 
interpretation and analysis of text have long been associated with legal 
scholarship and, more recently, discourse analysis has emerged as one of the 
'new ' critical approaches that are becoming increasingly evident in 
management and social research. Interest in discourse does, of course, go well 
beyond the epoch referred to here as 'new ', but there is some support for the 
view that discourse analysis is a topical theme in management studies and one 
that offers the potential for an exciting contribution to qualitative research -  see 
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000).
As part of my dipping a toe in the unpredictable and diverse waters of 
discourse analysis -  albeit naively -  I have been around a few buoys, completed 
a number of circles and reached a few dead-ends in my endeavours to make 
sense of the 'sub-disciplines' of discourse analysis. In so doing, I have formed a 
view that many of the choices are mine, I may need to defend my choices at a 
later stage, but they need to work for me in the context of this research project. 
To help me, I will draw on the established perspectives of Ronald Dworkin and 
Norman Fairclough in their respective spheres of legal theory and critical 
discourse analysis. Dworkin is regarded as one of positivism's most important 
critics, rejecting the notion of a general theory about the existence and content 
of law in favour of a theory based on constructive interpretation. In his 
distinctive style of critical discourse analysis, Fairclough has focussed on the 
significance of language as an important part of our social lives and how 
language is connected to other areas of our social environment. Beyond this, I 
attempt to put a personal spin on the process of analysis and develop a 
distinctive approach. My venture into discourse analysis for the purposes of 
this research will attempt to release some of the potential to which Alvesson 
and Skoldberg refer.
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As a further prelude to the discussion in Chapter 5 ,1 invite the reader to 
note that I am proposing a four phase methodological approach to discourse 
analysis designed to uncover alternative interpretations. First, to relate the 
social issue in question -  in my case, sex and race discrimination at work -  to 
the social event of the employment tribunal and locate it within the wider 
context of employment practice. Second, to select and identify the examples of 
text which form the "raw material' for analysis. Third, to undertake the 
reflexive interpretation process of analysing the chosen discourse. Fourth, to 
consider the implications of the first three phases in terms of emergent ideas 
that may add value to legal and personnel practice.
The 'philosophical mix' and my approach to methodological process are 
brought together and illustrated at Figure 1.3
A CRITICAL PERSPECTIVE REFLEXIVITY
REFLEXIVE
INTERPRETATIONIMPLICATIONS
HERMENEUTIC
UNDERSTANDING
LEGAL
INTERPRETATION
Figure 1.3 Philosophical Mix Meets Methodological Process
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An interpretative analytical framework
In closing this introduction, I complete the signposting exercise by 
reference to Chapter 7 where theory and method meet and are 'brought to life' 
in a 'research engine' designed to facilitate and frame my analysis. This 
involves looking more closely at the reflexive interpretation phase of the 
approach to reveal how the model can work in practice. To me this necessitates 
a multi-directional circularity of thinking based on identifying 'suspicious' 
words, phrases or propositions, reflecting on this suspicion and debating this 
thinking with the text and the wider theoretical library. This synthesis of 
conceptual backdrop and analysis through reflexive interpretation is 
represented at Figure 1.4. I seek to apply these elements in a consistent and 
unified way in order to produce the outcomes I seek and to demonstrate 
discourse analysis with a critical edge.
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CONTEXT TEXT
REFLEXIVE INTERPRETATION
identify the 
suspicious
debate with 
theory
reflect on 
/  the suspicion
debate with text
REFLEXIVE
INTERPRETATIONIMPLICATIONS
HERMENEUTIC
UNDERSTANDING
LEGAL INTERPRETATION
Figure 1.4 Discourse Analysis with a Critical Edge
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From the analysis represented at Figure 1.4, my ambition is to identify a 
number of emergent themes which, when subjected to deeper analysis, release 
ideas of value to the personnel and legal professions. These discoveries provide 
the subject matter for chapters 8 -10.
Research journey in short
As I embark on my research journey, my aim is to illustrate and expose 
alternative interpretations of employment tribunal texts drawn from one aspect 
of discrimination law, namely the burden of proof in sex and race 
discrimination cases. Beyond that, to examine the influence of these alternative 
interpretations on individual employment relationships and personnel 
professional practice through a reflexive critical analysis. In so doing, I seek to 
make a contribution to knowledge in three ways. First, I am looking to adopt a 
critical perspective and draw on aspects of reflexive approaches, hermeneutic 
understanding and legal theory to create a pluralistic epistemological 
environment. Second, to develop and employ a distinctive interpretative 
analytical framework driven by discourse analysis and designed to operate 
within this environment. I have termed this discourse analysis with a critical 
edge. Third, I seek to translate my emergent themes into a set of ideas that add 
value in my professional practice.
In my attempt to achieve these ambitions, I intend to follow a process of 
exploring my epistemological perspective and my methodological approach 
through to a reflexive cycle designed to engage with my pre-understandings, 
expose any inconsistencies, draw out alternative interpretations and generate a 
set of tentative ideas.
My focus at the outset will be to locate my professional background as a 
Personnel Director and my research interest in discrimination law in the fabric 
of organisation and employment relations literature. As well a providing the 
employment landscape base-camp for my research venture, it is designed to
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identify research considerations for debate later in the thesis. I will then 
endeavour to develop a convincing and consistent conceptual foundation based 
on the synthesis of a critical perspective, reflexivity and hermeneutic 
interpretation. More distinctively, and, perhaps, more controversially, I seek to 
sharpen my research focus and influence my interpretative analytical 
framework by reference to legal theory. In bringing together ideas from all four 
dimensions under the heading of critical interpretation, I seek to establish an 
analytical process that leaves little room for the "taken for granted" and much 
scope for critical questions.
At the research methods level, I will explore a methodology based on the 
analysis of text and seek to provide a route to the critical examination of 
employment tribunal judgements -  as one manifestation of the employment 
discourse. Accordingly, I will illustrate the development of an interpretative 
analytical framework influenced by perspectives on legal theory and by 
approaches to the analysis of texts within their social contexts. In essence, my 
approach will be to pursue a form of interpretative analysis that I have chosen 
to term discourse analysis with a critical edge.
In exercising my analytical framework, I seek to engage in a healthy 
debate with the text and produce a robust and thoughtful critical analysis. In a 
practical sense, this will involve a themed analysis of the data designed to 
uncover alternative interpretations which can be debated with my research 
considerations drawn from prior reading. All of this should allow me to extract 
the raw material for a set of ideas that add value. The approach is depicted at 
Figure 1.5. Unlike many research strategies, where the endeavour is the 
elimination of variance, I seek to feed off variability and difference to encourage 
interpretation and promote understanding (Potter and Wetherell, 1987).
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Research __
considerations
Emergent Alternative Interpretations
Set of ideas that add value
Figure 1.5 Themed analysis of employment tribunal judgements
In sum, I seek to examine the presumption of employment tribunals as 
the Tegal theatre' for resolution of employment matters in a 'neutral manner' 
according to legal rules and to discover and analyse the contradictions and 
inconsistencies revealed by my interpretation. Along the way, I turn to my 
analysis of the written judgements to contribute to the understanding of the 
core assumptions that lie behind such judgements and how they might 
influence personnel practice and individual employment relationships. I look 
to do so with a pluralistic approach that represents a significant challenge in 
itself, particularly around my own reflexive capabilities. Undaunted and aware 
that some consistent themes may emerge that seek to deny my quest to unsettle 
the established discourse, I set off in search of contradictions and alternative 
images.
Themed Analysis
Research
considerationsChosen Cases
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CHAPTER TWO
A PERSPECTIVE ON THE EMPLOYMENT LANDSCAPE
Before progressing to the more conceptual and analytical phases of this 
research, it is important to consider employment relations in the wider 
organisational context and to understand how employment law has taken hold 
in organisational life. This chapter seeks to provide that understanding. I will 
begin with a brief consideration of the importance of organisation theory in my 
debate around organisation issues and move through to a discussion about 
employment relations at this macro -  or organisational level -  and then - as an 
exemplar -  examine an issue at the micro level through reference to the 
connections between employment relations and the psychological contract. In 
covering this ground, with reference to the relevant literature, I will attempt to 
expose the influence of the management agenda, represented by the guru, and 
an apparent reluctance of practitioners to consider the role of organisation 
theory in the employment relations equation. Beyond that, I seek to illustrate 
how employment relations and the elements of the organisation associated with 
personnel professional practice are involved in attempting to balance 
organisational and individual aspirations within an increasingly complex 
legislative and policy framework. The latter is designed, in the main, to protect 
the interests of the worker and to contribute to maintaining the aspirational 
balance referred to here.
The employment tribunal process can be viewed as the release valve for 
the most heated employment relations exchanges. They lie outside the 
organisation and offer the opportunity to decide workplace disputes in a 
'neutral' and legally based arena. They are not necessarily concerned with 
resolution of the human relationship issues they are presented with. Attempts 
to integrate these tribunal decisions back into the organisation are rarely 
straightforward and these difficulties are the subject of further discussion later
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in this thesis. For now, Figure 2.1 is designed to illustrate the scope and inter­
connectivity of the various components I have mentioned here and endeavour 
to show personnel practice and employment relations as parts of the 
organisation whole.
organisation 
at work theoryinterpretation
Psychological  ^
 ^ contract
personnel
practice
employment
tribunal
statute employment
relations
Figure 2.1 The personnel practice and employment relations components
What the diagram above also illustrates are the potential links between 
theory and practice, policy and implementation and statute and interpretation.
It promotes questions about the extent to which organisational theory is 
relevant to the practitioner and the role of the researcher in trying to make 
sense of these multiple dimensions. Fundamentally, it draws attention to the 
complex nature of knowledge production as a practical activity within Teal 
world7 surroundings. In other words, it encourages reflexitivy. (Tsoukas and 
Knudsen, 2003)
I have used the term 'reflexivity' on a number of occasions already in this 
narrative and built the concept into my interpretative framework introduced in
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Chapter 1 and developed more fully in Chapter 8. I pause to offer an 
explanation of what I mean by reflexivity in the context of this research project.
I start from the premise of attempting to think about my thinking (Johnson and 
Duberley, 2000) and the mutual and continual relationship between myself as 
the researcher and my research material (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000). At the 
practical level, this entails considering how my pre-conceptions, interpretations 
and reflections interact with my empirical research material in the pursuit of 
knowledge development. I seek to demonstrate these reflexive characteristics 
by conscious recognition and linguistic transparency of my epistemological 
commitments as the research project progresses.
In traversing and debating the components identified in Figure 2.1,1 am 
looking to try to understand the interrelationships highlighted and to draw out 
a number of research considerations for examination later in this narrative. I 
approach this task in a reflexive manner aware that any references in this 
chapter are likely to surface in discussion later in this thesis.
Organisation theory and the organisational context
At the start of this chapter, I hinted at the challenge of persuading 
practitioners in the management field of the relevance of organisation theory. 
Even at the policy making level there appears to be a greater appetite for a 
consultant's 'ready made model' rather than influential theory based on context 
based research. Tsoukas and Knudsen (2003) suggest that a lack of clarity 
around what organisation theory actually represents may be partly responsible. 
Perhaps, but I also suggest that the continuing drive for efficiency and 
performance improvement in organisational activity has led to a preference for 
more purposive approaches and the greater recognition of instrumentalism 
within corporate strategy. Busy managers tend to adopt a reductionist 
approach, looking to reduce a mass of information to smaller units which 
enable them to make decisions. I have lost count of how many times I have 
heard the beleaguered manager cry "that is fine in theory, but I need results".
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At such times, the manager is more likely to turn to a project plan and a set of 
performance indicators rather than consider the sociological discourse or the 
managerial discourse. What Shenhav (2000) describes as the backbone of 
organisation theory. Resorting to such instant solutions is even more likely if 
they can be 'justified' by a recent guru comment or model. Huczynski (1996) 
attempts to explain the popularity of guru generated management ideas and 
highlighted predictability, control and esteem as key managerial requirements. 
He argued that management ideas are likely to continue to flourish and to be in 
demand if they hit these three buttons.
The theoretical dimension is left virtually untouched in popular 
management literature, ignoring the political nature of organisations and the 
consideration of on what terms management is actually conducted in the 
organisation (Huczynski (1996)). Chiapello and Fairclough (2002:207) capture 
this point rather elegantly:
"....such texts (those of influentive management gurus) have a real 
influence on the maintenance of dominant ideologies and on the 
actions of the managers who read them. Yet the lack of a scientific 
apparatus and a relatively unsophisticated style lead social scientists to 
treat them with disinterest or contempt, as is more generally the case 
with popular literature and television. Consequently, such texts are 
rarely subjected to critique, leaving the field free for them to do their 
doctrinal work. It seems to us, by contrast, that studying such texts is 
one of the tasks of social science as we conceive it -  to subject to debate 
what presents itself as given and obvious, and to expose to critique all 
the social agencies which impose themselves on people, in order to 
enhance democratic debate."
When confronted by a more reflective researcher, this context-free, quick-fix 
becomes less certain and the guru proposition is frequently undermined. It also 
exposes the lack of reflective activity amongst such writers. It seems reasonable 
to question the oppressive effect of such guru grand narratives and to seek to 
uncover the consequences of leaping aboard the latest trend.
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Having inflicted a few metaphorical blows on the 'superficial guru' for 
paying scant regard to organisation theory, I sense that I owe the reader -  and 
the balance of my thesis -  an understanding of what organisation theory is and 
why it is considered important. According to Starbuck (2003:143), 
"organisation theory is a collection of general propositions about organisations" 
and concludes his contribution with the thought that organisation theory is now 
so complex that it leaves students struggling to make sense of it. This might 
explain, partially at least, why theory is placed on one side. The description 
provided by McAuley et al (2007) is rather more elegant and refreshingly void 
of academic mystery:
"It (organisation theory) is a body of thinking and writing that describes, 
explains and influences what goes on in organizations. It provides an 
underpinning body of knowledge that enables us to explore and develop 
management and leadership theory." (McAuley et al, 2007: xiii)
Starbuck (2003) also contends that organisation theory is a relatively 
young phenomenon, with attention focussed on the second half of the 20th 
Century. Shenhav (2000) also places the birth of organisation theory in this 
epoch and suggests that organisation theory is a 1950s American creation.
These commentators address the questions of what organisation theory is, 
organisation theory's lifespan and, to some extent, the space occupied by 
organisation theory in the thinking of management researchers. So far, 
however, I fall short in providing an answer to the significant question posed at 
the beginning of this paragraph: why is organisation theory important?
In search of an answer, I turn to McAuley et al (2007) for help. The 
authors address the question as follows:
"Firstly, organization theory helps us to reflect upon and understand 
who we are and why we are who we are. Secondly, organization theory 
is about us and how we interact with others during our encounters in a 
vast array of different, often deceptively ordinary and mundane, social 
contexts that we take for granted because we cannot see or imagine any 
alternative to how things appear to be." (McAuley et al, 2007: 5).
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Again, the clarity of the message is important and one wonders if it had 
been presented consistently in these terms whether some of the complexity 
referred to earlier would be quite so daunting. To be fair to others, another 
recent contribution to the understanding of organisation theory -  Hatch and 
Cunliffe (2006: 4) -  provides a further neat and unambiguous commentary:
" .............whenever you create your own meaning or grasp someone
else's, you make things, feelings, ideas, experiences values and 
expectations into ideas or concepts. In doing this, you explain yourself 
and your world and this constitutes theorising."
At the level of my own professional practice and in the niche 
environment of human resources theory, the work of David Ulrich has 
established a widespread following, contemporary currency and dominant 
influence in many organisations (Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development, 2006). The 'Ulrich Model' is based on the central premise that 
the HR function can be represented with clarity by reference to a small number 
of roles and a consequent structural design. The emphasis on structure has not 
gone unnoticed: "But the main route to achieve the goal of a strategic, value- 
adding and business-aligned function has, we believe, been through structural 
change." (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 2006:2). Ulrich's 
work around a model for the HR function emerged in 1997 and has been 
through 2 iterations in 2001 and 2005 (Ulrich, 1997, Ulrich and Beatty, 2001 and 
Ulrich and Brockbank, 2005). This thinking is best illustrated in the chart below 
reproduced from Ulrich (2005):
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Employee champion Employee advocate (EA) 
Human capital (HC) developer
Employees are increasingly critical 
to the success of organisation. EA 
focuses on today's employee; HC 
developer focuses on how  
employees prepare for the future.
Administration expert Functional expert HR practices are central to HR 
value. Some HR practices are 
delivered through administrative 
efficiency (for example technology), 
and others through policies, menus, 
and interventions, expanding the 
'functional expert' role.
Change agent Strategic partner Being a strategic partner has 
multiple roles: business expert, 
change agent, knowledge manager, 
and consultant. Being a change 
agent represents only part of the 
strategic partner role.
Strategic partner Strategic partner See above
Leader The sum of the above four roles 
equals leadership, but being an HR 
leader also has implications for 
leading the HR function, 
integrating work of other functions, 
ensuring corporate governance, 
and monitoring the HR 
community.
Figure 2.2 Evolution of HR Roles (Source: Ulrich and Brockbank, 2005).
In addition to the power laden emphasis on structural definition as a key 
change component within the model presented by Ulrich and his co-writers, 
there seems to me to be two further significant implications. First, the model 
suggests a profession increasingly process driven, bound by hierarchy and 
regulation and drifting further away from reflexive practice and autonomy of 
action. Second, a compartmentalisation and constraining of career options, 
particularly within the functional expert category. Neither of these two outcomes 
appeal to this writer and, whilst recognising the potential impact at the 
organisation level of the strategic partner and HR leader roles, seem to undermine 
the opportunity for understanding of the complex relationships depicted earlier 
in Figure 2.1.
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McAuley (2000) adds support to the idea that the business partner model 
can lead to a form of elitism within the HR function noting th a t"... being at the 
centre for HR professionals has been seen as the place to be". In their 1993 
model of HR roles -  entitled 'Four Pillars of HRM' -  Shipton and McAuley 
acknowledge Ulrich's work, but endeavour to go a stage further by linking the 
roles to the proactive and reactive power of HR and how HRM is integrated 
into the organisation. The Shipton and McAuley (1993) model is reproduced at 
Figure 2.3 below:
FOUR PILLARS OF HRM
PROACTIVE
CAPABILITY
& EXPERTISE ▲
POWER
REACTIVE 
EFFICIENCY
& EXPERTISE M INTEGRATION INTO ORGANISATION *
LOW -  AT THE MARGIN HIGH -  IN THE CENTRE
QUADRANT FOUR QUADRANT THREE
ORGANISATION BUSINESS
DEVELOPMENT MANAGER/PARTNER
APPROACH APPROACH
QUADRANT ONE QUADRANT TWO
WELFARE & STAFF ADMINISTRATIVEDEVELOPMENT APPROACHAPPROACH
Figure 2.3 The Four Pillars of HRM (Source: Shipton and McAuley, 1993)
The authors also point out the dangers of HR becoming too closely 
aligned with other senior management roles and denying their particular 
professional input. Darwin et al (2002) pick up this theme suggesting that such 
management intimacy might have added to the difficulties of organisational 
downsizing and delayering in the 1980s and 1990s. The idea of the 
schizophrenic HR professional operating in the dual roles of detached, 
independent critical friend whilst at the same time being aligned with and
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contributing to business goals is an interesting one. I will return to the point in 
the concluding chapter of this thesis.
Perhaps the comments above and the examples from human resources 
theory are a sign of a recognition of the need to counter the charges of 
complexity around organisational theory and to encourage an improved 
relationship with the practice of management. It is also pertinent -  in the 
context of a discourse analysis based study like this one -  to point out how 
language and power are increasingly recognised as central to the process and 
product of, formulating organisation theory (Chia and King, 2001). Any 
theories which flow from my analysis of employment tribunal texts -  however 
tentative -  will only be relevant if they help make sense of what is going on and 
helps us to understand how language and power play a part in this sense 
making.
Employment relations at the organisational level
As recently as three years ago, the Chartered Institute of Personnel and 
Development devoted a research paper to the question 'W hat is Employee 
Relations?' (Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development, 2004). To a 
large extent, their answer was based on charting the decline of trade union 
focussed industrial relations and suggesting that the emphasis has shifted, and 
has continued to shift towards individual relationships. It was suggested that, 
for personnel professionals, the management of the employment relationship 
remains a key activity and a critical component of business performance. It was 
further contended that regulation of the workplace continues to extend its 
influence. Nothing new here, but it is worth considering how feasible the 
management of the employment relationship actually is, particularly if the 
emphasis is on individual commitment.
To suggest that we can manage engagement at the personal level seems to 
me to represent a rather unsatisfactory attempt to justify the role of the
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personnel professional and to grossly over simplify the complexity of our 
individual 'deals' with the organisation in which we work. Our aspiration 
needs to be much more limited. I would argue that to influence the construction 
of the workplace relationship within a much broader context of our relationship 
with organisations and with society is a more appropriate ambition.
It is also worth considering why some organisations develop more 
acceptable employment policy than others, perhaps by attempting to comply 
with the spirit of the legislation rather than the letter. To some extent, this can 
be explained by an organisation's approach to risk and the degree of public 
accountability it is subject to. However, the fact that 'employers of choice' can 
be found in every sector suggests that the balance between individual and 
organisation is a key factor and that organisations need to work with the 
legislation rather than against it.
Finally in this brief examination of employment relations at the 
organisational level, we should note that the changes to employment law 
featured in the next chapter and the timespan of my research project are located 
within the New Labour era. Kilpatrick (2003) considered the regulatory aspects 
of unfair dismissal before and under New Labour and posed the question 'Has 
New Labour Reconfigured Employment Legislation?' She argues that whilst 
the academic lawyer fraternity have continued to seek legislative change in 
response to social and demographic developments, relatively minor changes to 
individual employment rights are not consistent with a wider transformation 
agenda. As a result, legislative changes introduced under the banner of fairness 
at work, for example, have failed to bring about the flexibility in employment 
for which they were designed (Kilpatrick, 2003). As we have seen already, the 
lack of consistency between aspirational design, workplace application and 
intended consequences is a feature of the employment relations environment.
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Employment relations and the psychological contract
One distinct aspect of the employment relationship that has attracted the 
attention of this writer is the nature of the psychological contract in 
organisations. The work of Argyris (1960) and Schein (1965) established a 
platform for further debate and research around a behavioural perspective on 
the employment relationship based on unwritten reciprocal expectations. 
Herzberg (1968) picked up the theme and observed that in most organisations 
the requisite structure was in place to provide employees with the 'hygiene' 
system they needed; an appropriate salary, satisfactory working conditions etc, 
but the 'motivator' needs of employees, with a focus on the psychological 
growth of individuals, were not readily available. More importantly perhaps, 
Herzberg promoted the thought that employees believed the managerial 
discourse and that it was the hygiene factors that explained why people worked 
in an organisation.
More recently, Rousseau (1995) has picked up the baton and argued that 
all contracts are fundamentally psychological. She defines psychological 
contracts as "beliefs, based upon promises expressed or implied, regarding an 
exchange agreement between an individual, and, in organisations, the 
employing firm and its agents." (Rousseau, 2004:120).
The importance of the psychological contract literature to my own work 
lies primarily in its place amongst ways of understanding changes to the 
employment relationship during the latter part of the last century. This link to 
change is picked up by Goffee and Jones (2006: 6): " . . .the psychological 
contract for many (but never for all) involved movement up a relatively stable 
career ladder, often with one organisation". Although in common with many 
other social research concepts, the psychological contract cannot be 
characterised by a single definition, it is widely accepted that Rousseau's work 
published in 1989 forms the starting point for most research in this area 
(Conway and Briner, 2006). By the time a further iteration of her work emerged
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in 2001, Rousseau and Shalk (2001) make one of the very few references I have 
been able to discover to the legal influence in psychological contracts.
The Chartered Institute of Personnel and Development report (Guest and 
Conway, 2001) concentrates on organisational change and the psychological 
contract making the rather grand claim that the results are based on its annual 
survey of the 'state of the employment relationship'. The report draws on an 
'established conceptual framework' and is reproduced at Figure 2.4 below:
Organisational
characteristics
Type o f  organisation
Human resource 
practices
Union
membership
Individual characteristics 
and circum stances
Employment
change
Job change
Organisational
change
W ork-related
change
C hange in 
personnel policy
A T T H T JD IN A 1.
C O N SEQ U EN C ES
Organisational com m itm ent 
I Life satisfaction  
Work satisfaction  
Em ploym ent relations 
W ork-life balance 
Job security
BEH A V IO UR A L
C O N SEQ U EN C ES
( M otivation
Effort
Organisational citizenship  
Intention to stay/quit 
Innovative behaviour 
Performance
Figure 2.4 Conceptual framework (Source: Guest and Conway, 2001).
Somewhat surprisingly the framework does not contain the words law 
or legal and appears not to recognise that the psychological commitments made 
by individuals and organisations are increasingly informed by what the law 
says I can expect from my employer and vice versa.
Referring to a systems model of industrial relations, Guest (2004: 542) 
comments that "this traditional system of industrial relations has begun to 
break dow n... where there has been only a weak legal framework to support 
it". The link drawn between trade union activity and the influence of legal
frameworks is clearly appropriate, but, for me, it underplays the worker's 
awareness of employment law and willingness to pursue a legal route if other 
avenues do not meet their expectations.
Pratt and Doucet (2000) suggest that a number of features of 
organisational life -  financial insecurity, competitive marketplaces and 
inconsistent empowerment for example -  have affected what they term the 
"bonds between individuals and between individuals and their organisations" 
(Pratt and Doucet, 2000: 204). This in turn has led to a sense of ambivalence in 
the context of work relationships. Unlike many previous writers on the subject 
of psychological contracts, we see here mention of individuals' relationships 
with each other as well as with their parent organisation and the proposition 
that there are alternatives to the polarity of positive and negative organisational 
relationships. These two arguments provide added dimensions to the 
psychological contract debate and resonate with me when reflecting about the 
contracts or bonds we construct in our working lives.
In a rather ambitious aspiration, Conway and Briner (2005: 179 -  180) 
attempt to provide what they term "a comprehensive review of psychological 
contract research and theory" and "to critically evaluate psychological contract 
research and theory and suggest ways in which the field can be further 
developed". In so doing, they acknowledge that psychological contract 
researchers have limited themselves to two issues -  breach and contents -  and 
that the research field is potentially much wider. Further, Conway and Briner 
(2005: 109) remark that "the near exclusive use of the survey method has no 
doubt hampered conceptual, theoretical and empirical advance in this area". I 
share their view of the restricted nature and limitations of psychological 
contract research to date, but once again I note that the legislative framework 
does not feature in their review of the territory or in suggested future 
directions. This apparent failure to recognise that employment legislation has 
gained entry to the psychology of workplace exchanges between employers and
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workers concerns me. Whilst the focus of this work is not on the psychological 
contract directly and in isolation, I will enter this research with a sense that 
legal protections are part of individual psychological contracts.
What we have seen so far in this section provides important insights on 
the psychological elements of employment contracts, but very little has been 
said about the relationship between the legal and the psychological. Rousseau 
and Schalk (2001:19) argue that, "Law plays a key part in legitimating the terms 
of psychological contracts." Their argument is based on the premise that 
societal factors shape psychological contracts in a number of ways and 
understanding these helps us to understand how public policy and legal 
instruments support or undermine psychological contracts in employment.
There is widespread support for the contention that "the traditional 
psychological contract between employers and employee has broken down 
through endless downsizing and reengineering" (Kets de Vries, 2005: 62). The 
'new psychological contract' is also widely recognised and characterised by an 
adult to adult relationship between the organisation and the individual, in 
contrast to the parent /  child relationship described by the likes of Argyris and 
Schein (Wellin, 2007). In the new relationship, increased responsibility rests 
with the individual and the contribution from the employer is less about job 
security and more about portable human capital enhanced by knowledge and 
learning.
Far less has been said about the potential for employment legislation and 
employment policy to fracture or reinforce the new psychological contract. 
Echoing Rousseau and Schalk, Stone (2002) does break the relative silence by 
suggesting that the new psychological contract now describes the employment 
relationship and goes on to discuss the potential impact on contract law. Again 
emphasing the theme of employment law as a force for legitimising the 
psychological contract rather than influencing the psychological considerations 
of individuals.
I venture to suggest that there may be a connection between a 
recognition of the employment law element of the psychological contract I have 
argued for above and this breakdown of more traditional employment 
relationships. It is also worth reflecting on the extent to which we have 
witnessed a breakdown of such relationships or a renegotiation of 
psychological contracts influenced by increased individual rights. Wellin (2007) 
supports the idea of 'personal deals' that can be managed in the interests of 
increased business performance, but, for me at least, underplays the legal 
framework in which these personal deals operate.
Employment relations and personnel professional practice
This section is increasingly concerned with the bridge between theory 
and management practice to which I referred earlier. To help this connection, I 
draw on comment from some of the major players in this arena, including the 
Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS), the Chartered Institute 
of Personnel and Development (CIPD), the Confederation of British Industry 
(CBI), the Trades Union Congress (TUC) and the Department of Trade and 
Industry (DTI).
The publication in July 2001 of the Government's consultation paper 
'Routes to Resolution: Improving Dispute Resolution in Britain' provides a 
recent illustration of the significance of the employment legislation in 
organisational dynamics and, to some extent, reflects a concern that employees 
are increasingly resorting to litigation to address employment disputes. The 
DTI estimated that the number of justiciable disputes was in the range of 500000 
to 900000 per annum and that 15 to 25% of these actually registered in the 
employment tribunal arena -  see Johnson (2001). For their part, the 
Employment Tribunal Service recorded some 115000 tribunal applications in 
2003/2004, a 17% increase over the previous year (Income Data Services Brief 
(2004). Although this follows a fall in the number of applications over the
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previous two years from a peak of 130000 in 2001, the number of sex 
discrimination applications had risen from 8000 to 17000 and the trend of citing 
more than one jurisdiction continues. The latest statistical data available from 
the Employment Tribunal Service shows that the number of claims accepted 
under all jurisdictions was again 115000 for the financial year 2005/2006 and 
that the number of sex discrimination cases accepted stood at over 14000 
(Employment Tribunals Service, 2006). The indications are that cases are 
becoming more complex and hearings lasting longer. Before moving on, I need 
to say a little more about the employment tribunal system itself.
Employment tribunals, although introduced in 1964 -  as industrial 
tribunals -  did not really emerge as an established part of the industrial 
relations environment until the 1980s as a result of the extension of individual 
rights contained in the legislation outlined briefly in the introductory 
paragraphs of this narrative. Their composition -  a legally qualified chair and 
two lay members -provides what has been referred to as an 'industrial jury' 
with considerable workplace knowledge and experience (Waite: 2002). Their 
task is to employ this knowledge and experience to meet the overriding 
objective of dealing with cases justly.
The Employment Tribunal now covers 80 'jurisdictions', including such 
matters as unfair dismissal, breach of contract, discrimination in its various 
forms, parental leave and working time. The work of the employment tribunals 
is 'overseen' by a number of appellate authorities and it is here where stated 
case law is produced for the guidance of the wider employment community. In 
support, the DTI directs the Employment Tribunals Service to perform the 
following role: "Our role is to carry out the administrative tasks necessary to 
enable applications to Employment Tribunals and appeals to the Employment 
Appeal Tribunal to be determined" (Employment Tribunals Service, 2006).
With an influence far beyond its original remit, the employment tribunal 
system has attracted criticism from a number of directions. Suff (2006), as
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author of an ACAS policy discussion paper, identified some of the concerns 
about the employment tribunal system, primarily from an ACAS perspective, as 
complexity, cost, increasingly adversional tribunals and a system slow to 
deliver outcomes. As a result, employers complained of a growing 
compensation culture and employee representatives claimed that individual 
access to fair resolution was being eroded. She responds to the unwritten 
question -  'is the employment tribunal system fit for purpose?' -  with two 
important points. First, "Britain's employment tribunal system still offers a far 
preferable alternative to the much more legalistic route for settling individual 
rights cases that exists in many other European countries such as Germany and 
France"; and second, "The logic of avoiding legal dependency is as strong, if 
not stronger, today as it was when employment tribunals were first set up." 
(Suff, 2006: 2).
Her interest is one I share. That is how to ensure that the employment 
tribunal system delivers what it was designed to deliver: "an accessible, speedy, 
informal and inexpensive dispute resolution mechanism". (Suff (2006: 2)). I am 
not convinced that this aim is being achieved -  evidenced by some of the legal 
arguments that we will encounter later in this narrative -  and it is clear that Suff 
agrees. In her conclusion, she says "The tribunal system is characterised by a 
tendency towards legal dependency." (Suff, 2006:17).
In September 2005, the General Secretary of the TUC responded angrily 
to a suggestion from the CBI that the employment tribunal system was clogged 
with vexatious claims and the proposal to introduce charges for individual's 
bringing claims. Brendon Barber responded by saying that "Employment 
tribunals are an important last resort in resolving workplace disputes and 
access to them should not be limited to those who can afford to pay." (Barber, 
2005).
Unsurprisingly, the increased application of a legal framework to 
workplace issues has made an impression on the view of the employment
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relationship held by professional bodies. In 1997, the then Institute of Personnel 
and Development advised organisations to review their approach to the 
employment relationship to build a constructive relationship with employees in 
order to prevent a return to the adversarial industrial relations of the 1970s. 
Significantly, the Institute of Personnel and Development drew attention to the 
'new ' employment relationship and the role of employment legislation in this 
process. Somewhat ironically in the light of the constant flow of employment 
legislation in recent years, the Institute of Personnel and Development took the 
view "that, as far as possible, the role of the law in the workplace should be 
minimised" (Institute of Personnel and Development, 1997:12).
Emerging alongside this encouragement to build constructive 
partnerships at work was a clear recognition that the employment relationship 
could no longer be seen as a 'master and servant' situation with all the cards 
held by the employer. The latter must now tread carefully through a complex 
mix of worker rights designed to shift the balance to a relationship of equals. 
Whilst the employment contract remains at the heart of the employment 
relationship, the emphasis on legal obligations has been strengthened by a 
myriad of new legislation and case law. In principle, both employers and 
employees continue to support the notions of early conflict resolution 
interventions when disputes at work occur in order to limit the damage to the 
employment relationship. In practice, however, the number of cases submitted 
to employment tribunals continues at a very high level.
In the wider context of employment relations in organisations and the 
link to the psychological contract, the advent of discrimination law has 
contributed to the changing dynamic of the workplace. One of these effects 
seems to me a defensive stance taken by many employers to counter possible 
tribunal claims. Turner (2002) provides an interesting perspective on this:
"I think employers have for many years been on the back foot. I think
they have been frightened of legislation and the use of legislation by
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employees and representatives of employees against them. I think they
have tended to lose track of common sense values".
This defensive reaction by employers has often resulted in tightly drawn 
policies that inhibit discretionary action and disturb the balance of the 
relationship between individual and organisation.
Looking forward, the European Commission is engaged in a consultation 
exercise examining ways to modernise Labour Law in the context of the 21st 
Century (European Commission, 2006) with a focus on individual law 
provisions rather than collective law. The document is motivated by a 
flexibility agenda aimed at securing the European Commission's competitive 
position into the future under the rather intriguing banner of 'flexicurity' 
(European Commission, 2006: 4). Helpfully, we are reminded that "The 
original purpose of Labour Law was to offset the inherent economic and social 
inequality within the employment relationship". (European Commission, 2006: 
5). We are encouraged to consider alternative approaches to the contractual 
relationship whilst at the same time paying attention to the potential social 
inequalities of short-term, low paid roles. From this author's perspective, the 
presence of a 'live' debate makes the 'real world of day to day employment 
relationships' and the continual engagement with employment law provisions 
an even more worthwhile research arena.
Closer to home, the DTI produced a policy statement in March 2006 
entitled 'Success at Work: Protecting Vulnerable Workers, Supporting Good 
Employers' which included a section on 'good workplaces'. The idea intended 
to promote a direct link between company performance and individual 
workplace satisfaction based around employee friendly policies and practices. 
The psychological commitment perhaps! Success at Work also identified an 
ambitious review programme covering seven key areas: dispute resolution, an 
employment standard, maternity leave and pay, employment particulars,
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statutory redundancy, time off for public duties and employment law guidance. 
(DTI, 2006)
More recently, in December 2006 the DTI also announced an 
independent review -  chaired by Michael Gibbons - of employment dispute 
resolution, particularly the 2004 Dispute Resolution Regulations. The latter 
introduced measures designed to simplify discipline and grievance procedures 
and stem the flow of cases to employment tribunals. The terms of reference 
also included the following statement:
"Proposals emerging from the review should be genuinely 
deregulatory, reduce the complexity of the current system 
and reduce costs to business and employees. They should 
preserve existing employee rights and ensure access to 
justice. Proposals should be cost -effective for Government 
to implement." (Gibbons: 2007)
The final report of the Gibbons Review was published in March 2007 and 
is now subject to Government consultation. Although not a specific focus of 
attention in this thesis, I note in passing that the report recommends the repeal 
of the statutory dispute resolution procedures only three years after their 
introduction on the grounds that they are too prescriptive and complex!
Research considerations
At this stage and in the light of the discussion above, I invite the reader 
to consider the idea that whilst discrimination legislation may have been 
designed to, and in some case led to, improvements in the working 
environment, it may not necessarily have taken working relationships in the 
direction originally envisaged. Moreover, it has had a powerful effect on the 
personnel and legal professions. Unintended consequences appear to have 
emerged and four of these will inform my analysis later in this work. They are 
that:
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• employment law has established a pivotal position in employment 
relations.
• employment law now forms a key element of the psychological 
contracts between workers and employers.
• personnel professional practice has moved closer to legal practice
• the employment tribunal system has yet to fully deliver on the 
expectation of easy access to workplace dispute resolution
In the narrower context of discrimination law and employment tribunals, 
I also ask the reader to note a fifth research consideration to bear in mind as the 
analysis develops:
• The contradictions inherent in the interplay between a reality 
constructed through language on the balance of probabilities -  
reliant on interpretation and inference -and its production within an 
objectively designed, legal framework, set of tribunal rules and 
procedures needs to be better understood.
Against the backdrop of this flurry of activity, on the legislative and 
policy fronts, and as will be clear already, my particular interest lies in 
discrimination law and that I am using employment tribunal judgements to 
represent this area of activity. By a close examination of a sample of such texts,
I will be seeking to illustrate how a number of key principles employed to 
interpret particular events leads to inconsistencies with the rule bound 
construction of an 'industrial court' and, as a result, carries implications for 
personnel practice.
Closing thoughts on chapter two
It is my contention that employment law has emerged as a prominent 
organisational discourse over the last three decades or so and has impacted on 
the contractual relationship that lies at the heart of the mutual expectations of 
individuals and organisations -  informal and formal, psychological and 
contractual. This emergence opens a number of avenues of interest that deserve 
the attention of critical management researchers. As Garfinkel (1967) illustrated 
in his work around how jurors reach decisions, making sense of the world and a 
particular set of circumstances -  even in what would generally be perceived to 
be a rule bound context such as a court or tribunal -  may not be quite as 
straightforward as it appears at first sight.
CHAPTER THREE
DISCRIMINATION LAW AND THE BURDEN OF PROOF
In the previous chapter, we have seen how employment relations 
intervenes at the organisational level and considered employment relations in 
the context of the psychological contract and personnel professional practice. 
Throughout, I have alluded to the employment law dimension of these 
connections and suggested that this may have been underplayed in 
management research. Before attempting to substantiate this claim, I recognise 
the need to invite the reader into what some might regard as the sterile and 
researcher free zone of employment legislation that forms the focus of my 
study.
Even a cursory examination of 'new ' law from the early 1970s to the 
present day would reveal the emergence of a brand of legislation grouped 
under the generic heading employment law -  alternatively referred to as labour 
law or industrial law. By way of indication, inquirers would discover early 
employment legislation enactment for the period such as the Equal Pay Act 
1970, the Industrial Relations Act 1971, the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 and the 
Race Relations Act 1976. All focus on the workplace and represent attempts to 
'legislate out' specific inequalities and potential unfairness in organisational 
life. We have seen in the previous chapter how these workplace legislative 
provisions have become an essential element of employment relations.
Wrapped around this collection of statutes is a range of institutions of 
employment law designed to 'bring the legislation to life' through practical 
application: most notably, the Advisory, Conciliation and Arbitration Service 
(ACAS) and the Employment Tribunal (formerly the Industrial Tribunal).
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Beyond the latter, the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT), the Court of Appeal 
(CA) and the House of Lords (HL) provide ascending appellant authorities for 
employment law issues. All judgements are publicly available and significant 
developments are reported widely across the media spectrum, but specifically 
in the Industrial Relations Law Reports (IRLR). Whilst the latter is the favoured 
reference point for those with a professional interest, the former is the strongest 
influence on public opinion forming and increasingly likely to be utilised by the 
public relations machinery of Government or organisations to promote a chosen 
message.
Within the extensive and growing body of employment law lies the 
specific category of discrimination law. In more recent years, the 
discrimination legislation of the 1970s has been refined and extended to cover 
areas such as age, disability, religion or belief and sexual orientation. Whilst in 
no way wishing to underestimate the significance of such developments, the 
focus for this thesis rests with sex and race discrimination. These are areas of 
discrimination law that are more mature than most and areas to which I have 
been more exposed in my professional practice. Moreover, they tend to 
produce the more complex combinations of legal argument, emotional 
involvement and public interest.
As I have already indicated, the employment law discourse is 
represented, in part, by the official texts that flow from each employment 
tribunal, EAT, CA and HL hearing, all of which become a matter of accessible 
public record. It is this source of written texts that I seek to harvest and to add a 
degree of practical research credibility to the assertion that "such public records 
constitute a potential goldmine for sociological investigation" (Silverman, 2001: 
135).
Although the principal employment law statutes have been around for 
over thirty years, they are breached consistently at considerable financial and 
emotional cost to individuals and organisations. Discrimination in particular -
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alleged or real -  continues to absorb organisation and legal capacity to a 
significant level. As Grint (1991: p217) points out "securing the backing of the 
law is not the equivalent of removing sex discrimination' and, in any case, 
many forms of discrimination are beyond the grasp of legal recrimination". Is 
he, in part at least, hinting that legislation has driven discrimination 
underground? In my own work and in discussion with legal colleagues (Goss, 
2007), we recognise that discrimination emerges at three levels. First, 
individuals are genuinely unaware that their actions constitute an unlawful act. 
Second, individuals are aware that they have committed an unlawful 
discriminatory act, but believe that they have done 'the right thing' in a 
business sense, e.g. not hiring women of child bearing age. Third, individuals 
seek to 'cover up' their actions in the knowledge that they have committed an 
unlawful discriminatory act. This sentiment is expressed succinctly in an 
extract from one of the cases I will return to later in this thesis:
"In order to find discrimination on the ground of race or sex, the tribunal 
must find that subjectively racial or sexual considerations were in the 
mind of the discriminator" (Bahl v The Law Society and other (2004) IRLR 
799 CA).
Within the broader spectrum of discrimination law, a topical and distinct 
aspect of legal determination -  the burden and standard of proof -  has attracted 
the attention of this author. In part, this reflects an increased intellectual and 
professional interest in these issues, but also a sense that the jurisprudence 
angles lie at the heart of the legal interpretation of discrimination matters. It 
has long been recognised that not all discrimination is conscious and that pre­
conceptions and prejudices may lead individuals to discriminate without being 
conscious of their motivations. This in turn has made discrimination acts very 
difficult to prove even at the lower standards applied in civil cases, on the 
balance of probabilities. The introduction of the Burden of Proof Directive was 
designed to help overcome this difficulty and, as we shall see, has sponsored 
considerable case law in attempts to clarify the situation.
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The purpose of this chapter is to provide an introduction to the key legal 
principles engaged in my analysis, to illustrate the fast moving burden of proof 
case law in recent years and to explain why this particular area of employment 
law provides fertile ground for my research project. It is important to explain 
these key concepts at this stage and to understand how they relate to the 
analytical phases of this thesis.
Legal Principles
By way of introduction to discrimination law and the review of burden 
of proof case law later in this chapter, it is important to understand what is 
meant by the concepts of burden of proof and standard of proof. These two 
concepts are important to understand at this stage because they are central 
issues in the cases I have selected for analysis. Indeed, the cases track the 
development of burden of proof interpretation over a 25 year period. At the 
end of this section, I also include a brief discussion of three terms that merit 
some clarification in advance of the analysis of my chosen employment tribunal 
texts: discrimination, unlawful discrimination and inference.
In essence, the burden of proof involves the responsibility for proving a 
disputed allegation and the standard of proof sets the level of proof required to 
satisfy a tribunal on a particular point. In civil cases -  including those 
conducted in employment tribunals -  the standard of proof is at the level of 
'balance of probabilities' which means that the version alleged is simply more 
probable than not. This is a lower standard of proof than the 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' demanded in criminal cases. Whilst the latter has remained a 
consistent feature of industrial/employment tribunals, the burden of proof 
issue has been an equally consistent source of debate.
Prior to the introduction of the Burden of Proof Regulations in 2001, the 
legal authorities with regard to the burden of proof in discrimination cases 
(King, 1991 and Zafar, 1998) confirmed that it was for the complainant to make
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out her case on the balance of probabilities. The burden of proof remained with 
the claimant throughout the proceedings. Although tribunals were reminded 
that the claimant may find this difficult to do, they were not bound to produce a 
finding of unlawful discrimination even if they found the employer's 
explanation unconvincing.
The Burden of Proof Regulations moved away from this position and 
introduced the concept of a shifting burden of proof into employment 
legislation. A concept deemed unnecessary in the King (1991) judgement where 
it was suggested that evidence of less favourable treatment and a difference of 
race may indicate racial discrimination. In such circumstances, tribunals were 
expected to seek an explanation from the employer, but the guidance stopped 
short of requiring the respondent to prove that no discrimination had occurred.
This shift in responsibility for establishing that any discrimination was 
not on an unlawful ground is made clear in Article 4(1) of the Burden of Proof 
Directive:
"  when persons who consider themselves wronged because the
principle of equal treatment has not been applied to them establish, 
before a court or other competent authority, facts from which it may be 
presumed that there has been direct or indirect discrimination, it shall be 
for the respondent to prove that there has been no breach of the principle 
of equal treatment."
As we shall discover as this thesis develops, it is now a requirement that once 
the complainant has made a prima facie case from which an inference of 
discrimination may be drawn, the respondent is required to prove that no 
unlawful discrimination took place. Successive cases on this issue and the 
resultant guidance have indicated that the burden on the respondent in such 
circumstances has been set at a high level and that there has been some debate 
about whether the bar has been set too high.
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In trying to provide an explanation of the significance of this move in 
the key legal principle of burden of proof as it relates to the employment 
context, it is also important to understand the terms discrimination, unlawful 
discrimination and inference. In everyday usage, discrimination indicates 
choice or preference and it is only when such different treatment is based on an 
unlawful ground -  gender, race for example -  that we have unlawful 
discrimination in the employment law sense. We should not underestimate this 
need for precision in language usage.
Any sort of reflection on my own experiences in the workplace brings to 
mind many occasions where colleagues have suggested that they have been 
discriminated against. More often than not, they equate discrimination with 
unlawful discrimination and quite often they are reflecting that they did not 
receive the response expected. To hear the claim' I have been discriminated 
against' is not, I suggest, an unusual occurrence.
Aside from understanding the distinction between discrimination and 
unlawful discrimination, it is also important to understand how the term 
'inference' is applied in the determination of discrimination cases. As I have 
already indicated, unlawful discrimination is frequently difficult to prove since 
discriminators are not always aware of their unconscious motivations. This 
extract from Sinclair Roche & Temperley v Heard (2004) IRLR 763 EAT 
confirms the prominence of inference:
"In order to find discrimination, an employment tribunal must set out 
the relevant facts, draw its inferences if appropriate and then conclude 
that there is a prima facie case of unfavourable treatment by reference to 
those facts,...."
To put this in terms familiar in criminal court proceedings, where there is no 
direct evidence of discrimination, inferences of such discrimination from 
circumstantial evidence may be made. Gifis (2003) defines inference as: "A 
deduction from the facts given, which is usually less than certain but which
may be sufficient to support a finding of fact; " A definition which sits
neatly with the employment tribunal extract above, but also emphasises the 
lack of certainty which pervades such decisions. It is also worth noting that 
criminal law involves a positive thought process -  mens rae -  discrimination law 
does not.
So much for the legal principles at the heart of this narrative, I now turn 
to a review of the burden of proof case law and the main points that emerge 
from consideration by the appellant courts.
Case Law
Until very recently, the key authority on the determination of burden of 
proof in sex and race discrimination cases rested with King v Great Britain 
China Centre (1991) IRLR 513, subsequently endorsed by the HL in Zafar v 
Glasgow City Council (1998) IRLR 36. In essence, these judgements confirmed 
that the legal burden of proof remained with the complainant throughout the 
proceedings and that the employment tribunal was not necessarily bound to 
make an inference of discrimination even if it did not accept the employer's 
explanation of events.
This emphasis was about to change with the introduction of the Sex 
Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations on 12 
October 2001 and now to be found in Section 63A of the Sex Discrimination Act. 
As we shall see, the precise impact of the regulations remains a matter of 
continuing legal debate, but as Korn (2004) suggests the most obvious reading 
is that where a complainant can establish an arguable case of discrimination on 
the facts, the legal burden of providing an adequate explanation shifts to the 
employer. Further, an employment tribunal is bound to uphold the complaint 
if it is not satisfied that the employer's explanation is adequate.
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The effect of the change to the burden of proof provisions was 
considered by an appellant tribunal for the first time in Barton v Investec 
Henderson Crostwaite Securities Ltd (2003) IRLR 332 EAT. The EAT confirmed 
that the test set out by the HL in the Zafar case needed to be revised in the light 
of the amendment to the burden of proof. For the benefit of readers, the 
judgement included a '12 point plan' which has subsequently been labelled the 
'Barton Guidelines'. Notwithstanding these early attempts to clarify the effect 
of the new regulations, the appellant courts found it necessary to engage with 
the new regulations throughout 2004 and, in early 2005, to refine the decision in 
Barton so as to provide further guidance on the burden of proof in sex 
discrimination cases.
University of Huddersfield v Wolff (2004) IRLR 534 EAT was reported 
in July 2004, followed closely by Chamberlain Solicitors v Emokpae (2004) IRLR 
592 EAT in August 2004, Sinclair Roche & Temperley v Heard (2004) IRLR 763 
EAT in October 2004 and Webster v Brunei University (2004) EAT in December 
2004. All four cases indicate the ongoing tensions between the new regulations 
and the existing, and extensive, body of jurisprudence on this key issue 
(Rubenstein, 2004).
Amidst this ongoing legal debate, a further case was played out in 
Tribunal that merits mention here. Law Society v Bahl (2003) IRLR 640 EAT, 
was determined prior to the changes on the burden of proof and produced 
what were referred to as 'undisputed principles' for proving direct race and sex 
discrimination. This did not prevent an appeal to the CA, by Ms Bahl in July 
2004(!) and a further substantive judgement on the issues at stake.
The importance of this case and its place amongst the selection referred 
to here lies in the clear distinction drawn between unreasonable treatment and 
unlawful discrimination. The two do not necessarily equate. At least they do 
not equate in law. In the workplace, the distinction is often less clear and, as I
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have suggested earlier, the word discrimination is often used to imply different 
treatment, but not necessarily linked to a category designated as unlawful.
Next in this review of burden of proof cases, the beginning of 2005 
provides an important reference point for my research with three 
discrimination cases being determined in the CA: Chamberlain Solicitors v 
Emokpae, Brunei University v Webster and Igen Ltd v Wong (2005) IRLR 258 
CA. All three cases were heard together and each sought clarification on 
aspects of the burden of proof regulations in discrimination cases. As 
Rubenstein (2005: 226) makes clear, clarification was keenly sought:
"The three statutory commissions (Equal Opportunities 
Commission, Commission for Racial Equality and 
Disability Rights Commission) were allowed to jointly 
intervene and Robin Allen QC was instructed to help sort 
out the confusion arising from inconsistent authorities at 
both EAT and Court of Appeal level."
The intervention of the statutory commissions is relatively uncommon 
and was allowed in recognition of the potential impact of the decisions on 
practice in discrimination cases. The decision takes us back -  with some 
important amendments -  to the 'Barton guidelines' decided in 2003. Not quite 
full circle, but certainly a tour with much retracing of ground.
Finally, in early 2007, the Court of Appeal handed down its decision in 
Madarassy v Nomura International Pic (2006) IRLR 246 CA, revisiting the issue 
of burden of proof in discrimination cases. Although to a very large extent 
confirming the approach taken in Chamberlain Solicitors v Emokpae, Brunei 
University v Webster and Igen Ltd. v Wong IRLR 258 CA, the case provides a 
useful methodology for working through the burden of proof provisions and, in 
not suggesting any change of direction with regard to dealing with the burden 
of proof in discrimination cases, seems to indicate that we have reached a 
degree of common understanding, at least in the eyes of the appellant courts,
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three years after the introduction of the Burden of Proof Regulations. A point 
recognised by Lord Justice Mummery in his judgement:
"The guidance in Igen v Wong....does not need to be 
amended to make it work better. The only possible value 
of this judgement... is in showing how the burden of proof 
should work" (paragraphs 12 and 13).
I am less convinced that the situation is as clear at the practitioner level 
as Mummery alludes to in his opening remarks:
"We were informed that, as evidenced by this clutch of 
appeals and by appeals pending in other cases, 
employment tribunals are experiencing difficulty with the 
burden of proof in sex and race discrimination cases. This 
is surprising, as the Court of Appeal analysed the law in 
depth and gave clear and sound detailed guidance in Igen 
v Wong (2005) IRLR 258. At the end of the judgement of 
the court an Annex set out guidance in 13 short and 
logically arranged numbered paragraphs. The judicial 
guidelines were framed with expert assistance from the 
Commissions for Equal Opportunities, Racial Equality and 
Disability Rights, which, with the permission of the court, 
intervened in Igen v Wong and made submissions through 
leading counsel (Mr Robin Allen QC). None of the parties 
in these appeals challenges the correctness of Igen v 
Wong."
According to Hetherington (2007), these doubts are not confined to the 
practitioners -  legal or personnel professionals -  working in organisations, but 
stretch to the higher reaches of Matrix Chambers:
"Recent judgments have shown that, despite the Court of 
Appeal's best efforts to provide guidance in Igen v Wong, 
tribunals are still grappling with the burden of proof 
provisions in the discrimination statutes. The Court of 
Appeal's judgment in Madarassy v Nomura appears to 
come dangerously close to removing any material effect 
from the provisions altogether."
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In other words, she is questioning -  if the Madarassy judgement holds 
good -  what has changed since the introduction of the Burden of Proof 
regulations. Her analysis argues that if the establishment of less favourable 
treatment is not sufficient to shift the burden of proof to the respondent, the 
'old law' -  where the burden of proof is placed heavily on the claimant -  
remains pretty much intact. If this is the position adopted by a member of one 
of the leading employment law practices -  Matrix Chambers -  the personnel 
practitioner may remain on the back foot!
Lord Justice Mummery also makes two further comments about the 
development of the burden of proof provisions which merit repeating here:
"Some of the difficulties with the new burden of proof are 
attributable to the process of adapting to change. It takes 
time for everyone to get used to the new law"
and
"Now tribunals and courts are faced with amended 
statutory provisions, which changed the law, but do not 
explain how it actually works. The difficulty is in knowing 
how much difference the amendments should make in 
practice."
These difficulties are, of course, at the centre of the concerns I laid out at 
the beginning of this thesis. Trying to understand how the law interacts with 
employment relations, increasingly played out within the legal framework of an 
Employment Tribunal is a core element of my research.
Before leaving Madarassy v Nomura for the moment, I record one 
further comment from Lord Justice Mummery which provides a smile in the 
course of my endeavours:
"I should add that there is really no need for another
judgement giving general guidance. Repetition is
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superfluous, qualification is unnecessary and contradiction 
is confusing."
Taken together, the cases outlined above provide my data field and, I 
submit, fertile ground for the analysis conducted in Chapter 8. Further 
comments on the cases chosen for analysis is included under the case selection 
section in Chapter 5 and a brief synopsis of the cases mentioned here is 
included in appendices 1-10.
Why is this area of employment law important?
The interpretation of this area of law has been a key issue in a number of 
cases over the last two or three years and although we seem to be approaching 
a degree of consensus, remains the subject of considerable debate. Moreover, I 
contend that it has a particular relevance to personnel practice and the 
employment relationship since it has a direct bearing on how cases are 
approached and managed. I remarked in the previous chapter on a sense of 
defensive employer reactions to discrimination law in general and it seems to 
me that the shifting of the burden of proof may provoke a similar sort of 
reaction.
Some of Lord Justice Mummery's comments in Madassary v Nomura 
International Pic (2006) IRLR 246 CA, a case referred to in the previous section, 
support such contentions:
"I do not underestimate the significance of the burden of 
proof in discrimination cases. There is probably no other 
area of the civil law in which the burden of proof plays a 
larger part than in discrimination cases. Arguments on the 
burden of proof surface in almost every case. The factual 
content of the cases does not simply involve testing the 
credibility of witnesses on contested issues of fact. Most 
cases turn on the accumulation of multiple findings of 
primary fact, from which the court or tribunal is invited to 
draw an inference of a discriminatory explanation of those 
facts. It is vital that, as far as possible, the law on the
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burden of proof applied by the fact finding body is clear 
and certain."
Mummery is, of course, referring specifically to the significance of the 
legal aspects of the burden of proof in discrimination cases. However, when we 
remind ourselves that the claimants and respondents in employment tribunal 
cases are employers and workers, not their legal representatives, the 
importance of this area of employment law in the wider context of work is more 
evident. Whilst I accept that such legal representatives acting in employment 
tribunals, and more so in the appellant courts, may decide the tactics of the case 
and, on occasion, descend into seemingly academic legal debate, the outcome of 
the case comes to rest with the parties lodging or defending the claims. If 
discrimination law is to be seen as a force for emancipatory change in the 
workplace, the complexities and nuances of the law must be penetrated by a 
wider audience.
Closing thoughts on chapter three
In this brief 'technical' chapter, I have attempted to explain the legal 
principles and the importance of language in our understanding of the standard 
and burden of proof in employment law cases. Further, I have shown how the 
implementation of the Burden of Proof Directive has impacted on these 
principles and spawned a case law debate in an attempt to clarify the correct 
interpretation of the Directive. A debate followed closely by the employment 
relations community looking for guidance on how to approach the 
management of potential discrimination cases.
We have also seen in this chapter that the making of 'good law' 
represents only a part of the story. How the law is interpreted and applied 
through the tribunals and the courts and then added to the body of knowledge 
we see reflected in case law completes the picture. One of the difficulties with 
the latter -  as Rubenstein (2007) points out -  is that it is only relatively recently
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that employment law specialists have begun to take their place as key decision 
makers in discrimination cases. Even now, they are very few in number at 
Court of Appeal and House of Lords levels. The quest to find individuals with 
a balance between a deep understanding of the complexities of discrimination 
law and an understanding of how workplace issues are played out day to day 
may be far from easy, but it does matter to employment relations practitioners.
As my research project progresses, it is my intention to prick the 
employment law bubble and subject the products of the employment tribunal 
arena to the sort of social analysis that is rarely entertained in the wider 
management literature. Additionally, I seek to enter this technical and complex 
area of law and illustrate how a deeper reading and understanding of 
discrimination law narratives can inform the wider practice of employment 
relations. Engaging in a distinctive way with a small element of employment 
tribunal material forms a substantive element of this thesis and contribution to 
the body of knowledge in this area.
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CHAPTER FOUR
EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Setting the conceptual parameters
Recognising that no researcher, including this one, can stand outside 
their epistemological commitments (Johnson et al, 2004), I switch my attention 
to this 'cleansing process' and to outlining my own philosophical stance. As I 
have already indicated, I am seeking to set out a conceptual framework that 
draws together the hermeneutic interpretation of meaning and the reflexivity 
implicit in the philosophy of critical theory. A potential synthesis recognised by 
others before me, including Forester (1983: 236): "Critical theory .... provides a 
foundation for .... the interpretative analysis of meaning." What O'Neill (1974) 
describes as our essential "making sense together." As I move towards the 
development of an interpretative analytical framework for my research -  the 
subject of Chapter 6 -  the purpose of this chapter is to set out the 
epistemological foundation on which it is based.
However, before doing that, I should say a few words about how I have 
reached my personal epistemological position and give brief mention to the 
alternatives that I have considered, but rejected. To many, this might be seen as 
an inconsequential matter and that the notion of truth is an everyday concept 
based on our beliefs and common sense interpretations. The researcher cannot 
afford to dismiss the issue so lightly and for this work to be given any academic 
credence, the writer's ontological and epistemological perspectives need to be 
clear.
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The attempt to locate my version of truth and give it some sort of label 
betrays, in itself, a positivist trait of the search for a definitive answer. For those 
within the positivist school, the ability to pursue central engagement with the 
subject and to reach a position of absolute truth is a given. The relative 
simplicity of the positivist approach to management research, the clear 
epistemological underpinnings and the overt definition of truth criteria 
represent a seductive and reassuring cocktail. Furthermore, the idea that we 
are able to conduct objective, scientific research to establish a 'truthlike theory' 
which remains current until a 'better' theory is established and progress 
knowledge in this way seems to make some sense and perhaps explains why 
positivist approaches remain the dominant force in management research 
(McAuley et al, 2007).
Unfortunately, for me, it makes less sense, particularly in the arena of 
human relations. If I return for a moment to my employment tribunal scenario, 
I can accept the existence of a legal framework and even the claims to superior 
knowledge that it implies, but I am unable to justify excluding the subjectivity 
of the human actors involved. Nor can I subscribe to the assumption of a 
neutral observational language. For me, this is epistemologically 
unsustainable. The idea of me as the researcher engaging with my research 
material without bringing my experiences and biases to bear is not a tenable 
position. In reaching this position, I recognise that, to some extent, I am 
complicating the research process and, much more significantly, removing a 
key epistemological pillar of the managerial agenda. A step which puts me in 
direct debate with concepts of hierarchical structures, superior knowledge and 
status quo enforcing language. The implications of this stance will pervade my 
analysis in later chapters and I will return to how it influences my approach to 
my professional practice at the conclusion of the thesis.
At this point, I should admit to a certain affinity with the postmodern 
technique of critique and the excavation of alternatives. I would even go so far
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as to say that I practice the technique as an important element of my own 
management style. I suspect that I would be regarded by my colleagues as an 
individual who allows others to elucidate their solutions before making a quiet, 
but hopefully, impactive interjection which unsettles the argument and widens 
the discussion. However, I recognise this as a technique to establish positions 
and encourage reflection rather than an end in itself. To depersonalise this 
thinking, I turn to an illustration of what I have termed a postmodern technique 
drawn from the MacPherson's (1998) inquiry into the death of Stephen 
Lawrence. Perhaps the most important recommendation to emerge from the 
report was aimed at changing police thinking from treating people equally to 
treating people according to need. To me, this represents a clear attempt to 
disturb the mindset of those employed in the criminal justice system, but, 
significantly, it was equally clearly intended to address a perceived problem. It 
was about promoting change in practice.
Accepting that postmodernism does provide a "different lens" and that 
the consideration of alternatives broadens the search for truth, it is inescapably 
difficult for the practitioner seeking to shape management practice in the future 
to survive on alternatives alone. Parker (1992:11) describes this dilemma as "a 
retreat into the sophistry of academic speculation". I find the postmodern 
technique helpful in my efforts to demystify management and not without 
reward in my working life, but the disabling effects of postmodern 
epistemology and the associated lack of space for intervention and engagement 
I find less attractive. It seems to me that if management research is to be seen to 
be worthwhile and to be assigned an element of utility, the complete 
abandonment of the notions of truth and progress is unhelpful.
Bhaskar (1978) notes that a subjectivist epistemology is capable of being 
combined with either realist or subjectivist ontological positions and I recognise 
that the debate continues between the ideas of soft postmodernism based on the 
first combination and hard postmodernism based on the latter combination. I 
also acknowledge that the postmodern perspective can make a contribution to
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management research (Kilduff and Mehra, 1997). In the extreme dimension, it 
is just not for me. I am left with the Kantian position that involves the 
acceptance of an objective reality and the unavoidability of the influence of my 
a priori assumptions on how I view that reality. I prefer the critical theorists' 
position of trying to disturb the established knowledge and practice, but in a 
way which promotes change and the surfacing of suppressed voices.
My position is complicated by the difficulty in trying to differentiate 
between social reality and social construction. Returning again to the 
employment tribunal scenario, I am prepared to accept the social reality of the 
legal framework, but the decision making process involves an interpretation 
(subjective) of the evidence (subjective) in the quest for reasonableness 
(subjective). The decision seeks to be practical in application and accepted, in 
legal spheres at least, as fair in all the circumstances. In essence, bringing 
together consensus and practical application.
This leaves me in what some might refer to as the 'grey area' between the 
positivist and postmodern extremes. My challenge now is to show that rather 
than being an uncomfortable 'sitting on the fence' position, my stance 
represents a distinctive and sound conceptual basis for my work.
A critical perspective and reflexive approaches
It would be reasonable to suggest that a considerable proportion of the 
vast array of management research available to the enthusiastic student might 
seek to shelter under the banner of critical approaches and claim to be 
undertaking research in a critical manner. What this means is often unclear and 
there is a need to distinguish between this broad canvas of critical thinking and 
the more tightly defined critical theoretical approach (Johnson and Duberley,
2000). My own approach falls within the latter dimension, particularly in so 
much as my research is concerned with understanding restrictive influences 
and seeking to posit alternative considerations. In other words, to promote
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change and provide an escape route from such restrictive influences. Not by 
revising practices necessarily, but by encouraging reflexive activity amongst 
those involved in a given social context.
Fournier and Grey (2000) offer three criteria that distinguish critical 
management studies. First, critical perspectives place the pursuit of knowledge 
above output and efficiency and, as a result, do not carry the baggage of 
attempting to improve managerial effectiveness. Second, they seek to uncover 
alternatives to the 'grand design' often portrayed as the only way forward. 
Finally, critical studies focus on revealing power relations and control 
structures. Taken together, those three elements provide a useful reference 
point for critical research and gel rather neatly with the Johnson and Duberley 
perspective outlined in the preceding paragraph.
I should at this point make reference to some of the alternative 
perspectives within the critical dimensions, critical theory, critical realism and 
pragmatism to name but three. Whilst my particular leaning is towards the 
consensus criteria associated with critical theory and the discovery possibilities 
created through a smooth integration with the hermeneutic art of 
interpretation, I do not regard the various perspectives as necessarily 
incommensurable. More that each perspective seeks different outcomes: 
pragmatism, for example, would be keen to demonstrate practical adequacy as 
a knowledge criteria. Critical realists would be more likely to look for practical 
ways of testing any potential improvement theories.
The concept of reflexivity is central to critical management research in 
order to expose the a priori 'baggage' that influences how we engage with the 
world. Applied in this context, such reflection liberates the researcher and 
allows a way forward through consensus in a democratic debate. Thus, the 
critical researcher would reject the extremes of positivism's 'objectivist illusions' 
and also eschew the 'anything goes' and relativism associated with the 
postmodernist position. Flolland (1999) stresses the importance of exposing the
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underlying assumptions on which arguments are built and seeks to extend the 
work of Kuhn (1962) and Burrell and Morgan (1979) by describing paradigm 
analysis as the "pathway to reflexivity" (Holland, 1999: 466.) I mention 
Holland's work here because, significantly for me, his framework of types of 
reflexivity leads him to 'transdisciplinary reflexivity', a state of reflexivity that 
allows the researcher to overcome the restrictions imposed by such as 
discipline, mindset or paradigm and opens the door to alethic pluralism. In 
resisting the temptation to sail too close to the postmodern edge, he helps to 
establish a distinctive critical position whilst retaining the central tenet of 
reflexivity.
Hermeneutic understanding
The hermeneutic tradition encompasses the notion of spiritual knowing, 
achieved through a concentration on interpretation and understanding. The 
emotional and intellectual preunderstanding of the researcher is important and 
this ultimately leads to reflection and an understanding of the researcher's own 
limitations. Accordingly, any output from the research is likely to centre on 
hermeneutic clarification and an insight into the intentions of the various 
players in the arena of study ( McAuley, 2001). Research in the hermeneutic 
paradigm does not lead to the emergence of facts, only interpretations. Such 
interpretations should not be granted a status beyond that of hypotheses since 
they can be adjusted in the light of new information (Held, 1990). As the 
hermeneutic paradigm does not allow for an objective evaluation of 
inter subjective agreement, the hermeneutician relies on a common 
understanding and shared satisfaction of expectation between researcher and 
researched. Furthermore, as Held (1990: 313) points out, the researched needs 
to be understood in its historical context: "The meaning of text, for example, is 
always open to future interpretations from new perspectives".
Some readers will feel short-changed by my attempt to explain 
hermeneutics, but to be more precise would suggest the presence of a neat
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definition that I have yet to uncover. Beyond a widespread acceptance that the 
hermeneutic approach involves a relationship between researcher and 
researched designed to reveal alternative meanings often hidden beneath the 
surface of an accepted truth, writers in this arena seem content to identify 
characteristics of hermeneutics without trying too hard to pigeon-hole their 
underlying dimension. To some extent, such latitude appeals to this writer 
since it makes it easier to associate with other dimensions without denying 
fundamental elements of the hermeneutic personality. More of this later.
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000) place their chapter on hermeneutics quite 
deliberately -  it seems to me - between their chapters on Data Orientated 
Methods and Critical Theory -  between empirical and more theoretically critical 
approaches -  to emphasise the importance they attach to interpretation, be it of 
data or theory. Whilst I recognise that their handling of hermeneutics is 
somewhat complex in places, I will attempt to feed off this theme of data and 
theory interpretation later in this chapter and show how, taken together, 
hermeneutics and critical theory offer a powerful and, perhaps, radical 
methodological approach. A synthesis that I will term critical interpretation.
Critical interpretation
The quotation from Forester (1983) at the beginning of this chapter is by 
no means the only reference to attempts to link hermeneutics and critical 
theory. By way of further example, McAuley (1997: 469) - in his review of the 
work of Sievers (1994) - notes that "Sievers uses both Hermeneutic 
epistemology and Critical Theory as underpinning philosophy". Philips and 
Brown (1993:1548) apply critical hermeneutics to their analysis of 
organisational communication and remark that "The most important potential 
contribution of critical hermeneutics lies in its extension of existing interpretive 
approaches to the study of management".
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More recently, Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000:110) introduce their 
chapter on critical theory with the comment "Critical theory is characterised by 
an interpretative approach combined with a pronounced interest in critically 
disputing actual social realities. It is sometimes referred to as critical 
hermeneutics." This theme is developed further by the end of the chapter 
where Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000:144) describe critical research "as a kind 
of triple hermeneutics" which they break down into simple hermeneutics, double 
hermeneutics and triple hermeneutics as follows:
• "Simple hermeneutics -  in social contexts -  concerns individuals' 
interpretations of themselves and their own subjective or 
intersubjective (cultural) reality, and the meaning they assign to this."
• "Double hermeneutics is what interpretative social scientists are 
engaged in, when they attempt to understand and develop 
knowledge about this reality. Social science is thus a matter of 
interpreting interpretive beings."
• "The triple hermeneutics of critical theory includes the 
aforementioned double hermeneutics, and a third element as well. 
This encompasses the critical interpretation of unconscious processes, 
ideologies, power relations, and other expressions of dominance that 
entail the privileging of certain interests over others, within the forms 
of understanding which appear to be spontaneously generated."
McAuley (1985: 298) emphasises that "The hermeneutic paradigm does 
not replace other paradigms: it complements and enriches them". He goes on 
to make the point that "what hermeneutic approaches do is to give greater 
depth to our understanding of the ways in which actors shape up and give 
meaning to their lives" (McAuley, 1985: 296). In seeking to establish some form 
of synthesis between critical theory and hermeneutics, in order to portray a 
critical research framework that can be placed under the heading of critical 
interpretation, I have been keen to discover such signs of similarity and 
congruence between what some would see as quite distinct schools of thought. 
McAuley (1985: 296) assists further with the comment that "the use of the 
hermeneutic approach is not designed to discount or discredit other approaches 
to organisational life -  that is, more positivistic approaches". This 'neutral'
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stance in relation to other approaches whilst retaining a distinctive 
methodological position helps to promote association with a critical philosophy. 
Additionally, the merger of hermeneutics with critical theory allows the latter 
to defend more robustly the criticism that 'critical theory offers more criticism of 
positivism and empiricism and less in the way of constructive methodological 
suggestions" (Alvesson and Skoldberg, 2000:130).
Finally in this section and in an attempt to provide further clarity of 
definition, I turn to the entry headed critical hermeneutics in the summary of 
qualitative terminology penned by Schwandt (2001: 44). His description points 
to the following components being present: a sceptical view of given meanings 
and interpretations; critiques of meanings and practices designed to change 
society and free individuals; and a concern beyond the relationship between 
language, meaning and understanding to social and organizational practices.
These three dimensions sit comfortably with the approach I have 
outlined above and bring together rather neatly the critical and the 
hermeneutic.
Critical interpretation in a legal context
Not unlike the way in which critical perspectives have emerged as 
response to the domination of positivism in the management disciplines, 
various legal theories set themselves against the historic primacy of classical 
and analytical jurisprudence. To some extent, picking up where the legal 
realism movement -  influential in the United States in thel920s and 1930s -  left 
off and seeking to extend the challenges to natural law and positivist legal 
philosophy to another level (Tebbit, 2000).
MacCormick (1994: xv - xvi) comments that his own thinking has shifted 
from an "already muted version of legal positivism" to his present stance in 
what might be called "a post-positivist institutional theory of law". By which
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he means that he retains an acceptance of the simple formulaic logic of the rule 
of law that Rule + Facts = Conclusion, but beyond that he indicates that "an 
account of rational practical discourse can be constructed". To some extent, this 
reflects a less certain approach to legal determination and a retraction of some 
of the harsher elements of criticism directed at Dworkin's theory of law as an 
interpretative concept.
Ward (1998: 6) takes the critical perspective and the anti-positivist 
argument a stage further and contends that the law is "a matter of opinion, 
nothing more and nothing less". This contention is central to much critical legal 
thinking and, in particular, to the attempts to undermine the notion of the 
neutrality of the adjudicator. Ward (1998:156), drawing on the work of Kelman 
(1987), suggests that "every legal judgement and every judge is a political actor 
affecting a particular political agenda". A comment from the heart of a 
committed critical legal theorist! Equally of interest to this writer, is the 
attachment of some critical legal theorists to the theories of language. 
Hutchinson (1988) asserts that we all 'live' in language and because language 
and imagination are inextricably linked 'we are never not in a story'. Frug 
(1992) comments that "our legal contexts are conversationally created, through 
the interaction of all of us in the social situation ", a line supplemented by Hunt 
(1990) in his assertion that law is textual and no more than a social and 
contingent construct.
According to Harris (1997:109), those engaged in critical legal studies 
"seek to 'deconstruct' or 'trash' the law by showing how the materials to hand 
could be manipulated either way, that coherent exposition is an illusion, that 
there are no purposes, principles or policy constraints with any dispositive bite, 
and that consequently every outcome is arbitrary". This contention goes too far 
for my liking, but it does illustrate how far the debate has been stretched from 
the positivist starting point.
Page 64
Drawing back from some of the more extreme views expressed by some 
critical legal theorists, at least part of the credit for rediscovering the 'forgotten 
threads of connection between jurisprudence and philosophy' must go to 
Oxford University's former Professor of Jurisprudence, Herbert Hart (Lacey 
(2004) p: 5). Notwithstanding his commitment to positivist principles and an 
analytical approach to philosophy, Hart was a passionate advocate for placing 
the philosophical aspects of legal scholarship above the mechanical application 
of a set of rules and to an extent responsible for igniting the debate that has 
followed on from a fairly sterile acceptance of natural law at face value. His 
work has also encouraged me to look across the legal and management 
disciplines and attempt to synthesise elements of critical interpretation and 
legal interpretation. Hart's own intellectual journey seems to leave this door 
ajar "a combination of methods is crucial to philosophical innovation" (Lacey 
(2004) p: 4).
Hart supplemented his analytical philosophy with elements of linguistics 
to create a version of legal positivism with a strong philosophical base. The 
relationships between language and the law is central to Hart's thinking and 
much of his argument is characterised by precision in the choice and use of 
individual words (Wacks (2005)). In terms of jurisprudence and philosophy, 
Hart's "The Concept of Law" published in 1961 remains one of the most 
important contributions to the subject and an inescapable reference point for 
legal scholars (Hart, 1991).
To this point and quite deliberately, I have only made passing mention 
of Ronald Dworkin's sophisticated and much debated alternative to legal 
positivism in this very brief skate across the ground of legal theory. Dworkin 
has been described as "the most influential English-language legal theorist of 
his generation and as being responsible for "establishing a third alternative to 
legal positivism and natural law theory: an interpretative theory of law" -  see 
Bix (1999: 81). For my research task, I have in part been influenced by 
Dworkin's contention -  described by Harris (1997:190) -  that "law is
interpretative through and through". As Dane (1996:116) points out, Dworkin 
is a man who "rejects legal positivism, but also embraces legal hermeneutics".
Dworkin brought to the table an interpretive approach to law -  in 
practice and in theory -  which he referred to as 'constructive interpretation'. In 
essence, he argues that legal issues cannot be simply decided and that they need 
to be interpreted if they are to be understood. Going further, he contends that 
they should be interpreted constructively and principally against the two 
criteria of 'best fit' and moral value. He was looking to find the best 
interpretation of what had gone before rather than sticking to the positivist 
attempt to see law objectively 'as it is' or value free. As Bix (1999) explains, 
Dworkin favours an interpretation of 'law as integrity' where the interpretive 
process produces individual or collective rights in a consistent and coherent 
way.
It is clear that Dworkin was not prepared to accept the legal positivist's 
stance that there is a separation between law as it is -  descriptive legal theory -  
and law as it ought to be -  normative legal theory. He eschewed the contention 
that there is no connection between the law and morality. From this I draw 
some support for my arguments later in this narrative where I seek to illustrate 
that the employment tribunals do not provide decisions that can be explained 
by logical deduction from a set of predetermined legal rules. They are much 
more complex than that.
In his latest book, Dworkin (2006) relates his view that interpretive 
concepts must flow from a shared practice. As individuals we might disagree 
about the criteria for determining injustice for example, but we share the 
concept (interpretive) of justice itself. We also understand that we interpret 
justice based on our knowledge of the particular circumstances, our knowledge 
of the law and related infrastructure etc. If we accept this line, as I do, we are 
accepting that the doctrine of law is an interpretative concept. This 
convergence around recognising concepts as interpretive, but, at the same time,
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making a distinction between the concept itself and the interpretation of 
particular instances underpins Dworkin's thinking and leads him to the 
statement:
''So a useful theory of an interpretative concept cannot
simply report the criteria people use to identify instances or 
simply excavate the deep structure of what people mainly agree 
our instances. A useful theory of an interpretative concept must 
itself be an interpretation " (Dworkin, 2006:12)
Dworkin does not depart from his long held premise that it is 
not possible to separate morality and the law. Indeed, he goes further 
and suggests that the domain of legal theory can be better understood 
as an element of the domain of morality.
This brief excursion into the realms of legal theory is intended to 
illustrate that critical responses to positivism are active in the field of law and, 
to some extent, mirror the debates in the social and management sciences. 
Accepting that his thinking has been challenged robustly by supporters of 
Hart's legal positivism and by a 'new breed' of critical legal theorists, Dworkin 
provides a post-positivist standpoint and a model for constructive 
interpretation to which I will return later.
Closing thoughts on chapter four
In this chapter, I have attempted to construct a conceptual framework for 
my research project and, in so doing, I have devoted considerable space to my 
philosophical approach. In part, this reflects my support for the Alvesson and 
Skoldberg (2000: 4) comment that "it is not methods, but ontology and 
epistemology which are the determinants of good social science". A remark 
very much in line with the view of Potter and Wetherell (1987:159), " 
developing an adequate theoretical understanding or interpretation is at least as 
important as perfecting a cast iron methodology". More broadly and to add to
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the completeness of my theoretical framework, I have examined briefly some of 
the topical debates in legal theory in an endeavour to show how legal theory 
might influence critical interpretation. As my research project progresses, I 
believe that such investment will be rewarded by facilitating the interplay 
between theory and data in a reflexive manner.
I have also sought to address the challenge set by Alvesson and Deetz
(2000) to articulate a relationship between the critical tradition -  characterised 
by critical theory -  and the interpretive tradition -  characterised by 
hermeneutics -  under the more generic banner of critical management research. 
In my terms, critical interpretation. In so doing, I have endeavoured to address 
their three overlapping tasks for this critical type of management research: to 
provide insight, to offer critique and to consider the more pragmatic element of 
using the research to enable change. I may ultimately differ in my approach to 
the third component -  what Alvesson and Deetz (2000: 20) term 
"transformative redefinition" -  but I support the ambition to address all three 
elements in my research project.
I am left more reassured that a blend of critical theory and hermeneutics 
provides an opportunity to underpin a reflexive research process. Critical 
theory provides a skeptical element to our understanding of the world and it is 
given more substance and an outlet to a more sustainable methodological 
approach through association with the search for interpretation and 
understanding that forms the backbone of hermeneutics.
I conclude this chapter with the thought that if I am to adopt, however 
naively, the mantle of the critical management researcher, my 'success factors' 
are more about promoting a healthy debate amongst the various actors in the 
employment law arena than they are about searching for facts or superior 
knowledge. At best, I may uncover a set of ideas that add value in the legal and 
personnel professions. To my mind, this is a worthwhile pursuit. I contend 
that the pluralistic conceptual framework I have outlined above provides a
distinctive starting point from which to pursue this ambition. It also provides 
the opportunity to establish knowledge criteria based around consensus and 
coherence within the employment relations domain.
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CHAPTER FIVE
METHODOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Methodological choice for critical interpretation
Whilst not wishing to fall into the trap of commencing this part of my 
narrative with an apology, I am prepared to admit -  and it will already be clear 
to the reader -  that I have fallen victim to the "explosion of interest in 
qualitative methods" (Symon and Cassell, 1998:1) and that I intend to tap into 
this embarrassment of riches (Denzin and Lincoln, 1998). For me, such methods 
in management research provide the more exciting and potentially revealing 
routes to developing our knowledge about the management of organisations.
As my research journey progresses, I recognise that I will be increasingly called 
upon to justify this rather grand claim and to put more substance to my 
methodological choices. Similarly, I acknowledge that the quality of my 
qualitative research will, to a considerable extent, depend upon the research 
decisions taken (Seale, 1999).
In inviting the reader to accept, for the moment at least, that a qualitative 
approach makes sense for the research journey I have so far outlined, I accept 
fully that the defining of a research strategy and the making of methodological 
choices is a complex issue. Under the banner of qualitative research, the range 
of methodology and method available invariably involves a considered choice 
and a series of compromises between the many approaches. Moreover, as 
Denzin and Lincoln (1998: 5) point out, qualitative research "privileges no 
single methodology over any other". The research process is not simply about
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choosing a particular method to conduct a piece of research, but also about the 
different relationships between theory and method and researcher and research 
material (Morgan, 1983). All of which adds to the difficulty of mounting a 
conclusive argument about the authority of one methodology over another 
since all have inherent strengths and weaknesses, particularly when issues such 
as social context, philosophical assumptions and availability of data are added 
into the decision making cocktail.
It is also important to recognise the significance of underlying 
assumptions in any research analysis (Burrell and Morgan, 1979) and to display 
an understanding of what Morgan (1983:13) terms the "possible modes of 
engagement" with the research object. Both are vital if the research process and 
interpretation of research results are to have any sense of credibility or 
foundation. Having addressed the significant challenge of association with a 
particular theoretical framework -  the lens through which to view the research 
- and looked more closely at an appropriate research methodology, the 
researcher faces some more practical choices. As Gill and Johnson (1997:128) 
have pointed out, "inevitably the researcher must choose between these 
different approaches in making an area of interest researchable". In other 
words, the research project must be 'doable'.
To reach the point of being comfortable with one's theoretical 
perspective and to be broadly aware of the direction of the potential challenges 
is a significant advance in itself. To have adopted a position that falls within 
the extensive frame of critical management research still leaves the door open to 
a multitude of ways of conducting research (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). To 
begin to suggest a research process that moves beyond the restrictions imposed 
by the Burrell and Morgan (1979) 'paradigmatic incommensurability' towards 
synthesis and similarity extends the complexity of choice to another level. 
Undeterred, I find myself seduced by critical research and its inherent challenge 
to restricted thinking and established practices (Alvesson and Deetz, 2000). As 
this narrative unfolds, I aim to convince the reader that adopting this critical
Page 71
perspective in relation to discourse analysis -  and more narrowly, the 
interpretation and analysis of written text - provides the potential to facilitate 
the 'conversation between theory, reflection and data and to release alternative 
interpretations.
Even such a brief look at some of the issues around methodological 
choice, serves to illustrate the significance of research design in any 
management research project and, in particular, the need to expose the strands 
of coherence running from the meta-level conceptual framework through to the 
research strategy and extending to the research methods themselves. In other 
words, to recognise the need to locate my research design and my chosen 
research methodology within the paradigm of critical management research - 
in my terms, more accurately described as critical interpretation - and to link 
the various elements of the design in a coherent fashion. Pursuit of this goal 
will be the focus here rather than an examination of the numerous alternative 
methodologies and / or to explanations as to why they have been dismissed.
Approaches to discourse analysis
Wood and Kroger (2000) suggest that the engagement of researchers in 
the social sciences with the analysis of discourse has a relatively short history. 
They claim that the 'tu rn  to language' did not appear until the 1980's, but, 
significantly, the move attracted interest across the spectrum of social science 
disciplines. Moreover, a number of approaches to discourse analysis emerged, 
each with a distinct personality of its own. This eclectic theme is picked up by 
Wodak and Meyer (2001) and by Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) as they draw 
distinctions between the various forms of discourse analysis, both in terms of 
research methods and underlying theoretical connections. What follows in the 
reminder of this chapter is an attempt to touch on some of these varieties of 
discourse analysis and to make my own position clear.
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Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000: 203) include in discourse "all kinds of 
language use (speech acts) in oral and written social connections, that is, 
utterances and written documents. A discourse is a social text". This leads 
them to an alignment with Potter and Wetherell (1987: 7) who view discourse in 
the open sense to "cover all forms of spoken interactions, formal and informal, 
and written texts of all kinds" and view discourse analysis as "analysis of any of 
these". Potter and Wetherell are keen to point out that discourse analysis in 
their terms is not a concern "purely with discourse per se", but a study of social 
texts "to gain a better understanding of social life and social interaction".
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000:200) comment that the interest in 
language "has tended to move from limited linguistic units to larger textual 
units -  discourses" and it is becoming increasingly clear that discourse and 
discourse analysis represent topical themes in the social and management 
sciences. They also point out that discourse analysis has the ability to deepen 
and vary the various philosophical approaches and make a contribution to 
providing a critique for more data orientated methods. Travers (2001:121) 
offers further support for this line with the comment, "There have, however, 
been a large number of studies published in the inter-disciplinary field of 
discourse analysis, which has become one of the fastest growing areas of work 
in the human sciences".
Discourse analysis calls on the researcher to remain reflective and 
sceptical throughout the research process to try to ensure that the analysis picks 
up the variations and nuances in the conversation or script. There is a real need 
to go beyond what is actually said or written and begin to interpret the 
discourse in a way that reveals something about what is in the mind of the 
speaker or writer and to say something about the social context in which the 
discourse takes place. Barry et al (2006) package approaches to discourse 
analysis as essentially a researcher's choice between working within a text, 
working outward from the text to its context or a combination of the two
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whereby textual analysis is integral to conceptual considerations. They propose 
that all three approaches are now widely employed in organisational research.
Whilst recognising the presence of numerous other styles of discourse 
analysis, Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) divide the 'field of discourse analysis' - 
or more precisely 'social constructionist discourse analysis' -  into three areas: 
Laclau and Mouffe's discourse theory, critical discourse analysis and discursive 
psychology. In so doing, they seek to present for each approach 'a complete 
package' of philosophical premises, theoretical models, methodological 
guidelines and specific techniques for analysis embedded within the paradigm 
of social constructionism (Philips and Jorgensen, 2002:4). All three variations 
share the common premise that our use of language is not a neutral activity - 
their differentiation of the three approaches can be described as follows:
• Laclan and Mouffe's discourse theory
"The theory has its starting point in the portstructuralist idea that 
discourse constructs the social world in meaning, and that, owing 
to the fundamental instability of language, meaning can never be 
permanently fixed." (Philips and Jorgensen, 2002: 6).
• Critical discourse analysis
"Critical discourse analysis, with special focus on Norman
Fairclough's approach, also places weight on the active role of 
discourse in constructing the social world." The point of 
departure from Laclan and Mouffe is Fairclough's commitment to 
the idea that discourse is just one element of any social practice. 
(Philips and Jorgensen, 2002: 7).
• Discursive psychology
"Discursive psychology shares critical discourse analysis'
empirical focus on specific instances of language use in social
interaction." The principal ambition being " ................. to explore
the ways in which people's selves, thoughts and emotions are 
formed and transformed through social interaction and to cast 
light on the role of these processes in social and cultural 
reproduction and change." Rather than a focus on "internal 
psychological conditions". (Philips and Jorgensen, 2002: 7).
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My interest lies in the critical discourse analysis approach and the 
potential to explore the employment tribunal discourse as one component of the 
employment relations environment. I turn my attention in this direction.
Scollon (2001:140) provides a useful definition: "Critical Discourse 
Analysis is a programme of social analysis that critically analyses discourse -  
that is to say language in use -  as a means of addressing problems of social 
change." Equally helpfully, Van Dijk (2001: 96) terms critical discourse analysis 
as "discourse with an attitude" and claims that "Critical discourse analysis can 
be conducted in, and combined with, any approach and sub-discipline in the 
humanities and social sciences." Accordingly, a central theme in critical 
discourse analysis involves the conversation or narrative being studied to be 
viewed from a political perspective to reveal the power relationships and to 
emancipate the meaning for those who do not hold such authority (Travers,
2001). Although discourse analysis methods may differ in detail, they would 
normally involve the adoption of some of the principles of literary theory 
applied to a particular context.
As Fairclough and Wodak (1997) point out, critical discourse analysis is 
distinguished by a particular view of the relationship between language and 
society and the relationship between analysis and the practices analysed. More 
specifically, critical discourse analysis posits language as a form of social 
practice and in doing so implies a relationship between the discourse and the 
context in which the discourse is produced. Fairclough (2003) carries the baton 
a stage further and expresses the concern that the two 'disciplines' of linguistic 
analysis and social research have led independent lives for too long. 
Unashamedly motivated by a desire to expose dominating forces, the researcher 
under the critical discourse analysis banner seeks to intervene, unsettle and 
promote change. In my quest for a methodology consistent with a theoretical 
synthesis of reflexivity and interpretation, the critical variant of discourse 
analysis commands attention and offers the potential identified by Wodak
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(2001:64), "research in CD A must be multi-theoretical and multi- 
methodological, critical and self-reflective".
Van Dijk (1997), Wodak and Meyer (2001) and Wetherell, Taylor and 
Yates (2001) all identify Norman Fairclough as a key exponent of critical 
analysis. Whilst promoting the value of textual analysis as an element of social 
science, Fairclough (2003) recognises that textual analysis does have its 
limitations. For him, no analysis can be objective, complete or definitive and to 
uncover meaning it is necessary to interpret texts within their social context.
Fairclough (2003) concludes his own assessment of textual analysis by 
commenting that critical discourse analysis is but one form of critical social 
research, a wider subject which seeks to examine how societies work. This is a 
very grand ambition and demands that researchers concern themselves with 
important social issues. My choice of research focus -  discrimination law and 
its influence on the employment relationship -  is one of those important issues 
that deserve attention. Much of Fairclough's research work is now centred 
around 'new capitalism' and he is very clear that the phenomenon is leading to 
social transformation that cannot be uncierstood without an appreciation of the 
language used. (Fairclough, 2003). I contend that the language around 
discrimination, employment law and workplace dispute resolution is similarly 
impactive.
Significantly for this writer, Fairclough (1992) has provided a vehicle for 
critical discourse analysis through the interpretation of Bhaskar's (1986) concept 
of 'explanatory critique' and translation into an analytical framework. As Dick 
(2004) explains, Fairclough has based his approach to critical discourse analysis 
on the work of Foucault and constructed a three dimensional framework for 
analysis of discourse. First, there is a need to understand how a piece of text is 
constructed, what is it trying to achieve and how is it trying to achieve its 
purpose. Second, the context in which a piece of text is produced needs to be 
examined to guide the forms of interpretation which might follow. Third, the
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wider 'social home' of the piece of discourse needs to be considered and the 
extent to which dominant discourses are reinforced or challenged. Taken 
together, these steps allow the researcher to analyse discourse from a take 
nothing for granted stand point and, it seems to me, across any form of 
discourse drawn from any source. Utilisation of such an approach with 
documents that influence future interpretations, practice and behaviour -  such 
as employment tribunal judgements -  has added attraction.
The three stage model is revisited in Chapter 7 and represents an 
important influence on the interpretative analytical framework I intend to use 
to conduct my own research.
Employment tribunal judgements as a data source
In attempting to demonstrate how critical discourse analysis offers the 
consistency I seek between method and data source, I am encouraged by the 
Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000: 206) comment quoted here: "Discourse analysis 
is often interested in accounts or documents which have arisen in the natural 
course of events, rather than in interaction between participants and 
researchers." As I have already indicated by reference to the 'researcher 
intervention free zone' that surrounds and adds to the value of 'historic' 
documents, employment tribunal judgements represent a data source that is 
free from the researcher's involvement at the point of entry. Additionally, 
employment tribunal judgements are in ready supply and freely available over 
a timeframe spanning four decades.
To further the 'purity ' of data source point -  from a researcher 
perspective at least - in the specific case of employment tribunal judgements, 
the transcription of the 'story' has, of course, already been undertaken by the 
members of the tribunal, invariably drafted by the legally qualified chair. 
Unlike the researcher who can refer back to a tape recording of an interview to
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check the accuracy of the transcription, the textual analyst must rely on what is 
actually written and build any insight or inference on that basis.
From a different angle, employment tribunal judgements represent an 
attractive data source in that they would generally be perceived as being 
produced in an objective, rule bound, context. It occurs to this writer that such 
a perception merits challenge, particularly when the players are bound by a 
burden of proof that relies on 'the balance of probabilities' rather than 'beyond 
reasonable doubt' leaves considerable scope for interpretation and inference.
It seems to me, that this particular collection of social texts has been left 
relatively untouched by management researchers to date and is not without 
scope for critical examination. The seminal work of Garfinkel (1967) concluded 
that jurors tend to look for evidence to support their conclusions rather than 
look at the evidence and deduce a decision. This implies a retrospective search 
for justification with outcome preceding decision. My research provides an 
opportunity to uncover whether this proposition holds good in the context of 
written employment tribunal judgements.
Case selection
The choice of individual case for analysis was always going to be a 
difficult one and one that is wide open to comment and any number of possible 
alternatives. However, it is important to recognise that case selection is a 
crucial element of the research project, that those selected serve the research 
issue and that the case selection criteria are clear (Hodson, 1999). As I have 
already indicated, hundreds of discrimination cases are determined by 
employment tribunals each year. Of these, a number proceed to the various 
appellant authorities and a few cases come to be regarded as significant in case 
law terms. By way of example, the IRLR contained reports on 34 discrimination 
cases in 2002 spread evenly over the main jurisdictions: 10 involving race 
discrimination and 9 involving sex discrimination (Rubenstein (2003)). In 2003,
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the number of discrimination cases rose to 43 -11 involving race discrimination 
and 16 involving sex discrimination (Rubenstein (2004)) - and in 2004, 42 
discrimination cases were reported - 8 involving race discrimination and 15 
involving sex discrimination (Rubenstein (2005)). 2005 saw 45 cases reported of 
which 15 related to sex discrimination and 13 related to race discrimination 
(Rubenstein, 2006) and, in 2006,32 cases were reported of which 9 related to sex 
discrimination and 5 related to race discrimination (Rubenstein, 2007).
Now in its 20th iteration, the annual IRLR publication "Discrimination: a 
guide to the relevant case law on sex, race and disability discrimination and 
equal pay" -  referenced in the previous paragraph - is recognised in the 
employment law arena as the 'bible' of discrimination case law and I make use 
of it to help define my field of analysis. I have already revealed my interest in 
the standard of evidence and burden of proof issues surrounding 
discrimination in sex and race discrimination law and the cases selected for 
analysis represent this interest. My case selection criteria can be summarised 
as follows:
• the case involves an allegation of sex or race discrimination
• the case contains debate and comment around the concepts of 
burden of proof or standard of proof
• the case is heard by at least one appellant court beyond the initial 
industrial /  employment tribunal
• the case is considered sufficiently important to be included in 
Rubenstein's annual review of cases reported in the IRLR under 
the burden of proof or standard of proof headings (Rubenstein, 
2003 -  2007)
• the cases are within my sphere of professional knowledge and 
considered likely to contribute to the social issue being researched 
(Hodson, 1999).
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The judgements listed below are drawn from my review of the relevant 
case law in Chapter three and set against the selection criteria outlined in the 
previous paragraph. They are designed to provide a rich analytical source:
• King v Great Britain China Centre (1991) IRLR 513 CA
• Zafar v Glasgow City Council (1998) IRLR 36 HL
• Barton v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd (2003) 
IRLR 332 EAT
• University of Huddersfield v Wolff (2004) IRLR 534 EAT
• Chamberlain Solicitors and another v Emokpae (2004) IRLR 592 
EAT
• Sinclair Roche & Temperley and others v Heard and another 
(2004) IRLR 763 EAT
• Webster v Brunei University (2004) EAT
• Bahl v The Law Society and others (2004) IRLR 799 CA
• Igen Ltd and others v Wong, Chamberlain Solicitors and another 
v Emokpae, Brunei University v Webster and the Equal 
Opportunities Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality 
and the Disability Rights Commission (2005) IRLR 258 CA.
• Madarassy v Nomura International Pic (2006) IRLR 246 CA.
In line with normal legal practice, these cases include extensive reference 
to previous legal authorities and, in so doing, add a deeper context to the 
ground covered in these 10 judgements alone. This degree of coverage over a 
15 year period allows me to claim with some confidence that, taken together, 
the cases 'tell the story 'of how the concepts of burden of proof and standard of 
proof have been interpreted in discrimination case law.
Coding the data
Having identified employment tribunal texts as a relevant and available 
data source and made the selection of the cases to be analysed, the data
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demands reading and re-reading in search of words or phrases of interest 
(Wetherell et al, 2001). My refinement on this approach is explained in more 
detail in Chapter 7, but, in short, involves three steps: noting words, phrases or 
constructs which raise a degree of suspicion in my mind; reflection on the 
grounds for my suspicion; and considering the relationship between my 
reflective analysis and the text plus existing theory. Such deep analysis seeks to 
reveal patterns that emerge from the data to put those into some sort of order 
that can be examined and re-examined as the research progress. Wetherell et al
(2001) acknowledge that not all patterns will last the distance of the research 
project or that the researcher can hope to identify all the patterns present in the 
data, let alone include them in the writing-up of the research project. A 
selection of patterns that advance the research issue is inevitable and the 
exclusion of some patterns -  consciously or unconsciously -  equally so.
The coding of the researcher's findings is an essential requirement of 
discourse analysis and it is important to be clear on how the coding is to be 
managed before engagement with the data begins. Seale (1999: 154) provides a 
helpful statement about what coding involves "representing the researcher's 
thoughts about how data might be interpreted, given a particular set of 
concerns." Seale (1991: 154) goes on to warn about the dangers of coding too 
early in the analysis and, as a result, "fixing the meaning" before other 
possibilities have been explored. He recommends a more flexible approach 
where early visits to the data are more about signposting potential areas of 
interest rather than looking for outcomes at this stage.
With Seale's advice in mind, my coding framework includes the 
following:
• my coding category starts from a word, phrase or construct that 
gives cause for suspicion e.g. inference
• my second categorisation involves the identification of a 
qualifying word, phrase or construct e.g. justifiable inference
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• my third categorisation involves identification of any relationship 
with any word, phrase or construct elsewhere in the specific text 
under review
• my fourth categorisation involves identification of any 
relationship with any word, phrase or construct elsewhere in the 
set of texts (selected cases) under review
• my fifth categorisation is about any potential relationship with the 
wider employment relationship literature, particularly that 
relating to my research considerations.
Once the data has been coded in this way, it provides a sort of 'processed 
product' drawn from the raw material of the employment tribunal texts and 
one that underpins the analysis to be undertaken later in this thesis. The 
important point to make here is that the coding exercise is about identification 
rather than reflection. The latter comes later and forms an important part of the 
interpretative analytical framework. As Seale (1991) makes clear, it is important 
not to close off awareness of discovery at this early stage.
Closing thoughts on chapter five
In this chapter, I have worked through the essential considerations of 
methodological choice and, specifically, approaches to discourse analysis. In so 
doing, I have endeavoured to maintain consistency with the conceptual threads 
that permeate my work. I have also said something about employment tribunal 
texts and the potentially illuminating value they may hold. I have attempted to 
justify my case selection around a particular area of discrimination law and a 
set of criteria designed to tell the story of the development of case law in this 
important area. To provide a rich data source, and, finally, I have outlined my 
approach to coding as a pre-requisite for the analysis which follows.
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CHAPTER SIX
REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH PROJECT SO FAR 
My thinking journey
Having progressed through a depiction of my chosen research area 
against the backdrop of a wider employment landscape, engaged in a debate 
about my epistemological stance and methodological approach and before 
turning to the construction and running of the 'research engine' in the next 
chapter, it might be helpful to the reader, not to say therapeutic for the writer, 
to reflect on the practical issues of coming this far on the research journey. In 
essence, to give an insight into my research style and to illustrate the storyboard 
of my thinking journey.
Although I attempted to 'draw  a picture' of my research journey in 
Chapter 1, figure 1.1,1 was not suggesting any obvious clarity of thought at the 
outset of my study or that the journey has not been punctuated by numerous 
twists and turns along the way. The drawing of pictures and the development 
of mind maps are important elements of my thinking process at work and they 
have been equally important to me in this academic endeavour. They were 
crucial to me as I wrestled with my first meaningful exposure to the 
complexities and contradictions around epistemology, ontology and reflexivity 
and sought to escape from the dominant managerial discourse that I had 
become so familiar with, not to say, influenced by. One of my earliest 
scribblings is reproduced below at figure 6.1 and reflects an attempt to make 
sense of the question 'w hat is truth in management research?' The pendulum  
was to swing repeatedly between the 'positivism and postmodern extremes' as 
my reading and thinking turned corner after corner.
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Positivism
(thesis)
Postmodernism
(anti-thesis)
TRUTH
(synthesis)
Figure 6.1 The truth pendulum
I recognise that not everyone would share my representation of 
postmodernism as the anti-thesis of positivism, but it served to put 
epistemology into some sort of personal perspective and to open the door to the 
synthesis of the objective ontological and the subjective epistemological 
position. Such a synthesis drew me ever closer to the critical domain and an 
association with the important starting point for the critical researcher that any 
accepted truth is there to be challenged. It is also in tune with -  and indeed 
informed by - the Johnson and Duberley four quadrant model reproduced at 
Figure 6.2 below:
objectivist ONTOLOGY
positivism
objectivist
neopositivism
subjectivist
incoherence
EPISTEMOLOGY
critical theory
convent onalism
subjectivist
critical realism 
pragmatism
postmodernism
Figure 6.2 Reflexivity and management research (Johnson and Duberley, 2000: 
180).
In marking out the 'south-west quadrant', Johnson and Duberley (2000) 
are not defining a specific epistemic personality, but highlighting an extensive 
'grey area' with many opportunities for pluralistic approaches. A DBA 
colleague of mine has consistently eschewed attaching a label to his 
epistemological perspective, arguing strongly that others should attach such 
labels if they so choose. I share his reservations and I have gone to some 
lengths to draw on a number of perspectives to build my own, distinctive 
conceptual foundation. What I have found, however, is that the established 
labels do provide important reference points to navigate around.
The next step on my reading and thinking journey was to assemble a few 
of the elements that seemed to me more secure in my research 'package' than
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others. These are represented at Figure 6.3 as a jumble of potential foundation 
stones.
employment tribunal 
judgements 
texts
critical hermeneutics 
'art of interpretation'
the role of inference 
and interpretation various actors in 
employment law arena
jurisprudence 
'interpretation of laws' discourse analysis organisational
discourse
scepticism of ideals 
'search for a best 
interpretation' critical theory 'political and 
ideological'
methodologically > 
looking for synthesis of:
• critical hermeneutics
• critical theory 
•discourse analysis
Figure 6.3: A few foundation stones
Consolidation of a developing and personalised conceptual model, 
recognising some of the connections, is shown in the more mature diagram at 
Figure 6.4.
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CRITICAL DISCOURSE 
ANALYSIS
CRITICAL THEORY REFLECTION CRITICALHERMENEUTICS
CRITICAL LEGAL THEORY
Figure 6.4: Conceptual construction
Looking for some support for my developing thinking, I was encouraged 
to find Alvesson and Skoldberg (2000: 207) confirm their view that the ideas of 
discourse analysis and associated streams such as conversation analysis and 
ethnomethodolgy are "exciting and worthy of serious attention". Travers 
(2001) remarks on the strong links between critical discourse analysis -  reflected 
in the various approaches to the study of language -  and the ideas and concepts 
of critical theory. For the social psychologists Potter and Wetherell (1987:1), a 
failure to accommodate discourse analysis of social texts damages the 
"theoretical and empirical" adequacy of the research. Phillips and Brown (1993: 
1567) suggest that a critical hermeneutic approach is likely to provide more 
reflective research through a combination of an "inescapably interpretative 
impact" and "an objectifying formal moment of analysis". These references 
were helpful in that they illustrated the synergy between critical research and 
critical discourse analysis and the potential they offer for a quality piece of 
research.
Taking these thoughts into account and increasingly reassured that the 
components represented at Figure 6.4 'felt right' from a personal perspective, I 
embarked on the process of joining-up my conceptual founding with a research 
methodology and the design of an interpretative analytical framework to bring 
my research to life. Figure 6.5 provides a visual image of my search for
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consistency in thinking and practice and represents one of the most satisfying 
drawings that I have been able to produce. It represents the point where I felt 
comfortable to get my hands dirty with some data analysis and perhaps of 
greater significance revealed where any potential contribution to knowledge 
might come from. Not quite a eureka moment but pretty close!
Interpretative
Analytical
Framework
Methodology
Critical Theory
Contribution 
to Knowledge
Critical
Interpretation
Hermeneutics
Legal Theory
Critical Interpretation 
(legal context)
ContributionCreative
Reconstruction
Discourse
Analysis Text
Knowledge
Interpretative
Analytical
Framework * Alternative interpretations
Contribution 
to Knowledge
Figure 6.5: Consistency of theory and practice in research
Epistemology
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I also recognise that by adopting this conceptual and methodological 
construction, I embraced the interpretative paradigm, characterised by the 
"treatment of social reality as text, whose meaning needs to be deciphered" 
(Tsoukas and Knudsen (2003:17)). From a personal and practical point of view, 
this is best reflected in my attempt to use a distinctive interpretative analytical 
framework to analyse the employment tribunal texts which make up my data 
field in such a way that I can draw out a number of research themes and debate 
these themes with the early research considerations identified in Chapter 2. It is 
this three-dimensional conversation between the text, the research 
considerations and the research themes which offers the potential to produce a 
set of interesting ideas for the professional practice of people 
management. Any such ideas can be strengthened further by reference to the 
existing body of literature. Once again, I resort to a drawing to better explain 
my thinking -  see Figure 6.6.
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RESEARCH CONSIDERATIONS:
i  k
DATA COLLECTION 
AND ANALYSIS
( 1 - 6  are possible outcomes)
RESEARCH THEMES
FINDINGS - REFLECTION ON USEFULNESS AND SIGNIFICANCE
1. 2 .
3. 4.
Figure 6.6: Generating a set of ideas
In the midst of all this learning and reflective activity around 
epistemological perspectives, the forms discourse analysis and how they might 
be used to design and underpin an interpretative framework, two interviews 
with Robert Turner, Senior Master, Royal Courts of Justice, provided an 
enjoyable and informative diversion. Robert had been one of the earliest 
Industrial Tribunal Chairs going back to the late 1960s and early 1970s when, in 
his words:
" industrial tribunals differed from today in that they were objective 
tribunals. Objective in the sense that they had a set of regulations which
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they enforced. If the case fell within the parameters of those regulations 
then you won or you lost."
In his view, it was not until the introduction of unfair dismissal 
legislation that a subjective -  or human -  element of employment law began to 
emerge around the concept of fairness. This change marked a significant move 
away from a deterministic employment situation to one where human values 
began to play a part. Robert went on to remark that:
"In many ways, there was a deterioration initially in the relationships in 
employment as a result of this new subjective approach to employment. 
There were many more heavily contested cases on the basis of unfair 
dismissal, what was unfair?"
He was also very clear that this was happening at a time when the role of 
very powerful Trade Unions was beginning to change and employers were 
realising the importance of positive staff relationships which recognised the 
needs of individuals.
Having read this thesis to this point, the reader will appreciate that what 
I was learning served to fuel my hunches about the subjective association 
between employment relationships and employment legislation. Robert had, of 
course, thus far been talking about a period of time which pre-dated my 
particular interest in discrimination law. I asked him if he considered that 
important statutes such as the Sex Discrimination Act and Race Relations Act of 
the 1970s resulted from a policy motivated wish to improve the employment 
environment for workers or as a result of a policy response to the breakdown of 
employment relations that was already happening. His response was 
illuminating and contained a number of strands:
"I think it was a number of factors; it was a period where the 
trade unions were very strong and were influencing 
governments in a way that probably never happened before and 
never happens again. It is trite to comment on beer and 
sandwiches at number 10, but it was very much that sort of 
atmosphere where the trade unions were so strong that they
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could dictate the management of the firms. It was not the 
management who were in charge. The trade unions should not 
have got to the stage where they were dictating the 
management policies of firms they usually did it badly it 
usually led to poor, weak management looking over their 
shoulders at what the trade unions would say or do with regard 
to any decision that was made. There wasn't an atmosphere of 
cooperation and consultation it was very much a 
confrontational situation. You sat on either side of the table it 
didn 't work. We lost a lot of good industry because of this and 
equally it led to very poor management."
I went on to ask Robert where the influence for the 1975 Sex 
Discrimination Act came from. Was it pressure from the unions, was it 
pressure from management, was it pressure from Government, was it pressure 
for a better working environment or was it a combination of all of those? Again 
his response was fascinating:
"It was never pressure from the unions, the unions were always 
very male orientated. I don't think the unions can claim to have 
made a significant improvement to the present situation of 
women. In 17 years of working with the unions, I hardly ever 
met a women trade union member who held a significant post, 
you never met a shop steward who was a woman, you very 
seldom met senior executives of a union who were women. I 
don't believe generally that the trade union movement in those 
days was promoting women's rights. The government I think 
did play a significant part in this. They could see a political 
reward in supporting women's rights. Women constitute 50% 
of the vote. The government could see sex discrimination in the 
work place and supported legislation to prevent sex 
discrimination I think there was a genuine social realisation 
that women were entitled to the same rights as men."
Before leaving this interview with Robert Turner, I need to record one 
further statement from him that has stayed with me throughout this research:
"Where you have subjective problems, you have to adapt a 
different approach. In an objective problem it would be enough 
to explain in your judgement as a tribunal chairman why the 
law found this way rather than that way. With a subjective 
decision, you must always explain not why the one party won
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but why the one party lost. Nobody worries about the reasons 
as to why they won. A good judgement will always explain to 
the loser in a subjective case why he lost. If this is done 
properly that loser goes away satisfied with why he lost. This is 
what judges and courts should do."
This short excursion outside the world of written text provided a 
refreshingly honest and personal first hand perspective on tribunal and 
employment relationship activity and, to some extent, "grounded" my thinking 
in the practicalities of the day. I recognise that the views represented here are 
those of one individual influenced by his own preconceptions and social 
experiences. However, they do add to the richness of my personal and internal 
debate and also chime pretty well -  in time and concept -  with the idea of a 
behavioural perspective on employment relationships and the importance of 
hygiene factors promoted by Argyris (1960), Schein (1965) and Herzberg (1968).
Finally in this short review of my thinking journey, I return to the point 
of entry and a consideration of what truth might look like in relation to my 
epistemological and methodological perspectives. Darwin (2004) drew my 
attention to the concept of alethic pluralism or, in other words, an acceptance 
that truth is a multi-faceted concept and that the analysis of my data may reveal 
evidence of more than one theory of truth -  see Figure 6.7 below.
'Story' hangs together Judgements follow the
and is 'elegant' law and earlier case law
Coherence Correspondence
Consensus Pragmatism
Judgements accepted 
by various groups in 
employment domain
RH side positivistic 
Figure 6.7: Theories of truth (based on Darwin, 2005)
Law that works in 
practice
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For instance, Dworkin's anti-positivist stance -  discussed in Chapter 4 - 
may point to the coherence and consensus theories of truth as the 'justification' 
for this argument. As I have attempted to illustrate with my annotations 
outside Darwin's four box model, this would support Dworkin's ideas of best 
fit taking into account all the circumstances of the case. In pursuing this line, 
Dworkin, and indeed anyone who accepts that there may be more than one 
interpretation -  or version of truth -  is open to challenge. There will always be 
the need to explain why a particular interpretation adds value in the face of any 
number of alternatives that might have value claims. As I fall into this camp, I 
will respond to this challenge as my analysis unfolds in subsequent chapters.
The value, for me at least, in John Darwin's illumination is not to point to 
one version of truth that I can attach myself to, but helping me to undermine 
the very idea of one version of truth holding primacy.
Closing thoughts on chapter six
The purpose of this chapter has been to catch my breath along the 
research journey and to reflect on my learning and approach as a novice 
researcher. I have endeavoured to show how my thinking has m atured and 
how my meeting with Robert Turner helped to put some of my emerging ideas 
into perspective. My energies restored, I approach the next step of my journey: 
the design and use of my interpretative analytical framework.
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CHAPTER SEVEN
DESIGN AND USE OF AN INTERPRETATIVE ANALYTICAL
FRAMEWORK
As should be clear by this point, I am endeavouring to bring together a 
critical philosophy and the hermeneutic interest in insight and understanding. 
What some writers have termed critical interpretation (Denzin and Lincoln, 
2003). Further, to locate this combination within a conceptual framework 
bolstered by reference to some of the theoretical considerations resident in legal 
theory. Under this conceptual umbrella, I am developing a research 
methodology based on critical discourse analysis and, in particular, the textual 
analysis of employment tribunal judgements. I have termed this discourse 
analysis with a critical edge.
Having developed these philosophical and methodological 
underpinnings in detail in the previous two chapters, it is now time to put these 
to one side for the moment and to concentrate on developing the 'engine' to 
drive the research. In other words, to consolidate this thinking into an 
interpretative analytical framework and a practical process of analysis that 
allows me to address the 'how ' question of my research methodology. Once 
this has been done, I introduce the reader to extracts from the chosen 
employment tribunal texts substantially for the first time and expose my 
analytical framework to practical usage. The use of references to other work is 
limited in this chapter as I endeavour to provide the route map and operating 
instructions for my analysis rather than seeking to relate my interpretation 
activity back to what has gone before in the literature. This task is 'on ice' until 
the emerging themes are dealt with substantively, in the chapters that follow 
this one.
Page 95
I have already identified a range of approaches to legal interpretation 
(Chapter four) and discourse analysis (Chapter five) as influential in their 
respective spheres focussing on the contributions of Dworkin and Fairclough 
respectively. It is my intention now to draw on these established perspectives 
and to set out my own model for the critical interpretation of employment 
tribunal judgements. To do so, demands that I provide a brief refresher of the 
ideas presented by Dworkin and Fairclough and outline their respective 
analytical models.
Legal interpretation
The discussion of critical interpretation in a legal context in Chapter 4 
concluded with a summary of Dworkin's stance on legal interpretation and 
pointed the way to his model for constructive interpretation. I return to this 
theme now.
It is important to be clear at this stage that Dworkin's constructive 
interpretation was not referring to the brand of interpretation more often 
associated with lawyers. This approach can best be described as an attempt to 
interpret what was in the mind of the writer of a particular statute or legal 
authority. In other words, to rely on descriptive legal theory and to see lazu as 
it is. Dworkin was seeking to expose a more subjective interpretative attitude 
that presents the law as it ought to be (normative legal theory) and the outcome 
as 'best fit' located within a three stage analytical approach (Harris, 1997). 
Dworkin argues that having identified the elements that are part of law at the 
pre-interpretive stage, adjudicators then proceed to the interpretive stage and 
develop a theory that represents these elements in their best light. This allows 
for the settlement of legal questions at the post-interpretive stage. 
Diagrammatically, Dworkin's approach is represented at Figure 7.1.
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Stage 1 Stage 3
Pre-interpretative Post-interpretative
Figure 7.1 Dworkin's approach to constructive interpretation
What is important to highlight here is that Dworkin advanced a theory 
of law which is not entirely rule based and a contention that legal questions 
almost always yield 'right answers' to a certain set of circumstances (Bix, 1999). 
He argued that the legal system is not a closed logical system in which 
decisions can be deduced from the logical application of pre-determined legal 
rules alone. Hence, as Bix (1999) argues, Dworkin's constructive interpretation 
involves a double aspect: the interpretation of the current body of law and the 
creation of 'new law' according to the principle of best fit. This second element 
has a particular significance when it forms part of a landmark judgement and, 
often, includes a set of guiding principles which lead to a readjustment in legal 
and personnel professional practice. Such judgements are devoured by lawyers 
and employment relations specialists alike in a continuing race to stay ahead, or 
at least in line, with the latest case law. Back in the workplace, subtle -  or 
sometimes not so subtle -  changes of personnel policy or practice are enacted to 
'bring the new case law to life'.
Interpretation and discourse analysis
In similar vein, the review of discourse analysis in Chapter 5 drew to a 
close with a look at Fairclough's approach and again suggested that his model 
for analysis would be visited later in this narrative. I turn to this now as a 
second influence on my own approach. Fairclough (1992) advanced a three 
dimensional model "for empirical research on communication and society" 
(Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002:68). This involves a specific discourse analysis of 
each of the following three elements:
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• stage one - the linguistic features of the text (text)
• stage two - the processes relating to the production and consumption 
of the text (discursive practice)
• stage three - the wider social practice to which the communicative 
event belongs (social practice)
Fairclough's model is reproduced diagrammatically at Figure 7.2
TEXT
SOCIAL PRACTICE
Figure 7.2 Fairclough's three-dimensional model for critical discourse
analysis (1992b: 73)
As Phillips and Jorgensen (2002) point out, Fairclough draws heavily on 
the concepts of interdiscursivity and intertextuality in the discursive practice 
stage of his analytical approach and they merit brief exploration here. 
"Interdiscursivity occurs when different discourses and genres are articulated 
together in a communicative event" and "Intertextuality refers to the condition 
whereby all communicative events draw on earlier events" (Phillips and
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Jorgensen (2002: 73), the former being a form of the latter. In other words, we 
all draw on phrases or words used previously to reformulate a new discourse 
and, on some occasions, draw explicitly on earlier texts. Thus, supporting the 
contention that texts can be seen as links in an intertextual chain (Fairclough, 
1995). Central to Fairclough's approach is that discourse forms part of social 
practice and texts can not be analysed in isolation. To reach understanding, 
texts must be interpreted in relation to other texts and their social context 
thereby giving rise to a range of interpretations and potential meanings 
(Phillips and Jorgensen, 2002). The links between discourse and social practice 
open up a particularly important element of Fairclough's thinking in relation to 
the practice of management. Phillips and Jorgenson (2002: 82) put it succinctly: 
"According to Fairclough's theory, a high level of interdiscursivity is associated 
with change, while a low level of interdiscursivity signals the reproduction of 
the established order".
Recognising that Fairclough presents his approach as a coherent model 
with inter-related parts, albeit separated analytically, I am reluctant to suggest 
that any one of the elements can be given precedence over another or be 
considered in isolation. Flowever, to inform my critical interpretation of 
employment tribunal judgements, my particular interest lies with the second 
and third segments. That is, how existing discourses are drawn upon to create 
and interpret text and the influence of discursive practice on confirming or re­
shaping existing discourse. These seem to me to take me in the direction of 
what is going on in the context of legal interpretation.
A model for discourse analysis with a critical edge
With critical interpretation as the goal, the avenues outlined above -  pre- 
interpretive, interpretive and post-interpretive -  as depicted in the Dworkin 
approach and -  text, discursive practice and social practice -  according to 
Fairclough's analytical style, influence my thinking towards the four phase
Page 99
approach highlighted alongside the Dworkin and Fairclough approaches in the
model at Figure 7.3.
RONALD DWORKIN NORMAN FAIRCLOUGH
Pre-interpretative
• identification of institutions and material 
that are generally recognised as part of law
Text
• understanding how a piece of text is 
constructed
• what is the text trying to achieve? -  
persuade, justify, defend, explain, accuse, 
assert for example
• how does the text achieve its aims -  what 
words, phrases are used and what 
propositions* made?
Interpretative
• development of a theory that shows the 
material identified at the pre-interpretative 
stage in its best light
Discursive practice
• an examination of the context of text 
production
• how does the context influence the types 
of interpretation that might be made?
• the interpretation of a particular statement 
or question in context with impact on the 
subsequent text that is produced in 
response
Post-interpretative
• settle any legal questions based on the 
theory developed at the interpretative stage
Social practice
• an examination of the propositions made
• to what extent the dominant discourses 
are taken for granted or reinforced or 
challenged or defended
• such challenging or defensive propositions 
are competing for dominant recognition 
and a sign that competing discourses exist 
in that particular domain
• Fairclough calls this the 'hegemonic ** 
struggle'
RD STEVEN CHASE NF
pre-i Context dp
pre-i Text t
i Reflexive interpretation dp
t
sp
post-i Implications sp
* propositions -  statements that are treated as self-evident Tacts'.
** hegemony -  the process through which contested views of reality are dealt with in order to 
secure ideological consent
Figure 7.3 Developing a Model for Discourse Analysis (The Dworkin 
elements of the model are based on Harris (1997:190) and the Fairclough 
elements on Dick (2004:205-206)
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Simplistically, my phase one relates to aspects of Dworkin's pre- 
interpretive stage and Fairclough's discursive practice stages. Phase two relates 
to Dworkin's pre-interpretive stage and Fairclough's text stage. My phase three 
is informed by Dworkin's interpretive stage and Fairclough's text / discursive 
practice /  social practice stages. My phase four allows for influence from all 
parts of the Dworkin and Fairclough models - although specifically the 
Dworkin post-interpretative stage and Fairclough's social practice stage. More 
importantly, it opens the door to my own critical reflection and the emergence 
of tentative ideas. For clarity, I have used the word "phase" purely to 
differentiate from the term "stage" most commonly used with reference to 
Dworkin and Fairclough.
The four phases of my approach to analysis are presented as a step by 
step process of conversation with the text and are depicted at Figure 7.4 under 
the heading Discourse Analysis with a Critical Edge. The influences of Dworkin 
and Fairclough are recognised in blue and red type respectively.
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DISCOURSE ANALYSIS WITH A CRITICAL EDGE
Pre-interpretative
Context
Identification of the social issue, marking out the social issue footprint, \
Discursive practicefocus on a social event
Text
Selection and definition of the text to be analysed
Reflexive Interpretation
text
Intuitive identification of suspicion
Interpretative
Reflection on grounds for suspicion
Relate back to text and theory
Implications
Emergent ideas, conclusions and or theories
social practicePost-interpretative
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS WITH A CRITICAL EDGE
Figure 7.4 A model for discourse analysis with a critical edge.
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The practical usage of the model relies to a large extent on the hard graft 
or reading, rereading and coding the data having been undertaken prior to this 
point. As we saw at the end of Chapter 5, the "body of evidence' collected 
during this process is fundamental to good research and discourse analysis in 
particular. As far as my project is concerned, the 'deep dive' examination of the 
data underpins the reflexive interpretation phase of my analysis. By way of 
reminder, the features of the data coding framework are illustrated at Figure
7.5.
DATA CODING FRAMEWORK
'Identification rather than reflection'
identification of any links to 
research considerations and 
wider employment relations 
literature
identification of qualifying  
word, phrase or construct
identification of word, phrase or 
construct that gives cause for suspicion
identification of relationships 
with other words, phrases, 
constructs within the specific 
text (case)
identification of 
relationships w ith other 
words, phrases, constructs 
within the selected texts 
(cases)
Figure 7.5 Data Coding Framework.
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To bring my approach to life before using it more purposefully in 
Chapter 8 and beyond, the remainder of this chapter is devoted to explaining 
the individual phases of the model and demonstrating how this four 
dimensional approach - illustrated at Figure 7.4 - can be related to the data by 
way of a worked example under each heading.
Context
At first glance, this section should be one of the most straightforward 
elements of this narrative: discrimination is the social issue, legal and personnel 
practice and employment relations represent the wider context, the 
employment tribunal is the specific event. Identification complete. Indeed it is 
and I would not wish the reader to let go of this uncomplicated concept. 
However, what is less straightforward is the relationship and interaction 
between the issue, the context and the event and how meanings are constructed 
in this 'relationship'. What in ethnomethodological terms would be viewed as 
the "reflexivity of social interaction and context" (Holstein and Gubrium, 1998: 
153).
The interpretation that follows in the subsequent phases is intended to be 
seen as part of, and contributing to, its social context. In essence therefore, I am 
looking at employment tribunal judgements as texts, as an element of a social 
event (the tribunal), within their social context (legal and personnel practice and 
employment relations). This in itself provides an interesting challenge since 
law is often reported as existing in books (Mansell et al, 2004) and employment 
issues exist within the social situation of the workplace. The need to guard 
against interpretations drawn from one venue being turned into predictions or 
generalisations that can be classed as evidence in alternative venues -  the 
ontological paradox -  is clear. A reminder that critical discourse analysis is 
about exploration and explanation rather than specific remedies is helpful. 
However, it is also difficult to escape the contention that for such an 
employment issue to be resolved in the legal environment of an employment
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tribunal, the social problem -  employment issue -  needs to be translated into a 
legal problem and resolved according to legal rules. This tends to lead to a 
search for the facts that are legally relevant and the exclusion of those facts with 
no legal bearing. What also tends to be sidelined in such a restricted process is 
the social context of the issues being examined. By linking the contextual 
information to a piece of text drawn from that context, there is an opportunity 
to overcome this dilemma: the extract that follows illustrates the point:
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of King (appellant) 
v The Great Britain-China Centre (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  11 October 
1991. An industrial (employment) tribunal had found that the respondent had 
unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground of her race when 
it failed to short-list her for interview for a vacant position in the respondent 
organisation. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal from the 
Great Britain-China Centre and remitted the case to a different employment 
tribunal for a rehearing. The CA allowed the further appeal by Miss King and 
restored the order of the industrial tribunal.
TEXT
"The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected the submission that the decision of 
the majority of the industrial tribunal was perverse, but they accepted the 
primary submission on behalf of the respondent that the majority had erred in
law."
The context box sets out in brief terms the historical and social context, 
the nature of the complaint being examined and the decision of the 'court'. The 
piece of text reproduced here could give the impression that the decision is a 
purely legal matter devoid of context. Such 'context free' decision making may 
have its place in some forms of jurisprudence and even in elements of criminal 
law, but it should not be forgotten that to 'resolve' the issue determined in 
employment tribunal very often involves translating the legal resolution back 
into the social environment of the workplace. Accordingly, context cannot be 
separated from the outcome of the case. This example also supports the 
argument deployed in the previous paragraph that the research cannot simply 
take the version of reality created in one environment -  the employment 
tribunal -  and propose it as evidence in another -  the workplace. All that said, I
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suggest that it is open to the researcher to subject the version of reality 
constructed through tribunal processes and the language of the judgement to 
the scrutiny of the critical discourse analyst's search for hidden or alternative 
realities or meaning. Having done that, it is also permissible to consider the 
transferability of a set of ideas from one context to some others, but not all 
others. It seems to me that this is a process that opens up all sorts of 
interpretative possibilities and workplace reintegration dilemmas which stretch 
far beyond the Tribunal door.
Text
Moving on to the text phase of the analysis, the interest here is to select 
and define the piece of text for analysis. As we have seen, the text needs to be 
placed in context to aid our understanding. For example; in Sinclair Roche, we 
are provided with a helpful and uncomplicated 'definition' of the process of 
reaching a finding of discrimination. Perhaps an interesting development in 
itself since the definition is written down almost 30 years after the Sex 
Discrimination Act became law. I reproduce this below to guide the reader.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Sinclair Roche and 
Temperley and others (appellants) v Heard and another (respondent) -  Employment 
Appeal Tribunal - 22 July 2004. The appeal was against the decision of an 
employment tribunal that two junior partners in a law firm were discriminated 
against on grounds of sex by not being promoted to senior equity partners. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal overruled the decision of the employment tribunal
and allowed the appeal.
TEXT
In order to find discrimination, an employment tribunal must set out the relevant 
facts, draw its inferences if appropriate and then conclude that there is a prima facie 
case of unfavourable treatment by reference to those facts, and then look to the 
respondent for an explanation to rebut the prima facie case. If the tribunal satisfied 
itself that there has been on the face of it unfavourable treatment, it has effectively 
only reached halfway. It must set out clearly its conclusion as to the nature and 
extent of such unfavourable treatment, so that the respondent can understand what
it is that it has to explain.
It must then fully and carefully consider what the explanations of the employer 
were, and why, if such be the case, such explanations provide no answer. It may be 
that there is no explanation, or there may be an explanation which only confirms the 
existence of discrimination, or there may be a non-discriminatory explanation which 
redounds to the employer's discredit such as it always behaves badly to everyone, or 
there may be a non-discriminatory explanation which is wholly admirable.
Beyond this case and the 'uncomplicated definition', the year of 2004 
came to an end -  that is, in terms of burden of proof decisions -w ith Webster v 
Brunei University, a case heard in the EAT on 14 December 2004. The decision 
provided a helpful review of all the recent cases on the shifting the burden of 
proof and it includes an important 'general structure for a discrimination 
finding' as shown below:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Webster 
(appellant) v Brunei University (respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal -  
14 December 2004. An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Webster's race 
discrimination allegations on the grounds that she had failed to establish that the 
person complained of was an employee.
TEXT
The general structure required for a discrimination finding of an employment 
tribunal is now clear.... The tribunal must set out the relevant facts, draw its 
inferences if appropriate and then conclude that there is a prima facie case of 
unfavourable treatment by reference to those facts (identifying it), and then look 
to the respondent for an explanation to rebut the prima facie case. The 
employment tribunal must plainly make quite clear what the unfavourable 
treatment is which is prima facie discriminatory, so that the respondent can 
understand what it is that it has to explain.
To my mind, these two pieces of text earn their place in the analysis 
because they go to the heart of the social issue under the microscope, namely 
discrimination. They also attempt to explain what discrimination is and the 
process for reaching a conclusion that discrimination has taken place. What the 
two extracts also illustrate is the discursive practice of closely aligning texts 
with previous ones to reformulate the discourse. The language used sets the 
tone for much legal argument and professional consideration. It also highlights 
a continuing thirst to develop an authoritative position based on a given set of 
circumstances which can then guide others in entirely different circumstances.
The close relationship between phases one and two of the analysis -  
context and text -  is equally evident in the linkages between phases two and 
three -  text and reflexive interpretation. Indeed, in selecting a particular piece 
of text for analysis I am already involving myself in the reflexive cycle that 
makes up phase three of the analysis. Whilst not in any sense claiming any 
analytical breakthrough here, reaching this position of understanding the
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circularity of the debate and the impracticality of attempting to analyse material 
in isolation represents an important learning point for me.
Reflexive interpretation
Armed with an identified social issue, placed in context, and mindful of 
the social constructionist premise that my approach to a particular data set 
could provide an interpretation which differs from an alternative approach to 
the same data set, I make my way into the analysis. Drawing on Phillips and 
Jorgensen (2002), I recognise that I will find myself emphasising some elements 
and downplaying others as I search for alternative, perhaps disguised or 
hidden, meanings. This is the essence of discourse analysis in the critical 
dimension.
As I illustrated at Figure 7.4, this third phase is itself made up of three 
components: the identification of suspicion, reflection on the grounds for 
suspicion and the relationship with existing text and theory. My first step in 
this third phase is, quite simply, to return to the coding exercise and identify the 
words, phrases or constructs that raised a degree of suspicion in my mind.
Much of this 'suspicion' is driven by a sense of possible preference an d /o r bias. 
Bearing in mind that my data field is written in neutral language by design, I 
start from a premise that my 'suspicion' is more likely to rely on particular 
nuances rather than explicit statements. By way of worked example -  and one 
which happens to fit the latter category - the extract from King v Great Britain 
China Centre below details one of the five principles and guidance included in 
the judgement and includes the words unnecessary and unhelpful:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of King (appellant) v The 
Great Britain-China Centre (respondent) - Court of Appeal - 11 October 1991. An 
industrial (employment) tribunal had found that the respondent had unlawfully 
discriminated against the applicant on the ground of her race when it failed to short­
list her for interview for a vacant position in the respondent organisation. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal from the Great Britain-China Centre 
and remitted the case to a different employment tribunal for a rehearing. The CA 
allowed the further appeal by Miss King and restored the order of the industrial 
tribunal.
TEXT
"It is unnecessary and unhelpful to introduce the concept of a shifting evidential 
burden of proof. At the conclusion of all the evidence the tribunal should make 
findings as to the primary facts and draw such inferences as they consider proper from 
those facts. They should then reach a conclusion on the balance of probabilities, 
bearing in mind both the difficulties which face a person who complains of unlawful 
discrimination and the fact that it is for the complainant to prove his or her case".
REFLEXIVE INTERPRETATION
In reflecting on why my suspicion was aroused by this particular piece of text, I 
acknowledge that the CA may not have been able to foresee the introduction of the 
Burden of Proof Regulations in October 2003 (12 years later), but the use of the words 
"unnecessary" and "unhelpful" in the first line of the extract above appear to have 
been an attempt to warn the legal profession to steer clear of the particular complexity 
of a shifting evidential burden of proof. The latter is a complex area because it requires 
a Tribunal to judge at an early stage of proceedings if the person bringing the case has 
made a prima facia case of discrimination that the employer must explain. Issues 
around burden of proof remained problematical even after this milestone decision and 
as we shall see they have not been clarified entirely by the introduction of the 2003 
regulations. This, and what follows in the remainder of the extract, seems to me to 
widen the scope for subjective construction rather than restricting it. Bearing in mind 
that the quote was written as one of the guiding principles for deciding discrimination 
cases, the suggestion that legislating for burden of proof determination is not the way 
forward carries some significance and raises a number of potential questions.
First, why was it considered unnecessary and unhelpful to legislate. Second, and on 
the other hand, why was it considered necessary to set down principles and 
guidelines? Third, why was so much scope for interpretation and drawing of inference 
being left open for future decision making. The list could continue, but the important 
point here is that a number of questions are raised by the text and they are open to 
interpretation.
To complete the reflexive interpretation cycle, it is necessary to relate these reflections 
back to other elements of texts or related theory. As we saw in chapter 3, attempts to 
clarify the burden of proof issue in discrimination cases is a recurrent theme in my case 
sample, both before and after the introduction of the Burden of Proof Regulations. 
What this suggests to me is that the appellant courts are trying to make the burden of 
proof concept work in a practical sense and give meaningful advice to those required 
to engage with this aspect the law.
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In passing, I mention that the extract also includes the phrase 'draw 
inferences', an early mention of a concept that I will pick up in more detail in 
Chapter 7. At this stage, however, it is sufficient to point out that inference 
appears to hold a significant position in the decision making process in 
discrimination cases. An indisputably subjective concept at play within the 
legal framework of an employment tribunal.
By way of comparison, contrast the line taken regarding the need - or 
more precisely, the absence of a need - to introduce a shifting evidential burden 
of proof in the extract from the 1991 decision in King v Great Britain China 
Centre above to the much more prescriptive line taken in the quotation below 
from the Burden of Proof Regulations introduced twelve years later in 2003. 
From this point on, the Tribunal is being directed to draw an inference of sex 
discrimination if the employer's explanation is inadequate.
CONTEXT
Text shown is an extract from Section 63 A of the Sex Discrimination Act 
amended as a result of the introduction of the Burden of Proof Directive.
TEXT
"Where on the hearing of the complaint, the complainant proves facts from 
which the tribunal could, apart from this section, conclude in the absence of an 
adequate explanation that the respondent (employer) has committed an act of 
discrimination against the complainant which is unlawful, the Tribunal shall 
uphold the complaint against the respondent (employer) unless the respondent 
(employer) proves that he did not commit that act."
REFLEXIVE INTERPRETATION
On reflection, it appears that this "change of heart" after 12 year's of case 
law has not provided sufficient definition around the burden of proof issue and 
that a change in the law would provide such clarity. Perhaps so, but there is 
also a "suspicion" that some may have felt that complainants were finding it 
hard to establish unlawful discrimination and that the pendulum had swung 
too much in favour of employers as advocates became more proficient in 
mounting a defence. Alternatively, the driver may have been a social one based 
on a sense that workplace discrimination remained commonplace and further 
action was required.
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Reflecting on such questions, relating them back to the text, to relevant 
literature and to professional practice is at the heart of my analysis. This is the 
central task of the chapters which follow this one. I am attempting to achieve a 
more complete approach to reflexivity. Firstly, to be reflexive about my 
research methods and in particular how I deploy them and secondly, to 
understand how my own pre-understandings impact on my research 
endeavour. In other words, to embrace what Johnson and Duberley (2000) refer 
to as methodological reflexivity and epistemic reflexivity and to use this 
reflexivity to detect any bias that might contaminate my work (Tsoukas and 
Knudson, 2003).
Implications
Phase four is to a large extent about responding to the 'so what' question. 
Does anything emerge from this analysis that might confirm or question 
existing theory? In the latter case, does the analysis suggest scope for tentative 
new theory? In an attempt to confront these points and to continue the example 
used throughout this Chapter, I turn to an extract from Barton v Investec 
Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd -  the first consideration of the new 
burden of proof regulations by an appellant court.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Barton 
(appellant )v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd. (respondent) -  
Employment Appeal Tribunal -  3 April 2003. An employment tribunal had 
found that the respondent had not unlawfully discriminated against the 
applicant on the ground of her sex when it paid a male comparator a higher 
remuneration package than Ms Barton. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
allowed the appeal and remitted the case to a differently constituted
employment tribunal.
TEXT
"To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the 
grounds of sex, since "no discrimination whatsoever" is compatible with the
Burden of Proof Directive."
REFLEXIVE INTERPRETATION
Coming so soon after the enactment of the Burden of Proof Directive, I am left 
wondering why it should be necessary to elaborate in such absolute terms. If it 
was designed to remove all interpretative doubt, it clearly failed as our 
subsequent examination of burden of proof determination will reveal. If it 
reflects a political and social re-statement of the unacceptability of unlawful 
workplace discrimination, it calls into question the effectiveness of 
discrimination law now 30 years old. I will attempt to interpret these 
interpretations in Chapters 8-10, but, for now, I limit myself to illustrating the
reflexive process.
IMPLICATIONS
What this shows is that the complainant having made a case that needs 
to be answered, the burden on the employer to do so is a tough one -  "in no 
sense whatsoever". Proving "one's innocence" rather than being proven "to be 
guilty" is an entirely different test and, in my contention, brings the legal 
elements of the "industrial jury" even more into play than previously. This is in 
stark contrast to the aspiration of the personnel profession's representative 
body quoted earlier in this narrative, that "as far as possible, the role of law in 
the workplace should be minimised". The implication is a much closer link 
between employment relations and employment law rather than an arms length
divide.
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Closing thoughts on chapter seven
My intention here has been to pull together what has gone before in this 
narrative into a workable model for critical interpretation. True to my research 
design, I have drawn on aspects of discourse analysis and legal interpretation to 
'ground' the model and included a reflexive dimension to underpin the 
analysis. Further, I have illustrated how the model might work with several 
pieces of data to ease the reader into the analysis to be conducted in the 
subsequent chapters.
The remaining chapters will follow a similar pattern. Using the 
interpretative framework described in this Chapter, I will analyse a particular 
theme emerging from the material and provide key analysis and implication 
points at the close of each chapter together with summary comments on the 
theme.
Three of the most striking features of the King v The Great Britain - 
China Centre appear on page one of the judgement and do not require 
discourse analysis expertise to uncover. First, both the applicant (Miss King) 
and the respondent (Great Britain -  China Centre) were represented at the 
Industrial Tribunal stage by Counsel, clearly indicating that highly qualified 
and experienced legal brains were on the scene. As early as 1988 -  if not well 
before -  the complexities of discrimination law were attracting considerable 
interest. Second, the Industrial Tribunal returned a majority decision, the two 
lay members outvoting the legally qualified chair to return a verdict that the 
respondent unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground of her 
race. Third, a frequent and relatively inconsequent workplace event -  the 
rejection of a job applicant -  resulted in a Court of Appeal hearing and a set of 
discrimination guidelines that were to impact on discrimination case law for 
many years. Whilst my focus throughout this research project has been to 
employ my interpretative analytical framework to discover what is not said, 
these more visible influences should not go unrecorded.
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CHAPTER EIGHT
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS WITH A CRITICAL EDGE - IN SEARCH OF 
INFERENCES 
Background
My first analysis chapter considers the concept of inference and its role in 
deciding employment issues at tribunal hearings. As we have already seen in 
the examples of employment tribunal texts in Chapter 7, determinations of 
unlawful discrimination frequently depend on inferences drawn from the facts 
of a particular case. An outcome described in layman terms as "a conclusion 
reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning rather than from explicit 
statements" (Soames and Stevenson, 2003). For legal students, inference is 
more comprehensively defined as "a deduction from the facts given, which is 
usually less than certain, but which may be sufficient to support a finding of 
fact" or "a deduction of an ultimate fact from other proved facts, which proved 
facts, by virtue of the common experience of man, will support, but not compel 
such deductions" (Gifis, 2003). Both of these 'legal definitions' include 
reference to inference as a deduction from the available facts and a definition of 
deduction pays similar attention to inference: "deduction is a species of 
argument or inference where from a given set of premises the conclusion must 
follow" (Honderick, 1995:181). For completeness, the latter commentator also 
recognises the links between inference and inductive reasoning and adductive 
reasoning, respectively described as follows: "inference from particular to 
general" and "accepts a conclusion on the grounds that it explains the available 
evidence" (Honderick, 1995:405 and 1). Notwithstanding this recognition of 
broader perspectives on forms of inference and reasoning, the process of 
drawing inferences in law texts is predominantly linked to deductive reasoning.
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The 'clash' of deductive reasoning most prevalent in legal determination and 
my inductive approach to the analysis of employment tribunal texts is exposed 
in this chapter.
These various definitions provide a useful context for my research 
project and an interesting insight into how the elements of inference might 
influence employment decisions and subsequently be articulated as the 
'common experience of man'. Further, they suggest how a conclusion to a 
social issue might be reached on the basis of evidence and reasoning in a legal 
setting. I will return to these themes in Chapters 9 and 10 respectively. For the 
present, I focus on inferences as powerful and seemingly taken for granted 
elements of legal determinations in employment cases. I will also seek to 
illustrate how inferences drawn from deductive reasoning can be subjected to 
alternative interpretations which question 'unavoidable meanings' and m uddy 
the waters of the employment tribunal judgement. What is clear from reading 
and re-reading the employment tribunal texts in my sample is that the influence 
of inferences in discrimination cases is a common feature and not one to be 
underestimated.
In passing, I note that the role of inference has attracted comment 
beyond the confines of legal interpretation from authors providing guidance on 
the analysis of text and management research. Hodson (1999), for instance, 
expresses the need for caution when choosing a coding process that relies too 
heavily on inference during interpretation of the text suggesting that this 
reduces the reliability of the interpretation. Albeit in the context of observation 
analysis, Seale (1999) also posits the use of what he terms Tow inference 
descriptors' to strengthen the reliability of the interpretation and to preserve the 
neutrality of the researcher as much as possible. These wider references 
contrast beautifully with my theatre of analysis where inference is recognised 
and promoted as a route to decision making. I will return to the exposure of 
my discussion of inference to areas beyond the employment tribunal in my 
closing comments to this chapter.
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The role of inference in the determination of discrimination cases is my 
first emergent theme.
Analysis
It is now time to examine the role of inference in more detail, making use 
of the interpretative framework developed in the previous chapter and 
beginning with an analysis around context, text and reflexive interpretation 
before moving on to consider potential implications. The process is 
summarised diagrammatically for ease of reference in Figure 8.1 below.
Context Text
Reflexive Interpretatio
mplicatiom
Figure 8.1: Interpretative framework for discourse analysis with a critical edge.
In the 21 page CA judgement in King v Great Britain China Centre, as an 
example, the words 'inference', 'infer' or 'inferred' appear on 19 occasions. 
Moreover, this landmark judgement contained a set of guiding principles from 
the Court of Appeal that remained a point of reference in discrimination cases
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for over 10 years. The concept of inference is central to these guidelines as the 
extract below illustrates.
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of King (appellant) 
v The Great Britain-China Centre (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  11 October 
1991. An industrial (employment) tribunal had found that the respondent had 
unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground of her race when 
it failed to short-list her for interview for a vacant position in the respondent 
organisation. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal from the 
Great Britain-China Centre and remitted the case to a different employment 
tribunal for a rehearing. The Court of Appeal allowed the further appeal by 
Miss King and restored the order of the industrial tribunal.
TEXT
1. It is for the applicant who complains of racial discrimination to make out 
his or her case. Thus if the applicant does not prove the case on the 
balance of probabilities he or she will fail.
2. It is important to bear in mind that it is unusual to find direct evidence of 
racial discrimination. Few employers will be prepared to admit such 
discrimination even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will 
not be ill-intentioned but merely based on an assumption "he or she 
would not have fitted in"._________________________________________
3. The outcome of the case will therefore usually depend on what inferences 
it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal. These 
inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any inferences that it is just 
and equitable to draw in accordance with section 65(2)(b) of the 1976 Act 
from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire.
3. Though there will be some cases where, for example, the non-selection of 
the applicant for a post or for promotion is clearly not on racial grounds, 
a finding of discrimination and a finding of a difference in race will often 
point to the possibility of racial discrimination. In such circumstances 
the tribunal will look to the employer for an explanation. If no 
explanation is then put forward or if the tribunal considers the 
explanation to be inadequate or unsatisfactory it will be legitimate for the 
tribunal to infer that the discrimination was on racial grounds. This is 
not a matter of law but, as May LJ put it in Noone, "almost common 
sense".
4. It is unnecessary and unhelpful to introduce the concept of a shifting 
evidential burden of proof. At the conclusion of all the evidence the 
tribunal should make findings as to the primary facts and draw such 
inferences as they consider proper from those facts. They should then 
reach a conclusion on the balance of probabilities, bearing in mind both 
the difficulties which face a person who complains of unlawful 
discrimination and the fact that it is for the complainant to prove his or 
her case.
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Let us consider the third principle -  highlighted above -  relate it to other 
mentions of inference in King and elsewhere in my sample cases and run it 
through the 'reflexive interpretation' phase of my interpretative framework.
We should remind ourselves that at the time of the King judgement in 1991 the 
legal burden of proof in discrimination cases lay with the claimant and that this 
had been the case since the introduction of the Sex and Race Discrimination 
Acts in 1975 and 1976 respectively.
The principle includes the sentence:
"The outcome of the case will therefore usually depend on what inferences 
it is proper to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal."
The clear implication being that inferences drawn from the facts rather than 
facts themselves are likely to determine the outcome of the case. Recognising 
that these principles are designed to assist employment tribunals to reach their 
conclusions, a further potential implication is that employment tribunal 
members will set out on a positive search for inferences as they absorb the 
written and verbal evidence presented to them. Whilst I am not suggesting that 
employment tribunals will put aside their responsibility to establish the facts of 
the case, it is hard to imagine that they will not also be forming a subjective 
opinion of the evidence and the witnesses presented to them. Essentially, 
building their conclusion around opinion -  or inference -  and then looking for 
facts to support such inference rather than drawing inferences from the facts.
Most observers, I suggest, would see this as a dilution of an objective 
focus on facts and a move in the direction of a more subjective focus on 
inference. Taken further, can such a subjective basis for decision making be 
made more objective by finding more and more facts to support the inference? 
This appears to be the implication of inserting the word proper in the sentence 
above. In other words, at which point is the standard of proof reached or the 
basis of the balance of probabilities in discrimination cases? At which point can
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it be decided that one version of events is more probable than another? I don't 
really have a definitive answer to these questions, but my interpretation of the 
data in front of me is that the tipping point is likely to be a variable feature. So, 
not only are employment tribunals now faced with a shifting burden of proof 
as a result of legislation, but we might also be facing a shifting standard of 
proof in discrimination cases. A standard determined through the subjective 
application of reason and logic to militate a conclusion from a set of proven or 
accepted facts.
Beyond the use of the word inference and the impact of inferences on 
decision making, I am also particularly intrigued by the use of the word proper 
and other qualifying words and their relationship to inference. What does 
proper mean in this context? Does it differ from everyday, commonplace usage 
of the word proper, that is regarded to be genuine? If it does differ, is there 
scope for misunderstanding and the possibility of alternative meanings? 
Although proper is not elaborated upon in the original elements of the King 
narrative, the judgement does include an attempt at explanation by the 
inclusion of a reference to an extract from an earlier case -  North West Thames 
Regional Health Authority v Noone (1988):
"It is not often that there is direct evidence of racial discrimination, and 
these complaints more often than not have to be dealt with on the basis 
of what are the proper inferences to be drawn from the primary facts.
For myself I would have thought that it was almost common sense that, 
if there is a finding of discrimination and of difference of race and then 
an inadequate or unsatisfactory explanation by the employer for the 
discrimination, usually the legitimate inference will be that the 
discrimination was on racial grounds."
In the above extract from Noone and elsewhere in the King decision 
itself, the word legitimate appears seemingly as an alternative to the word 
proper:
Page 120
"It was therefore legitimate for them to draw an inference that the 
discrimination was on racial grounds." and "... usually the legitimate 
inference will be that the discrimination was on racial grounds."
Further, yust and equitable is also used in King again apparently as an alternative 
to proper and/ or legitimate:
"... the court or tribunal may draw any inference from that fact that it 
considers is just and equitable to draw ..."
In the case of Zafar v Glasgow City Council, considered by the HL in 1997, 
much of the King judgement is revisited and endorsed. Of particular note is the 
clarification of whether an inference of discrimination should be made in certain 
circumstances or whether it was legitimate to draw an inference of 
discrimination in such circumstances.
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CONTEXT
Text below is an extract from the decision in the case of Zafar (appellant) v 
Glasgow City Council (respondents) - House of Lords -  27 November 1997. An 
industrial (employment) tribunal had found that the respondents had unfairly 
dismissed and unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground of 
his race when it failed to adopt a fair procedure in respect of his dismissal on 
disciplinary grounds. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the 
employers' appeal against the finding of race discrimination and unfair 
dismissal. The employers further appealed the finding of race discrimination to 
the Court of Session and their appeal was allowed on the grounds that the 
industrial tribunal had erred in finding that he had been treated less favourably 
than others and in making an inference of discrimination on racial grounds. Mr 
Zafar appealed to the House of Lords who dismissed the appeal.
TEXT
Over the years since 1975, the courts have sought to give guidance to industrial
tribunals as to how inferences of fact can properly be drawn in this context.
In my judgement, that (making reference to King 1991) is the guidance which 
should in future be applied in these cases. In particular, certain remarks of
mine............
to the effect that such inference 'should' be drawn, put the matter too high, are 
inconsistent with later Court of Appeal authority and should not be followed.
Clear direction was given that should infer placed the matter too high and that 
legitimate to draw an inference was the correct position. Thus, leaving a greater 
degree of discretion with the tribunal than otherwise would have been the case 
and, in my contention, adding weight to the idea of a variable tipping point 
around standard of proof issues.
In the space of just two of my chosen cases -  King and Zafar -  and one 
referenced case -  Noone -  we have seen an indication of the significance 
attached to inferences and generated a debate around the qualifying words 
proper; legitimate, just and equitable. (See Figures 8.2 and 8.3.) Moreover, we 
have exposed the discussion about the weight to be attached to such inferences: 
should draw inference or legitimate to draw an inference.
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inference/infer
Proper
( 4 )
just and equitable 
(2)
legitimate
( 3 )
Figure 8.2: Inference and Qualified Inference. (Data drawn from King v Great 
Britain-China Centre (1991) IRLR 513 CA.)
inference/ infer
Proper
( 3 )
legitimate
( 3 )
Figure 8.3: Inference and Qualified Inference. (Data drawn from Zafar v 
Glasgow City Council (1998) IRLR 36 HL.)
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Such closer examination of these two texts in search of references to 
inference and qualified inference reveals the sort of language pattern that the 
discourse analyst strives to identify. As Fairclough (1999) points out, such 
textual analysis should be carried out seriously and thoroughly, but its real 
value in social research emerges when the relationship between textual analysis 
and social context is examined. This broad guidance seems to me to facilitate 
the interpretation of concepts and patterns which can be contextualised within 
the domain of a discrimination law determination at an employment tribunal, 
but also more widely within the domains of the employment relationship and 
the organisation footprint. For example, and in the context of this discussion 
about inference and qualified inference and my role as a personnel professional, 
it allows me to reflect on the considerable difference between advising a 
manager that she should take a particular course of action rather than advising 
her that it is legitimate for her to take a particular course of action. Missing this 
subtlety in policy writing could lead to unintended consequences if the policy is 
subsequently subjected to employment tribunal scrutiny and interpretation.
The Zafar case involved discussion about the relationship between 
unreasonable behaviour on the part of the employer and what inferences can be 
drawn from such unreasonable behaviour. An issue revisited at length in Bahl 
v The Law Society (2004) where the EAT confirmed that unreasonable 
behaviour does not equate to discriminatory behaviour. The notion of 
reasonableness and the ideas of the reasonable person are covered extensively 
in Chapter nine and I will not dwell on them here. Suffice to say, that the 
textual examples which follow illustrate a connection between inference and 
reasonableness.
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CONTEXT
Text below is an extract from the decision in the case of Zafar (appellant) v 
Glasgow City Council (respondents) - House of Lords -  27 November 1997. An 
industrial (employment) tribunal had found that the respondents had unfairly 
dismissed and unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground of 
his race when it failed to adopt a fair procedure in respect of his dismissal on 
disciplinary grounds. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the 
employers' appeal against the finding of race discrimination and unfair 
dismissal. The employers further appealed the finding of race discrimination to 
the Court of Session and their appeal was allowed on the grounds that the 
industrial tribunal had erred in finding that he had been treated less favourably 
than others and in making an inference of discrimination on racial grounds. Mr 
Zafar appealed to the House of Lords who dismissed the appeal.
TEXT
The industrial tribunal erred in drawing an hiferencej that because the local 
authority had afforded the appellant treatment falling far below that of "a 
reasonable employer", there was a presumption that they had treated him 
differently and "less favourably" than others within the meaning of the 
definition of discrimination in s.l(l) of the Race Relations Act.
The conduct of a hypothetical reasonable employer is irrelevant to deciding 
whether a discrimination claimant has been treated by the alleged discriminator 
"less favourably" than that person treats or would have treated another. If the 
alleged discriminator is not a reasonable employer, he might well have treated 
another employee in just the same unsatisfactory way as he treated the 
complainant, in which case he would not have treated the complainant "less 
favourably "for the purposes of the Act. The reasoning of Lord Morison in the 
Court of Session, that it cannot be inferred only from the fact that an employer 
had acted unreasonably towards one employee that he would have acted 
reasonably if he had been dealing with another in the same circumstances could 
__________________________ not be improved on.__________________________
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The relationship between unreasonable behaviour and the drawing of 
inferences also attracted comment in Igen Ltd and Others v Wong (2005):
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the conjoined cases of Igen 
Ltd. and others (appellants) v Ms Wong (respondent) and Chamberlain 
Solicitors and another (appellant) v Ms Emokpae (respondent) and Brunei 
University (appellant) v Ms Webster (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  18
February 2005.
TEXT
Whilst we would caution ETs against too readily inferring unlawful 
discrimination on a prohibited ground merely from unreasonable conduct 
where there is no evidence of other discriminatory behaviour on such ground, 
we cannot say that the ET was wrong to draw that inference.............................
Bahl v The Law Society (2004) also provides a complex and much 
reported twist on the burden of proof debate since the case was initiated in 
employment tribunal in 2000, prior to the introduction of the Burden of Proof 
Regulations in 2001, but not finally determined in the Court of Appeal until July 
2004. The case attracted considerable media interest and sits astride the 
legislative changes rather uncomfortably. This is particularly so since the EAT's 
decision contains a lengthy analysis of the most recent case law in respect of 
proving discrimination and purports to provide guidance on the correct 
approach to such matters. The decision is questioned almost immediately, due 
to the EAT's failure to recognise the impact of the Burden of Proof Regulations 
2001 (Rubenstein, 2003). The centrality of drawing inferences in determining 
the outcome of the case appears less in doubt as the extract below illustrates.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Bahl (appellant) 
v The Law Society and others (respondents) -  Court of Appeal -  30 July 2004.
An employment tribunal had found that the applicant (Dr Bahl) had been 
unlawfully discriminated against in some respects, but rejected many of her 
allegations. The Law Society and two individuals named as respondents 
appealed to the EAT. Dr Bahl cross-appealed. The EAT allowed the appeal and 
held that the employment tribunal had failed to take account of the obvious 
non-discriminatory treatment. The EAT dismissed the cross-appeal. Dr Bahl 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and her appeal was dismissed. The Court of 
Appeal confirming the findings of the EAT.
TEXT
The employment tribunal erred in law in finding that the President of the Law 
Society, Robert Sayer, and its Secretary General, Jane Betts, discriminated 
against the applicant on grounds of her race and sex in their treatment of her 
when she was Vice President of the Law Society. This was a case not merely of 
inadequate reasons, but of inadequate reasons combined with errors of law and 
in particular the absence of findings of primary fact from which race or sex 
discrimination could properly be inferred, whilst at the same time the tribunal 
made findings which provided non-discriminatory reasons for any less 
favourable treatment. The EAT was right not to remit the case. There was no 
evidence on which the tribunal could properly have found discrimination.
As we have already seen, between 1991, when the King decision 
emerged, and the introduction of the Burden of Proof Regulations in 2001, the 
role of inference in employment tribunal decision making remained prominent, 
but largely consistent. In 2003, the appellant courts engage with the Burden of 
Proof for the first time following the introduction of the new regulations and 
we are immediately in receipt of new guidelines for determining the outcome of 
discrimination cases. Barton v Intestec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd. 
marks a watershed point in the same way that King v Great Britain China 
centre did 12 years earlier.
The 'Barton guidance' is reproduced below to illustrate how the 
interpretation of discrimination law developed in the 12 years since the King 
judgement.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Barton 
(appellant )v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd. (respondent) -  
Employment Appeal Tribunal -  3 April 2003. An employment tribunal had 
found that the respondent had not unlawfully discriminated against the 
applicant on the ground of her sex when it paid a male comparator a higher 
remuneration package than Ms Barton. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
allowed the appeal and remitted the case to a differently constituted
employment tribunal.
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TEXT
1. Pursuant to S . 6 3 A ,  it is for the applicant to prove on the balance of 
probabilities facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of 
an adequate explanation, that the respondents have committed an act of 
discrimination which is unlawful by virtue of Part II or which by virtue of 
s.41 or 42 is to be treated as having been committed against the applicant. 
These are referred to below as "such facts".
2. If the applicant does not prove such facts he or she will fail.
3. It is important to bear in mind in deciding whether the applicant has 
proved such facts that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex 
discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such 
discrimination, even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will 
not be an intention but merely based on the assumption that "he or she 
would not have fitted in".
4. In deciding whether the applicant has proved such facts, it is important 
to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by the tribunal 
will therefore usually depend on what inferences it is proper to draw from 
the primary facts found by the tribunal.
5. It is important to note the word is "could". At this stage the tribunal 
does not have to reach a definitive determination that such facts would lead 
it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful discrimination. At this 
stage a tribunal is looking at primary facts proved by the applicant to see 
what inferences of secondary fact could be drawn from them.
6. These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any inferences that it 
is just and equitable to draw in accordance with s.74(2)(B) of the Sex 
Discrimination Act from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire or 
any other questions that fall within s.74(2).
7. Likewise, the tribunal must decide whether any provision of any 
relevant code of practice is relevant and if so, take it into account^ in 
determining such facts pursuant to s.56A(10). This means that inferences 
may also be drawn from any failure to comply with any relevant code of 
practice. _____
8. Where the applicant has proved facts from which inferences could be 
drawn that the respondents have treated the applicant less favourably on 
the grounds of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the respondent.
9. It is then for the respondent to prove that he did not commit, or as the 
case may be, is not to be treated as having committed that act.
10. To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on 
the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever 
on the grounds of sex, since "no discrimination whatsoever" is compatible 
with the Burden of Proof Directive.
11. That requires a tribunal to assess not merely whether the respondent has 
proved an explanation for the facts from which such inferences can be 
drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the burden of proof on
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the balance of probabilities that sex was not any part of the reasons for the 
treatment in question.
12. Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in 
the possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect cogent 
evidence to discharge that burden of proof. In particular the tribunal will 
need to examine carefully explanations for failure to deal with the 
questionnaire procedure and /  or code of practice.
Significant as the 'Barton guidelines' are to the burden of proof story, 
they were not to survive long without further amendment. The Court of 
Appeal heard three conjoined appeals in February 2005 and, as a result, set out 
revised guidance on the burden of proof provisions in the discrimination 
legislation, albeit drawing heavily on the principles laid out in Barton. They are 
reproduced in full below to confirm this point.
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the conjoined cases of Igen 
Ltd. and others (appellants) v Ms Wong (respondent) and Chamberlain 
Solicitors and another (appellant) v Ms Emokpae (respondent) and Brunei 
University (appellant) v Ms Webster (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  18 
February 2005_________________________________________________________
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TEXT
1. Pursuant to section 63A of the SDA, it is for the claimant who 
complains of sex discrimination to prove on the balance of probabilities 
facts from which the tribunal could conclude, in the absence of an 
adequate explanation, that the respondent has committed an act of 
discrimination against the claimant which is unlawful by virtue of Part II 
or which by virtue of s.41 or s.42 of the SDA is to be treated as having 
been committed against the claimant. These are referred to below as 
"such facts".
2. If the claimant does not prove such facts he or she will fail.
3. It is important to bear in mind in deciding whether the claimant 
has proved such facts that it is unusual to find direct evidence of sex 
discrimination. Few employers would be prepared to admit such 
discrimination, even to themselves. In some cases the discrimination will 
not be an intention but merely based on the assumption that "he or she 
would not have fitted in".
4. In deciding whether the claimant has proved such facts, it is 
important to remember that the outcome at this stage of the analysis by 
the tribunal will therefore usually depend on what inference^ it is proper 
to draw from the primary facts found by the tribunal.
5. It is important to note the word "could" in s.63A(2). At this stage 
the tribunal does not have to reach a definitive determination that such 
facts would lead it to the conclusion that there was an act of unlawful 
discrimination. At this stage a tribunal is looking at the primary facts 
before it to see what inferences: of secondary fact could be drawn from 
them.
6. In considering what inferences or conclusions can be draw n from 
the primary facts, the tribunal must assume that there is no adequate 
explanation for those facts.
7. These inferences can include, in appropriate cases, any i
that it is just and equitable to draw in accordance with section 74(2) (b) of 
the SDA from an evasive or equivocal reply to a questionnaire or any 
other questions that fall within section 74(2) of the SDA.
8. Likewise, the tribunal must decide whether any provision of any 
relevant code of practice is relevant and if so, take it into account in 
determining, such facts pursuant to section 56A(10) of the SDA. This 
means that inferences may also be drawn from any failure to comply 
with any relevant code of practice.
9. Where the claimant has proved facts from which conclusions 
could drawn that the respondent has treated the claimant less favourably 
on the ground of sex, then the burden of proof moves to the respondent.
10. It is then for the respondent to prove that he did not commit, or as 
the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that act.
11. To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to 
prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense 
whatsoever on the grounds of sex, since "no discrimination whatsoever" 
is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive.
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12. That requires a tribunal to assess not merely whether the 
respondent has proved an explanation for the facts from which such 
inferences can be drawn, but further that it is adequate to discharge the 
burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that sex was not a ground 
for the treatment in question.
13. Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally 
be in the possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect 
cogent evidence to discharge that burden of proof. In particular, the 
tribunal will need to examine carefully explanations for failure to deal 
with the questionnaire procedure and /o r code of practice.
14.
Notwithstanding the change in legislation around the burden of proof, 
the frequent references to inferences remain. However, attempts to clarify 
continue and point six -  highlighted above -  can be seen as a significant 
addition to the guidelines laid down in Barton. The amendments as a whole 
confirm that the Court of Appeal expects employment tribunals to follow a two- 
stage process where stage one consists of the claimant proving facts that, in the 
absence of an adequate explanation, the tribunal could conclude an unlawful 
discrimination act. Stage two requires the respondent to prove that they did 
not commit the unlawful act. Point six seems to suggest 'parking' any adequate 
explanations until stage one of the process has been completed. This seems to 
me a considerable mental challenge for a tribunal member attempting to 
identify proven primary facts from what could be a substantial body of material 
presented. An instruction which implies a delay in the opinion forming process 
does not appear tenable.
The extract from Madarassy v Nomura Pic below illustrates how 
employment tribunals might use the lack of potential to draw inferences to 
'disprove' an allegation:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Madarassy 
(appellant) v Nomura Pic (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  26 January 2007. 
An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Madarassy7s claims of sex 
discrimination, victimisation and unfair dismissal and her appeal against these 
findings was dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal with the exception 
of 2 matters which were remitted back to the employment tribunal to 
reconsider. The main ground of the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal 
was that the employment tribunal misdirected itself in law on the burden of
proof.
TEXT
Although the tribunal did not in every case spell out the process of making 
inferences, it was well aware of the familiar process of drawing appropriate 
inference! from primary facts: see paragraphs 163,164,167 AND 169 (4) of its 
decision. The tribunal's approach \yas that, if it considered that there were 
no relevant facts from which inferences could be drawn supporting her 
allegations of sex discrimination, then it was entitled to dismiss her claim 
without shifting the burden of proof to Nomura and requiring it to provide a 
non-discriminatory explanation proving that it had not committed an 
unlawful act of discrimination.
Finally in this collection of texts about inference, the extract from 
University of Huddersfield v Wolff below merits inclusion here because it 
seems to suggest that facts and inferences are of equal value:
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of University of 
Huddersfield (appellants) v Wolff (respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal 
-  16 July 2003. AN employment tribunal had upheld Dr W olffs complaint of 
unlawful sex discrimination when a male colleague had been promoted to 
principal lecturer and Dr Wolff had not been promoted. The Employment 
Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal and remitted the case back to the 
employment tribunal for rehearing._______________________________________
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TEXT
Once the tribunal concludes that there is a prima facie case, it then considers 
the respondent's explanations. It must, if it has not already done so, make 
findings of fact, or draw inferences from findings of fact, for the purposes of 
concluding whether any of the explanations put forward by the respondent 
satisfy them, the burden being on the respondent to show that the less 
favourable treatment was not on the grounds of sex.
The case studies in this field suggest that the use and interpretation of 
inferences has been a consistent theme, but one frequently misunderstood and 
demanding of clarification at the CA level on more than one occasion. First in 
1991 and more recently in early 2005. If that is the case, it seems to me to 
remove one of the 'objective layers' of legal decision making as it applies to 
employment legislation. A CA intervention in 1991 -  16 years after the 
introduction of the Sex Discrimination Act -  begs the question of what was 
going on in the intervening period. Additionally, why was it felt necessary to 
introduce the Burden of Proof Directive in 2001 and why was the meaning 
attached to its introduction so fiercely debated until the CA intervened again in 
February 2005? For me, the answers to these questions display an uncertainty 
amongst professionally qualified practitioners attempting to exercise a 
discretionary concept.
We have also questioned a further 'objective layer' of the decision 
making process around the point at which the standard of proof is reached. A 
balance of probability standard sits more easily with interpretation and opinion 
than it does with reason and logic. In consequence, the important piece of 
knowledge for the personnel profession is a realisation that whatever the 
outward impression of the employment tribunal system might be -  commonly 
an arena for legal arbitration -  it may not be so tightly defined by legal rules as 
we might think.
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In Zafar, we are treated to an obvious example of inter-textuality -  one 
text drawing explicitly on others -  a practice which is integral to the extension 
of legal jurisprudence through case law. As Rubenstien (1998: 2) puts it: "The 
House of Lords now rules that the guidance set in King should be preferred to 
the earlier test in Khanna and Chattopadhyay...." This 'story building' from a 
broader context lies at the heart of discourse analysis and can reveal either some 
reinforcement of the established discourse or a move towards a new discourse. 
Identifying these nuances at an early stage offers an important advantage to the 
practitioner attempting to keep pace with changes in the employment law 
environment.
In the preceding paragraphs of this chapter, I have drawn attention to 
inference as a frequenter of the pages of my chosen employment tribunal texts 
and argued the centrality of the concept to the decision making process. I have 
also implied that it is such a difficult concept to pin down that it has led to 
numerous attempts to tighten the definition and add qualifying words such as 
proper or legitimate. All of this in an area benefiting from legal training and 
experience, ranging from a legally qualified employment tribunal chair to the 
Law Lords and their extensive supporting network. For personnel 
practitioners, without a deeper understanding of the legal principles 
underpinning inference, the challenge is perhaps even greater.
Implications
In moving to the potential implications of my analysis of inference -  
what Dworkin terms post-interpretative and Fairclough social practice in their 
approaches -  it is important to remember that in critical discourse analysis the 
findings are normally arrived at through an analysis of the relationship 
between discursive practice and the broader concept of social practice. In other 
words, does this analysis serve to reinforce the existing discourse or does it 
contribute to a change in social practice through a challenge to what has gone 
before. The King judgement provides a very clear example of such a challenge 
with the inclusion of guidance on dealing with discrimination cases which was
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to become the dominant discourse in this area of employment law for many 
years. This change in the social order of things also reflects a retrospective 
element in that it confirms the unsatisfactory nature of what had gone before. 
As we have seen before, a main interest for the critical discourse analyst is the 
extent to which this change revealed underlying disparities and inequalities or, 
in its revised construction, put in place a whole new set of powerful discourse 
implications. I have argued that inference has had an enduring influence ever 
since employment law took a 'subjective turn' with the introduction of 
discrimination legislation and associated human interpretations of concepts 
such as fairness and equality (Turner, 2000). Just as Garfinkel (1969) found with 
jurors looking for evidence rather than looking at the evidence, the King 
guidelines direct employment tribunal members to pro-actively seek inferences 
from the evidence presented. In the hermeneutic sense, the appellant 
authorities in King -  and indeed in Zafar which followed soon afterwards - 
were trying to describe what discrimination means to an audience well beyond 
those associated with these two specific cases.
I have also argued that without the sort of deeper exploration of text and 
the associated contextual relationship that I have conducted in this chapter, the 
changing personality of a key concept such as inference will evade the busy 
practitioner. To adopt a suspicious stance every time I read the word inference 
in an employment tribunal text sparks reflective consideration and opens the 
door to reflexivity if I have the ambition to proceed. To read and think in this 
way has been necessary for this research project, but applied to business and 
management more generally would remind us that what looks like a step 
change, may have been developing nuance by nuance over a period of time. 
Our professional bodies and the various training providers may wish to 
consider this challenge.
I am left with an uncomfortable feeling that years of legal argument have 
done little to simplify the 'workplace court' for managers, staff and the 
personnel practitioner. Whilst I recognise that I make this observation on the
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back of the detailed analysis of only one key discrimination law concept I do so 
in the confidence that the story of inference alone is far from straightforward. 
In my experience, claimants, respondents and witnesses enter the employment 
tribunal bearing a range of emotions from arrogance to anger to fear, but united 
in the belief that the facts will emerge and that their position will be vindicated. 
Most do not have the energy or inclination to get to know the legal principles at 
play. As we have seen in the analysis in this chapter, when a case reaches an 
appellant court on a point of law workplace justice has already been left some 
distance behind. The concern here lies in confirming or setting legal 
procedures. Win or lose is still important -  perhaps more so in view of the 
mounting cost -  to the original protagonists, bit their story has moved from 
workplace conflict to legal debate. All of which makes resolution of differences 
and reintegration more difficult rather than easier. I suspect that Miss King 
wanted to secure the job she had applied for, not to be originator of an 
employment tribunal case that would generate guidance for establishing 
unlawful discrimination!
My analysis and consequent implications are summarised in the table at 
Figure 8.4.
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ANALYSIS IN BRIEF
• Discrimination cases do not always provide the proven facts to reach a 
conclusion in themselves.
• Inference lies at the heart of decision making in discrimination cases.
• Repeated attempts to clarify and qualify what is meant by the drawing of 
inferences have only been partially successful.
• Employment tribunal members are guided to draw inferences from the 
primary facts of the case, but the guidance might influence them to form 
an opinion and then look for the facts to support such opinion.
• Inference is frequently qualified by words such as proper and legitimate.
IMPLICATIONS IN BRIEF
• The 'objective illusion' of employment tribunals as a legal arena for the 
determination of legal matters, according to legal rules is undermined.
• The personnel profession need to recognise that the first point above 
influences the approach to handling discrimination cases accordingly.
• Understanding the storyline and nuances of the legislation and of case 
law is important in the formulation of policy and practice.
• The employment tribunal system is falling down between the twin goals 
of providing a forum for determining workplace matters and setting the 
legal dimension for social issues, such as discrimination at work.
• Disclosure analysis and reflexivity provide the practitioner with a social 
history of the development of taken for granted concepts.
Figure 8.4: Analysis and implications in brief.
Summary comments on the concept of inferences
At this point, I remind the reader of Lord Justice Mummery's remarks in 
Madassary v Nomura International Pic (2006) IRLR 246 CA, one of my selected 
cases:
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"I do not underestimate the significance of the burden of 
proof in discrimination cases. There is probably no other 
area of the civil law in which the burden of proof plays a 
larger part than in discrimination cases. Arguments on the 
burden of proof surface in almost every case. The factual 
content of the cases does not simply involve testing the 
credibility of witnesses on contested issues of fact. Most 
cases turn on the accumulation of multiple findings of 
primary fact, from which the court or tribunal is invited to 
draw an inference of a discriminatory explanation of those 
facts. It is vital that, as far as possible, the law on the 
burden of proof applied by the fact finding body is clear 
and certain/'
This extract from one of the most recent cases to engage with the burden 
of proof in discrimination cases offers confirmation of my endeavours to put 
forward convincing arguments around the importance of inference in 
determining unlawful discrimination and to question how well this is 
understood, particularly in respect of those who might become involved in 
employment tribunal proceedings and those working in the personnel 
profession.
I am not suggesting that the influence space occupied by inference in 
legal reasoning and decision making is in any way a new phenomena. The 
development of a 'corpus of knowledge', or case, from which inferences can be 
drawn is a central finding of Garfinkel's (1967) exploration of the 'decision 
making rules' adapted by jurors. However, it is not, in my experience, a 
concept which features heavily in human resources teachings or texts and yet 
the story of how it has developed reveals much about how discrimination law 
has been shaped over the last 30 years.
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CHAPTER NINE
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS WITH A CRITICAL EDGE -NOTIONS OF 
COMMON SENSE AND REASONABLENESS
Background
My second analysis chapter considers the idea that employment 
tribunals seek to deliver common sense solutions that are readily accepted as 
such by the 'passenger on the Clapham omnibus' and that those solutions are 
based around the subjective concept of reasonableness. Before indulging in the 
analysis, I share with the reader some definitions of the two concepts drawn 
from both legal and more general settings, starting with common sense.
Two 'definitions' of common sense -  one from organisation theory and 
one from legal theory -  illustrate the significance of the concept, but also how 
the emphasis might be very different in alternative arenas. Hatch and Cunliffe 
(2007: 4) refer to common sense as "a theory about how to understand and 
negotiate life", whilst (MacCormick, 1994:11) comments "....there is a matter of 
'common sense' as well as justice. This I believe depends on an appeal to 
contemporary positive morality as understood by the judge". These differences 
and definitions merit further exploration and discussion particularly, in my 
view, against the backdrop of the ethomethodological endeavour which stands 
astride the legal and management disciplines and focuses on how we make 
sense of our world. As Jenkings (2006) reminded us recently, the work of 
Garfinkel (1997) -  the acknowledged founder of ethomethodological 
approaches - is now 40 years old, but no less influential across a range of 
disciplines, including sociology, psychology and education studies. Garfinkel's 
treatise emphasised that the role of ethomethodological studies is to explore 
everyday activities, practical applications and common sense knowledge.
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At the broader level of understanding, Garfinkel talked about "common 
sense knowledge of social structures" and " descriptions of a society that its
members use and treat as known in common with other members, and
with other members take for granted." (Garfinkel, 1997: 76-77) This approach 
resonates with the Hatch and Cunliffe definition quoted above, but goes a step 
further by placing common sense meaning in the context of a society and its 
members. Rather helpfully, for this writer at least, Garfinkers elaboration sits 
comfortably with my Fairclough based approach to discourse analysis which 
involves textual analysis and the relationship between the text and the social 
practice in which it occurs.
Equally helpfully, Garfinkel extends his common sense approach to the 
interpretation of professional fact finding. In a legal setting, he contends that 
"Jurors make their decisions while maintaining a healthy respect for the routine 
features of the social order." (Garfinkel, 1997:104) and that "They (jurors) 
decide 'the facts' .... by consulting the consistency of alternative claims with 
common sense models." (Garfinkel, 1997:106) Again, Garfinkel's description is 
congruent with McCormick's insight in paragraph two above. The link to the 
'contemporary positive morality of the judge' is less evident, but in my own 
work I cover-off this dimension using Dworkin's notion of law of integrity 
where the judge seeks to find the one right answer to a case, an answer which 
best fits and justifies the law as a whole.
In terms of a common sense definition of common sense across a range of 
social dimensions, Garfinkel stands apart. I readily sign-up to his approach in 
this research project.
Reasonableness appears not to receive similar attention in the literature, 
at least in my search. Notwithstanding, it appears with frequency in 
employment tribunal texts and often close to suggestions around the notion of 
common sense. The common sense view of reasonableness might extend to a 
reasonable solution to a problem within the bounds of common sense and
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might posit a reasonable person as capable of sound thinking based on fair and 
rational reasoning. As I have indicated earlier, I favour this elegant simplicity 
when looking for definitional support. Legal conceptions of reasonableness or 
the reasonable person might blur this elegant simplicity, but our legal 
framework -  criminal and civil -  places considerable emphasis on the 
reasonable person, reaching reasonable interpretations. Whilst the meaning of 
the word reasonableness is consistently questioned, the concept is widely 
accepted (Lucas,1963).
The notions of common sense and reasonableness in the determination of 
discrimination cases are my second emergent theme.
Analysis
By way of reminder, my interpretative framework for analysis is 
summarised in Figure 9.1 below.
Context Text
Reflexive Interpretatio
mplication;
Figure 9.1: Interpretative framework for discourse analysis with a critical edge.
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To illustrate the idea of common sense concepts in a legal context, 
consider the extracts below from King v The Great Britain Centre, Barton v 
Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd. and Webster v Brunei 
University reproduced below:
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of King (appellant) 
v The Great Britain-China Centre (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  11 October 
1991. An industrial (employment) tribunal had found that the respondent had 
unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground of her race when 
it failed to short-list her for interview for a vacant position in the respondent 
organisation. The Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal from the 
Great Britain-China Centre and remitted the case to a different employment 
tribunal for a rehearing. The CA allowed the further appeal by Miss King and 
restored the order of the industrial tribunal.
TEXT
This is not a matter of law but, as May LJ put it in Noone, "almost common 
sense".
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Barton 
(appellant )v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd. (respondent) -  
Employment Appeal Tribunal -  3 April 2003. An employment tribunal had 
found that the respondent had not unlawfully discriminated against the 
applicant on the ground of her sex when it paid a male comparator a higher 
remuneration package than Ms Barton. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
allowed the appeal and remitted the case to a differently constituted
employment tribunal.
TEXT
In the future, we think industrial tribunals may find it easier to forget about the 
rather nebulous concept of "the shift in the evidential burden". In this case, the
industrial tribunal would, we suspect, have found the case rather more 
straightforward if, looking at all the evidence as a whole, they had simply 
decided whether the complaint had been established. No useful purpose is 
served by stopping to reach a conclusion on half the evidence.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Webster 
(appellant) v Brunei University (respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal -  
14 December 2004. An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Webster's race 
discrimination allegations on the grounds that she had failed to establish that 
the person complained of was an employee.
TEXT
It will be for a tribunal to ask itself, having found the facts as to what occurred, 
whether the treatment, which it, on the balance of probabilities, has established, 
could have been by the respondent. If it concludes that it could not have been
by the respondent under any Sensible) view of a prima facie case , then it may
well be that the tribunal would find that the necessary prima facie case is just
not established.
It seems to me that in all three instances, there is an attempt to simplify 
the legal argument and insert a degree of everyday common sense 
interpretation. In all three extracts, the comments from the appellant courts are 
aimed at employment tribunal members rather than the contesting parties. The 
comments appear to convey two key messages: first, that the tribunals are over 
complicating their legal interpretations of the law itself and second, that their 
findings do not make sense to others when considered alongside the facts of the 
case. I will deal with each of these points in turn.
The number of claims referred to the EAT -  15 discrimination cases 
reported in IRLR in 2006 -  suggests that employment tribunals continue to 
struggle with the complexities of discrimination legislation. (Rubenstein, 2007) 
Bearing in mind that an appeal to the EAT is only permitted on a point of law, 
which normally entails the identification of a potential flaw in the legal 
reasoning at the employment tribunal stage, the number and range of 
clarifications sought remains significant. EAT judgements expose such failings 
in legal reasoning and seek to provide further clarification and guidance for the 
employment tribunal community. In so doing, they create an additional 
storyline for a particular aspect of employment law -  sometimes conflicting
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with previous guidance -  and could, inadvertently perhaps, reduce the 
potential for straightforward findings. The very fact that a number of cases -  
albeit a small number -  continue up the appellant court hierarachy to the CA of 
HL would seem to reinforce this point and take us further away from easy 
access to workplace justice.
The choice of such words as common sense, sensible and straightforward 
also represent, in my view, an attempt to shape the understanding of the wider 
readership. Looked at in this way, the appellant courts could be seen as trying 
to move employment tribunals away from the use of legal jargon in an effort to 
offset some of the complexity highlighted in the previous paragraph. If this is 
the case, the motive is sound. Accepting that discrimination law is unlikely to 
be entirely free of complexity, to be able to translate legal argument into a 
judgement written in simple language is an attractive proposition. Articulating 
the judgement in such terms helps to redress the complexity balance for all 
parties. What it also does is reinforce one of my findings in the previous 
chapter. Namely, that practitioners who do want to understand the 
complexities of the legal argument will need to engage in reflective reading of 
the employment judgement to uncover the unfolding story, partially masked by 
everyday language.
The quote I used from Robert Turner (2002) earlier in this narrative bears 
repeating in this context and suggests that early discrimination law cases reveal 
a lack of common sense responses from employers:
"I think employers have for many years been on the back foot. I think 
they have been frightened of legislation and the use of legislation by 
employees and representatives of employees against them. I think they 
have tended to loose track of common sense values".
Robert Turner's observation sends a rather different message. His 
contention is that employers ran scared of employment legislation and failed to 
understand the implications for employment relationships. As a result,
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defensive responses were prevalent concentrating on how to avoid being 
caught out rather than resolving workplace issues in a common sense fashion. 
Relating this idea back to my discussion of the psychological contract in 
Chapter 2 ,1 suggest that Robert's observation also supports my proposition that 
the mutual expectations between employer and worker now necessarily contain 
a legal element. Understanding this point is a non-negotiable for the 
contemporary personnel practitioner.
Closely linked to the notion of common sense, there is a strong reliance 
on the concept of reasonableness and the hypothetical reasonable person in 
employment tribunal determinations. This extract from Madarassy v Nomura 
Pic provides a good example:
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Madarassy 
(appellant) v Nomura Pic (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  26 January 2007. 
An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Madarassy's claims of sex 
discrimination, victimisation and unfair dismissal and her appeal against these 
findings was dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal with the exception 
of 2 matters which were remitted back to the employment tribunal to 
reconsider. The main ground of the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal 
was that the employment tribunal misdirected itself in law on the burden of
proof.
TEXT
The burden of proof does not shift to the employer simply on the claimant 
establishing a difference in status (eg sex) and a difference in treatment. Those 
bare facts only indicate a possibility of discrimination. They are not, without 
more, sufficient material from which a tribunal "could conclude" that, on the 
balance of probabilities, the respondent had committed an unlawful act of 
discrimination. "Could conclude" in s.63A(2) must mean that "ja reasonable 
tribunal could properly conclude" from all the evidence before it.
The second example is drawn from Bahl v The Law Society which in the 
space of one paragraph the CA judgement makes three references to 
'unreasonable'. There appears to be an unqualified belief that all readers will
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readily understand what the CA mean by unreasonable. In the more extreme 
cases, I am confident that the meaning will be clear enough, but where the 
dividing line between reasonable and unreasonable is much finer, our 
interpretations may differ. As the text above illustrates it could be a turning 
point in deciding a case. A finding of unreasonable behaviour demands an 
explanation to ensure that the behaviour was not on an unlawful ground, a 
finding of reasonable behaviour does not. In other words, the distinction may 
decide whether the burden of proof switches from the claimant to the 
respondent, or not. An observation which draws support in the words of
Raban (2003:89) "  the distinction between reasonable and unreasonable
opinions may hinge on nothing more fundamental than whether an opinion is 
held among a certain elite".
Our interpretation of reasonableness might be assisted by reference to 
the reasonable person who will always interpret the law in the right way. 
Unfortunately, as Lucas (1963) reminds us, we have yet to discover irrefutable 
criteria for reasonableness from deductive inference, let alone inductive 
inference. More positively, employment tribunal judgements are rarely 
majority decisions and the consensus findings are accepted by knowledgeable 
practitioners far more often than not. This serves to improve our confidence in 
the decision making process, but not the absolute certainty that some would 
seek. Lucas (1963:7) provides us with an encouraging thought:
"For, in the last resort, human judgement is all that we have to go by: and we 
can only trust that it is possible for us to be reasonable, and sometimes even to 
be right".
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Bahl (appellant) 
v The Law Society and others (respondents) -  Court of Appeal -  30 July 2004.
An employment tribunal had found that the applicant (Dr Bahl) had been 
unlawfully discriminated against in some respects, but rejected many of her 
allegations. The Law Society and two individuals named as respondents 
appealed to the EAT. Dr Bahl cross-appealed. The EAT allowed the appeal and 
held that the employment tribunal had failed to take account of the obvious 
non-discriminatory treatment. The EAT dismissed the cross-appeal. Dr Bahl 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and her appeal was dismissed. The Court of 
Appeal confirming the findings of the EAT.
TEXT
In our judgement, the answer to this submission is that contained in the 
judgment of Elias J in the present case. It is correct, as Sedley LJ said, that racial 
or sex discrimination may be inferred if there is no explanation for 
unreasonable treatment. This is not an inference from unreasonable treatment 
itself but from the absence of any explanation for it. However, the final words 
in the passage which we have quoted from Anya are not to be construed in the 
manner that Mr de Mello submits. That would be inconsistent with Zafar. It is 
not the case that an alleged discriminator can only avoid an adverse inference 
by proving that he behaves equally unreasonably to everybody.
The next example provides a more implicit suggestion of reasonableness, 
illustrating how it is important -  and reasonable -  for the employer to 
understand what it is that they need to justify if the burden of proof switches to 
them.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of University of 
Huddersfield (appellants) v Wolff (respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal 
-  16 July 2003. An employment tribunal had upheld Dr W olffs complaint of 
unlawful sex discrimination when a male colleague had been promoted to 
principal lecturer and Dr Wolff had not been promoted. The Employment 
Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal and remitted the case back to the 
employment tribunal for rehearing.
TEXT
Once the burden is reversed, of course, the burden falls upon the respondent in 
the manner described by Judge Ansell in Barton, and the explanations have to
be looked at. It is the more important that there be appropriate findings on the 
basis of which the prima facie case of less favourable treatment on the grounds
of sex are made, and, of course, above all that there is such a prima facie 
finding, because it is only once there is such a finding that the respondent 
knows, and thus the tribunal knows, what the respondent has to justify.
Finally on the issue of reasonableness, the extract from Igen Ltd v Wong 
below illustrates the expectation of reasonable behaviour well before the 
employment tribunal hearing.
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the conjoined cases of Igen 
Ltd. and others (appellants) v Ms Wong (respondent) and Chamberlain 
Solicitors and another (appellant) v Ms Emokpae (respondent) and Brunei 
University (appellant) v Ms Webster (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  18
February 2005.
TEXT
The issue of the unsigned Individual Performance Review Form and the refusal 
to withdraw or pursue the harassment complaint was then formalised into a 
disciplinary matter. Thus, the respondents became more and more entrenched 
and a sensible resolution to what was, in reality, a trivial issue, became more
and more remote.
Instead she continued to adopt an inflexible and officious approach. True it is 
that she was not helped by the applicant or by Mr Dawes, who refused to 
disclose precisely what his credentials were. As however the Tribunal put to 
Ms Greene in the situation in which she had found herself, anybody who had 
the trust of the applicant and who was able to enter into sensible dialogue 
could, potentially, have provided a way out of this impasse.
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My intention in this chapter has been to draw attention to the importance 
of notions of common sense and reasonableness in employment tribunal 
determinations. Notwithstanding the outstanding contribution of Harold 
Garfinkel, the notions remain tricky to define and handle within the legal arena 
of my study. Taken together with my thoughts on the influence of the concept 
of inference in the previous chapter, the ideas of common sense and 
reasonableness add to a picture more coloured by subjectivity and discretionary 
behaviour than we would recognise at first contact.
Implications
Whilst applauding any attempt to introduce a degree of clarity and 
simplicity into legal texts, we also need to recognise that the relationship 
between how individuals use informal theories to make sense of their realities 
and the more formal theories deployed by social scientists -  or lawyers -  are 
often complex and not immediately evident (McAuley et al, 2007). Similarly, 
any theories advanced about the concept of reasonableness need to carry the 
caveat that we all interpret what is reasonable in our own way. I would 
venture to suggest that common sense and reasonableness are two of the most 
important informal theories that we use to understand our everyday worlds 
and social interactions. They are also good examples of theory meeting practice 
-  at the level of social interactions -  whether it be in the workplace or anywhere 
else.
I have, of course, looked at common sense and reasonableness in the 
context of employment tribunals, and I would not wish to fall into the trap of 
suggesting any direct transferability of my findings to other contexts.
However, we should not underestimate the notions of common sense and 
reasonableness as key elements of our everyday sense making. When we read 
an employment tribunal which talks about the exercise of common sense, our 
own values come into play, whatever our previous life experiences.
Page 150
My analysis and consequent implications are summarised in the table at 
Figure 9.2.
ANALYSIS IN BRIEF
• The concept of common sense interpretations motivates those making 
employment tribunal judgements and emerges explicitly in a number 
of the texts themselves.
• The concept of reasonableness is central to employment tribunal 
determinations and can be seen explicitly and implicitly in the texts 
themselves.
IMPLICATIONS IN BRIEF
• Two of our most frequently used informal theories -  common sense 
and reasonableness -  are engaged in the construction of employment 
tribunal judgements.
• We need a better understanding of how these informal theories 
interact with the more formal legal and social theories used to 
explain cause, effect and outcome.
Figure 9.2: Analysis and implications in brief.
Summary comments on the notions of common sense and reasonableness
Once again, Garfinkel (1967) provides a useful reference point for the 
idea that, just as jurors in court cases seek common sense solutions, 
employment tribunal members follow a similar mental process. Garfinkel 
(1967:106) put it like this:
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"Jurors come to an agreement amongst themselves as to what
actually happened ............  They do this by consulting the
consistency of alternative claims with common sense models."
We have seen in this chapter how the authors of employment tribunal 
judgements pursue a similar line by attempting to produce a text which will 
make sense to participants and the wider readership. Similarly, the concept of 
reasonableness can be taken back to the literature, where it is seen, by some 
commentators (Raban, 2003) as a 'contested term'. He described it thus:
"Terms like 'fairness' or 'reasonableness' always apply to a particular
combination of factors rather than a clearly, identifiable and potentially 
recurrent element " (Raban, 2003:14)
The analysis conducted in this chapter reveals instances of attempts to 
find common sense interpretations in the context of employment tribunal 
proceedings and to apply reasonableness in determining such interpretations 
and outcomes. These attempts engage our common sense ability to make sense 
of a social context -  in this case the employment tribunal -  to evaluate similarity 
and difference to provide meaning and understanding in our worlds.
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CHAPTER TEN
DISCOURSE ANALYSIS WITH A CRITICAL EDGE -  LEGAL RESPONSES 
TO SOCIAL ISSUES 
Background
My third analysis chapter relates to the idea that social - or workplace - 
issues are determined according to legal rules and then transferred back to the 
social environment of the workplace. Mansell et al (2004, 4) describe this 
transference thus: "....for a dispute to become legal the social problem must be 
transformed into a legal problem". Such an idea sounds relatively 
straightforward when described as I have done in the previous sentences. What 
follows is designed to question this apparent simplicity and to explore what the 
process involves by closer examination of three key components: the 
concentration on legal factors in the writing of judgements, the tension between 
emotion and reason in finding solutions to workplace matters and the power 
effects of the language used in the employment law discourse. These three 
elements lie not so far below the surface of employment tribunals and an 
understanding of their importance in this arena seems to me a worthwhile 
pursuit. It may then be possible to consider the potential influence on the wider 
employment relations audience and any read across to management more 
generally.
Recognition of the relationship between law and society is not a new 
concept (Banaker and Travers, 2002), but scholarly examination in the 
employment law context is, in my experience, relatively rare. Emotion as a 
social factor and the power effects of language are also established concepts in 
management studies and visited with some frequency as research topics. 
According to Fineman (2005,331), "An emotion perspective has led to a new 
wave of research into areas such as leadership, decision making, trust and
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negotiation, business ethics and organizational change". Much of the early 
work seemed to focus on the exclusion of emotion from the workplace or at 
least control of emotion in the workplace, in part, to preserve the modernist 
narrative. Whereas more recent accounts have tended to focus on incorporating 
emotion within the fabric of organisational life. (Hancock and Tyler, 2001) As 
far as language and power are concerned, Fairclough (1989) devoted an entire 
work to the subject and drew an interesting distinction between power in 
discourse and power behind discourse. A distinction particularly pertinent to 
legal texts, I would suggest.
So much for a brief introduction to what has gone on before, the 
challenge in my research project is to examine whether or not employment law 
determinations reflect the social perspective and provide potential social 
implications. The influences of emotion and power are likely to shape such 
examination.
Legal responses to social issues in the determination of discrimination 
cases is my third emergent theme.
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Analysis
By way of reminder, my interpretative framework for analysis is 
summarised in Figure 10.1 below.
Context Text
Reflexive Interpretatio
mplicatiom
Figure 10.1: Interpretative framework for discourse analysis with a critical
edge.
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In the context of discrimination in the workplace, the transference 
between the workplace, the employment tribunal and back again is illustrated 
in Figure 10.2 below. The process hinges on a social issue -  normally a 
workplace conflict of some sort -  being translated into a legal problem - 
determined according to legal rules -  and then the solution transferred back to 
the social environment of the workplace.
?
(Influence on the 
employment 
relationship)
SOCIAL ISSUE 
(Discrimination in 
the workplace)
LEGAL SOLUTION 
TRANSFERRED 
BACK TO SOCIAL 
CONTEXT) 
(Workplace)
SOCIAL ISSUE 
TRANSFERRED TO 
LEGAL CONTEXT 
WITH LEGAL RULES 
(Employment Tribunal)
SOCIAL ISSUE
TRANSLATED TO 
LEGAL ISSUE TO 
ALLOW IT TO BE 
SOLVED ACCORDING 
TO LEGAL RULES
Figure 10.2: Dealing with social issues in a legal context.
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Firstly under the broader heading of legal responses to social issues, I 
offer the reader an insight into the relative weight attached to legal factors and 
employment factors.
The 'Barton guidelines' were produced in 2003 as a result of the Barton v 
Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd. case and they have been 
referred to previously -  Chapters 7 and 8. The box below includes two of the 
guidelines to emphasise the legal basis of their construction.
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Barton 
(appellant) v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd. (respondent) - 
Employment Appeal Tribunal -  3 April 2003. An employment tribunal had 
found that the respondent had not unlawfully discriminated against the 
applicant on the ground of her sex when it had paid a male comparator a higher 
remuneration package than Ms Barton. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
allowed the appeal and remitted the case to a differently constituted
employment tribunal.
TEXT
(10) To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the
balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the
grounds of sex, since "no discrimination whatsoever" is compatible with the
Burden of Proof Directive.
and
(12) Since the facts necessary to prove an explanation would normally be in the
possession of the respondent, a tribunal would normally expect cogent
evidence to discharge that burden of proof. In particular the tribunal will need
to examine carefully explanations for failure to deal with the questionnaire 
procedure an d /o r code of practice.
The legal argument continues in the case of Chamberlain Solicitors v 
Emokpae -  determined only 14 months after the Barton decision -  where it was 
felt necessary to revisit guidelines 10 and 12 detailed above.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Chamberlain 
Solicitors and another (appellants) v Emokpae (respondent) -  Employment 
Appeal Tribunal -1 5  June 2004. An employment tribunal had found that Ms 
Emokpae had been unlawfully discriminated against on the grounds of her sex 
when she was dismissed following rumours about a relationship with her 
manager. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal by 
Chamberlain Solicitors and another against the decision of the employment 
tribunal and found that the latter had not erred in law.
TEXT
We do not consider the EAT in Barton was saying that account of the law was 
changed to require the respondent to show gender had no effect whatsoever in 
the decision. Nagarajan was cited in the skeleton arguments and is anyway the 
leading authority well-known to the EAT. It was not distinguished. In order to 
make this clear, for we accept there may be misunderstanding, we respectfully 
suggest that guidelines (10) in Barton should be adjusted to read as follows:
"To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the treatment was not significantly influenced, as
defined in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport (1999) IRLR 572, by
grounds of sex'
We are also asked to consider guideline (12) which requires 'cogent evidence' to 
be adduced by a respondent shouldering the transferred burden, once a prima 
facie case has been made out by the applicant. The EAT in Barton justified this 
expression on the basis that the material facts necessary to prove this would be 
in the hands of the respondent. 'Cogent' means forceful or persuasive. 
Guideline (12) is the correct statement of the law, if we may respectfully say so, 
and so is the justification. Facts and arguments which are forceful and
persuasive will discharge a burden of proof. The cogency of the evidence
required depends on the standard of proof the law requires, and the nature of
the allegation made. Lord Nicholls in In Re FI and others (minors) (sexual 
abuse: standard of proof) (1996) AC 563, 586 (a case not cited to us but upon 
which our judgment does not depend) approved as neatly expressed the 
proposition that 'the more serious the allegation, the more cogent the evidence 
required....to prove it." In discrimination, the (civil) standard is the balance of 
probability. Within that standard, the more unlikely the allegation, the more 
cogent must be the evidence to discharge the civil burden of proof. Once the 
burden has shifted, if the facts and explanation are not persuasive, the 
respondent will not discharge it. The respondent must prove its case on the 
balance of probability. To do so, it will produce evidence which persuades the
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\ industrial jury to find for it. It is entirely appropriate, supported by high
j authority, to describe that evidence as 'cogent'.
Again as we have seen previously -  Chapter 8 -  the Chamberlain 
decision was questioned within eight months when the same case, together 
with two others, was considered by the Court of Appeal. (Igen v Wong) The 
result was further amendment of the Barton guidelines:
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the conjoined cases of Igen 
Ltd. and others (appellants) v Ms Wong (respondent) and Chamberlain 
Solicitors and another (appellant) v Ms Emokpae (respondent) and Brunei 
University (appellant) v Ms Webster (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  18
February 2005.
TEXT
Before us there has been no challenge to the broad outline of the Barton 
guidance, although suggestions have been put to us as to how it might be 
improved. Some criticisms have been made and suggestions put forward by 
the EATs in other cases. We shall return to the wording of the guidance later.
However, it is important to stress at the outset that ETs must obtain their main
guidance from the statutory language itself. No error of law is committed by an
ET failing to set out the Barton guidance or by failing to go through it 
paragraph by paragraph in its decision.
and
Finally, we should refer to a dispute on whether paragraph (10) of the Barton
guidance requires modification. In Emokpae His Honour Judge McMullen 
Q.C., giving the judgement of the EAT, held that the reference in paragraph (10) 
to the words "no discrimination whatsoever", which are taken from the Burden 
of Proof Directive, was in appropriate because they concerned not the definition 
of or the ingredients in discrimination but merely the forms of discrimination.
Instead Judge McMullen suggested that paragraph (10) be rewritten to read:
"To discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the treatment was not significantly influenced, as 
defined in Nagarajan v London Regional Transport (2000) 1 AC 501, by grounds
of sex."
That was a reference to the following passage in Lord Nicholls' judgment in
Nagarajan at pp. 512,3:
T ’age W
"Decisions are frequently reached for more than one reason. Discrimination 
may be on racial grounds even through it is not the sole ground for the 
decision. A variety of phrases, with different shades of meaning, have been 
used to explain how the legislation applies in such cases: discrimination 
requires that racial grounds were a cause, the activating cause, a substantial and 
effective cause, a substantial reason, an important factor. No one phrase is 
obviously preferable to all others, although ^ ^ J ^ p p lic a tio n  of this legislation
legalistic phrases, as well as subtle distinctions, are better avoided so far
possible. If racial grounds or protected acts had a significant influence on the 
outcome, discrimination is made out."
and
In any event we doubt if Lord Nicholls' wording is in substance different from 
the "no discrimination whatsoever" formula. A "significant" influence is an 
influence which is more than trivial. We find it hard to believe that the 
principle of equal treatment would be breached by the merely trivial. We 
would therefore support the original paragraph (10) or the Barton guidance 
and, consistently therewith, a minor change suggested by Mr Allen to
paragraph (11) so that the latter part reads "it is adequate to discharge thef
burden of proof on the balance of probabilities that sex was not a ground for the
treatment in question."
Note: the revised Barton guidelines are reproduced in full in chapter 8.
The 'story' of the Barton guidelines is an interesting one on a number of 
counts. First, the debate around the wording of guidelines 10 and 12 seems to 
me to have much more to do with legal interpretation and legal rules than it has 
to do with the workplace issue of unlawful discrimination itself. Second, these 
three cases provide a clear example of what Fairclough would refer to as 
intertextuality: the idea of texts drawing on earlier texts. Thirdly, a sense that 
the debate has been largely confined to the employment law areas with little 
input from personnel practitioners. I will deal with each of these points in turn.
The rather 'detached' consideration of the wording of two guidelines 
from Barton -  10 and 12 -  appears purely linguistic -  the difference between 'in
no sense whatsoever' and not 'significantly influenced by' in respect of
guideline 10. These two interpretations, however, convey significantly different 
meanings and, when it comes to arguing a case in tribunal, a very different 
approach. The rather rapid reversal of the 'not significantly
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influenced................... by' interpretation brings to an end this phase of the
'story'. Guideline 12 is drawn into the spotlight because of the reference to 
'cogent evidence'. In Chamberlain Solicitors v Emokpae, the EAT found it 
necessary to spell out what was meant by 'cogent evidence'. The reaction to the 
use of the phrase pulls my 'suspicious' trigger and I wonder who would have 
found the interpretation of 'cogent' so demanding of detailed explanation. 
Perhaps it reveals a nervousness about extending the scope for interpretation in 
the surroundings of an employment tribunal.
In respect of points one and two, the build-up of the legal debate 
between cases around interpretations of the burden of proof provisions also 
sparks reflection. Chamberlain Solicitors v Emokpae draws on Barton v 
Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd and Nagarajan v London 
Regional Transport in a seamless fashion irrespective of the circumstances of 
the case and as though no other cases had been heard in the intervening period. 
This looks like an artificial separation of legal argument from the point where 
future employment tribunal cases are born; the workplace. This is the location 
of activity for the personnel professional and in their day to day activity where 
the law matters.
Madarassy v Nomura Pic provides a good example of the exclusion of 
'peripheral factors' in the construction of an employment tribunal judgement in 
the interests of producing a legally sound solution:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Madarassy 
(appellant) v Nomura Pic (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  26 January 2007. 
An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Madarassy's claims of sex 
discrimination, victimisation and unfair dismissal and her appeal against these 
findings was dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal with the exception 
of 2 matters which were remitted back to the employment tribunal to 
reconsider. The main ground of the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal 
was that the employment tribunal misdirected itself in law on the burden of
proof.
TEXT
According to this ground of appeal the employment tribunal erred in its 
approach to the evidence and its findings of fact by seeking corroboration of 
facts where none was required and by concluding that there was no evidence,
when in fact there was evidence from Ms Madarassy. The tribunal therefore
failed to direct itself properly in relation to what was evidence for the purposes 
of making findings of fact and the impact of s.63A(2).
There is no substance in this ground of appeal. It is reasonably clear that the 
tribunal sometimes used the expression 'no evidence' to cover both the 
situation where Ms Madarassy produced no evidence on the point either from 
herself or from any one else and the situation in which she gave evidence on the 
point, which the tribunal did not accept as establishing the allegation.
It would have been better if the tribunal had not used the expression'no
evidence' when they meant 'no credible evidence' but the substance of their
approach to the relevant evidence and their treatment of it is reasonably clear. 
It discloses some rather loose use of language, but that does not amount to an 
error of law in the decision of an employment tribunal if the factual conclusions 
and reasoning of the tribunal are sufficient to explain the decision reached on 
the point. These allegations failed for lack of evidence acceptable to the
tribunal.
A comment from University of Huddersfield, Wolff provides an example 
of how the 'hum an' concerns of the complainant were dismissed by the 
employment tribunal in favour of legal definitions and how the attempt to 
challenge a legal determination failed at the first hurdle:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of University of 
Huddersfield (appellants) v Wolff) respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal 
-  16 July 2003. An employment tribunal had upheld Dr W olffs complaint of 
unlawful sex discrimination when a male colleague had been promoted to 
principal lecturer and Dr Wolff had not been promoted. The Employment 
Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal and remitted the case back to the 
employment tribunal for rehearing..
TEXT
It may well be that it was that factor, quite apart from the fact that the applicant 
was no doubt disappointed not to be promoted herself (and she had previously 
been in the running for promotion in 1999, although that was a fact known to 
one of the assessors but which he did not reveal, either in her favour or against 
her, to his fellow assessors), which caused the applicant to be particularly 
concerned. Nevertheless, whether or not she was disappointed or concerned,Iof course, is not important; what matters is whether, as the tribunal indee
concluded to be the case, she was the subject of sex discrimination
For the reasons that we have given as to the substantial areas in which facts,
and indeed, available inferences were not dealt with at all by the tribunal, we
are satisfied that we cannot ourselves, as we are in any event encouraged not to 
do, pick up pieces of a jigsaw and put them back together again, and we regret 
that the only possible course in this case is for the matter to be reheard.
As well as providing another example of employment tribunal texts 
drawing on previous legal authorities, the extract from Webster v Brunei 
University below provides a more reassuring note -  from the perspective of the 
personnel practitioner -  in emphasising the point made in the previous 
comment from University of Huddersfield v Wolff that it is not for the 
appellant courts to substitute their own version of the facts of the case:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Webster 
(appellant) v Brunei University (respondent) -  Employment Tribunal Appeal -  
14 December 2004. An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Webster's race 
discrimination allegations on the grounds that she had failed to establish that 
the person complained of was an employee.
TEXT
The cases in the Court of Appeal, most recently in Crofton v Yeboah (2003) 
IRLR 632, have made the position entirely clear, namely that this Appea
Tribunal, even if it would have reached a different decision from the TribunalL,
not entitled to substitute that view and is not entitled to say that the Tribunal
as wrongj In order to establish perversity there has to be an overwhelming 
case either that there was no evidence upon which the Tribunal could reach the 
conclusion it did, or that the conclusion was so startlingly wrong that it can 
only be said to be totally perverse. It is emphasised again and again by the 
Court of appeal, and indeed by this Appeal Tribunal, that the industrial jury is 
the judge of the facts, and if this industrial jury reached the conclusion it did, 
then there is no ground upon which we would think it appropriate to interfere, 
on the basis of the submissions made to us by Mr Troop.
To many readers, however, the distinction between an error of law and 
an interpretation may not be as straightforward as the appellant courts would 
have us believe. Consider, for example, the extract from Bahl v The Law 
Society below:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Bahl (appellant) 
v The Law Society and others (respondents) -  Court of Appeal -  30 July 2004.
An employment tribunal had found that the applicant (Dr Bahl) had been 
unlawfully discriminated against in some respects, but rejected many of her 
allegations. The Law Society and two individuals named as respondents 
appealed to the EAT. Dr Bahl cross-appealed. The EAT allowed the appeal and 
held that the employment tribunal had failed to take account of the obvious 
non-discriminatory treatment. The EAT dismissed the cross-appeal. Dr Bahl 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and her appeal was dismissed. The Court of 
Appeal confirming the findings of the EAT.
TEXT
The EAT expressed its conclusion in this way: 239. For all these reasons we
consider that the tribunal has in a number of ways approached the issue of 
discrimination, both in relation to Mr Sayer and Mrs Betts, in an incorrect way.
It has failed to take account of the obvious explanation for any detrimental 
treatment. Both Mr Sayer and Mrs Bets, for their own distinct and separate 
reasons, had reason to feel hostile toward Dr Bahl. On occasions they have 
allowed their personal animosity towards Dr Bahl to distract them from their 
duty to act objectively and fairly towards her. But that is a far cry from
esl
gri
tablishing the very serious allegation that they have discriminated on
ounds of race and sex. In addition, the tribunal has made findings of
discrimination where no proper evidential basis for it exists: and it has inferred
in some cases that unfair and unreasonable treatment alone is evidence of
discrimination.
The extracts included in this section of my analysis reveal in me a sense 
of the dominance of the legal over the societal. A sense that the contested terms 
we examined in the previous chapter, such as fairness and reasonableness, are 
second order considerations when the focus is on a perceived error of law. In 
contrast with the issues addressed in the previous two chapters, we seem to be 
witnessing an attempt to reinforce the letter of the law rather than recognising 
the societal impact.
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The second idea presented in this chapter is a consideration of how acts 
often wrapped in high emotion are subjected to legal reasoning to produce an 
outcome invariably presented in legal language. Notwithstanding the relative 
paucity of graphic language in the decision sections of employment tribunal 
judgements, authors appear less reticent in the body of the text. Some examples 
will be discussed shortly. Figure 10.3 illustrates the various dimensions and 
tensions involved and attempts to put into focus the sense expressed by 
Fineman et al (2005:186): "Working with our own and others' emotions is part 
of the unacknowledged, but fundamental, fabric of organisational life". From 
my own professional dealings with employment matters, I would support this 
contention and also suggest that attempting reason without understanding 
emotion is a particularly unrewarding endeavour.
Figure 10.3 demands rather more explanation than I have so far afforded 
it. I am trying to suggest that the language of legal presentation and the 
emotional language of the conflict situation are very often different. When 
brought together they provide a 'text of events' full of tension and fed by 
interpretation of alternative discourses based on the same facts. The 
employment tribunal members need to absorb this cocktail, establish the facts, 
draw inferences where appropriate and produce an 'acceptable' employment 
tribunal judgement. As we have seen, the latter is then open itself to a range of 
interpretations. Even if the judgement favours the legal argument as I have 
suggested earlier in this chapter, emotional exchanges are not very well 
camouflaged.
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reason
the language of legal presentation
multiple \  
interpretations
▼  TEXT 
the language of an employment 
tribunal judgement
multiple \  
interpretations
the language of a workplace 'event'
Figure 10.3 Reason and emotion and alternative interpretations
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Consider the extract below from Zafar v Glasgow City Council reproduced 
below and the strength of language around the finding of sexual harrassement.
CONTEXT
Text below is an extract from the decision in the case of Zafar (appellant) v 
Glasgow City Council (respondents) - House of Lords -  27 November 1997. An 
industrial (employment) tribunal had found that the respondents had unfairly 
dismissed and unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground of 
his race when it failed to adopt a fair procedure in respect of his dismissal on 
disciplinary grounds. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the 
employers' appeal against the finding of race discrimination and unfair 
dismissal. The employers further appealed the finding of race discrimination to 
the Court of Session and their appeal was allowed on the grounds that the 
industrial tribunal had erred in finding that he had been treated less favourably 
than others and in making an inference of discrimination on racial grounds. Mr 
Zafar appealed to the House of Lords who dismissed the appeal.
TEXT
An industrial tribunal rejected the complaint relating to promotion. In 
relation to the dismissal the tribunal found that Mr Zafar had been guilty of
sexual harassment "of the most distasteful and unacceptable kind'
However, the tribunal held that the dismissal was unfair on procedural 
grounds, and that the employers' failure to adopt a fair procedure also 
constituted discrimination on grounds of race.
Similarly, the extract below from Bahl v The Law Society includes a 
quote from the chair of the inquiry appointed to examine complaints about Dr 
Bahl's behaviour from members of the Law Society staff.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Bahl (appellant) 
v The Law Society and others (respondents) -  Court of Appeal -  30 July 2004.
An employment tribunal had found that the applicant (Dr Bahl) had been 
unlawfully discriminated against in some respects, but rejected many of her 
allegations. The Law Society and two individuals named as respondents 
appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Dr Bahl cross-appealed. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal and held that the 
employment tribunal had failed to take account of the obvious non- 
discriminatory treatment. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the 
cross-appeal. Dr Bahl appealed to the Court of Appeal and her appeal was 
dismissed. The Court of Appeal confirming the findings of the Employment
Appeal Tribunal.
TEXT
Lord Griffiths' report was published on 10 March 2000. Complaints of 
bullying in relation to all five complainants were upheld. Lord Griffiths 
concluded as follows:
"We regret that we have been driven to the conclusion that the vice 
president resorted at times to bullying tactics. She treated the staff without
due consideration demanding immediate response to her own wishes
without regard to their other duties. Her treatment of staff was at times
demeaning and humiliating and at other times offensively aggressive. In
many ways, she usurped the secretary general's role as head of staff and 
introduced an atmosphere of fear and confusion in the line of command."
We can only imagine the emotional intensity of the exchanges between 
the participants in these cases, but even within the restrained language of 
employment tribunal judgements we are given a pretty clear indication.
The third component of legal responses to social issues relates to the 
language used in some employment tribunal judgements. Sometimes we find a 
choice of words not familiar to most of us and sometimes we find words with a 
legalistic heritage and meaning. Three examples of the former -  and ones that 
stood out on reading my selected employment tribunal texts are shown below:
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Madarassy 
(appellant) v Nomura Pic (respondent) -  Court of Appeal -  26 January 2007. 
An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Madarassy's claims of sex 
discrimination, victimisation and unfair dismissal and her appeal against these 
findings was dismissed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal with the exception 
of 2 matters which were remitted back to the employment tribunal to 
reconsider. The main ground of the subsequent appeal to the Court of Appeal 
was that the employment tribunal misdirected itself in law on the burden of
proof.
TEXT
" ... .as will be apparent, the findingsof fact as to what occurred are very
exiguous."
CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Webster 
(appellant) v Brunei University (respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal -  
14 December 2004. An employment tribunal had dismissed Ms Webster's race 
discrimination allegations on the grounds that she had failed to establish that 
the person complained of was an employee.
TEXT
The guidelines in which Judge Ansell laid out in Barton are helpful but are 
no substitute for the statute and indeed it has, on occasions, been suggested 
that they are, in any event, too proluf.
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CONTEXT
Text shown below is an extract from the decision in the case of Bahl (appellant) 
v The Law Society and others (respondents) -  Court of Appeal -  30 July 2004.
An employment tribunal had found that the applicant (Dr Bahl) had been 
unlawfully discriminated against in some respects, but rejected many of her 
allegations. The Law Society and two individuals named as respondents 
appealed to the EAT. Dr Bahl cross-appealed. The EAT allowed the appeal and 
held that the employment tribunal had failed to take account of the obvious 
non-discriminatory treatment. The EAT dismissed the cross-appeal. Dr Bahl 
appealed to the Court of Appeal and her appeal was dismissed. The Court of 
Appeal confirming the findings of the EAT.
TEXT
Although it (the Zafar v Glasgow City Council judgement) has stood the test 
of time, a number of interstitial problems have arisen and have been
resolved.
It strikes me that the authors of these comments are attempting -  
consciously or not -  to demonstrate a degree of academic superiority. An 
approach which seems out of place when recording legal rulings on workplace 
events where one of the key aspects of the judgement is to explain why one 
party has won and why one party has lost. I acknowledge that appeals from 
the employment tribunal and beyond are limited to perceived errors in law and, 
as a result, some element of legal complexity is almost inevitable, but, it seems 
to me, such discourse should be adding to our body of knowledge through 
common understanding. Judgements which require further legal interpretation 
to explain the outcome to the parties involved leave us some distance from the 
easy access to workplace justice sought by the law makers and all those 
involved in the employment relationship.
Implications
To my mind at least, the implications for professional practice of my 
analysis in this chapter are more confused than the implications expressed in 
the previous two chapters. In the latter, I tried to reveal an undermining of the 
'objective legal arena' for the resolution of workplace disputes by exposing the
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influence of subjective notions of inference, common sense and reasonableness. 
In this chapter, I reinforce the objective position by claiming the superiority of 
legal points in the decision making and text writing. On the other hand, I dilute 
the argument somewhat by exposing the influences of emotion and power 
laden language.
Much of this resonates with wider management studies, exposing a 
grand theory - modernism for example -  and the recognising that if the surface 
layer is stripped away, what lies beneath may not be so convincing.
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ANALYSIS IN BRIEF
• The transference of an issue from the social context of the workplace to the 
legal arena of an employment tribunal can produce a discourse somewhat 
detached from the point of grievance.
• A legal solution may be difficult to integrate back into the social context of 
the workplace.
• The coming together of emotion and reason can produce unpredictable 
outcomes.
• The use of language in employment tribunal judgements can reinforce 
power structure designed to retain an element of superiority.
IMPLICATIONS IN BRIEF
• Employment tribunal and particularly the appellant courts may be having 
unintended consequences for workplace policy and practice. These could 
include a defensive stance from employers and employees and legal 
outcomes removed from the emotion of the workplace situation.
• The aim of providing easy access to an 'industrial jury' may be falling 
short because of language and legal complexity.
Figure 10.4: Analysis and implications in brief.
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Summary comments on legal responses to a social issue
In this chapter, I have examined legal responses to social issues as the 
third emergent theme from my analysis of employment tribunal judgements. 
To aid examination, I have looked at three ideas contributing to the theme: the 
balance between legal and employment factors, the relationship between 
emotion and reason and the use of language to reinforce powerful influences. I 
have also tried to persuade the reader that there is value beyond reason, that 
some of our societal theories may not be capable of proof through reason, but 
nonetheless carry the weight of our convictions. The impact of our emotions at 
work and the effects of the language we use may fall into this category.
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CHAPTER ELEVEN
FINDINGS, PERSONAL REFLECTIONS AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS
At the outset of my research journey, I outlined three three potential 
contributions to knowledge. First, to develop a pluralistic and distinctive 
critical perspective drawing on aspects of reflexive approaches, hermeneutic 
understanding and legal theory. Second, to develop an interpretative analytical 
framework for discourse analysis consistent with my critical perspective. Third, 
to employ this perspective and framework in a themed analysis of employment 
tribunal texts in an effort to construct a set of ideas that add value to my 
professional practice. I also set out my research issue: towards a better 
understanding of discrimination law as an organisational discourse and as a potential 
force for emancipatory change in the workplace. It is now time to consider, in the 
context of my research issue, to what extent these ambitions to make a 
substantive contribution have been realised as this research project has 
progressed.
The first part of the chapter is structured around the three potential 
contributions to knowledge identified above and the articulation of my findings 
in relation to my research issue. The second part explores my personal 
reflections on the implications for my professional practice, role as a leader and 
the research journey itself. I conclude with an indication of future 
developments in the discrimination law field and closing thoughts on my 
engagement with organisation theory.
A distinctive critical perspective
The main contribution in this section has been to illustrate how social 
research projects demand that the researcher clearly understands their own 
epistemological stance and demonstrate an ability to make this clear to the
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reader. Accepting that any form of research undertaken outside of the 
positivist tradition is likely to face calls to defend the position taken and justify 
any truth claims made, I contend that I have met this philosophical challenge 
and secured my epistemic ground. Moreover, I have taken our understanding a 
step further by demonstrating that social and legal approaches can be combined 
to provide a powerful and critical lens. To my mind, any prospect of assessing 
the impact of discrimination law as a force for emancipatory change in the 
contexts in which it operates requires such a wide angle perspective and the 
confidence to draw purposefully on a variety of ideas.
Whilst the synthesis of reflexivity and hermeneutic understanding is not 
a new or unique venture in management research, to extend the synthesis to 
include elements of legal theory is less prevalent. As I have said, I have sought 
to open this box and release the two key weapons in the armoury of the critical 
hermeneutic researcher on legal thinking and a legal theatre. First, by trying to 
undermine the power laden language and structures associated with those in 
professional roles, managers and management and second, by looking to 
excavate deeper interpretations of what is going on in employment tribunals. I 
am excited by the opportunities presented by such a multi-dimensional 
perspective and the prospect of a more liberal debate within the legal and 
people professional communities. In some small way, I make a claim on 
unsettling the established wisdom, extending the debate across the social and 
legal boundaries and opening up a route to a more sophisticated understanding 
of how the world of work and the world of employment law interact.
An interpretative analytical framework
In the methodological domain, my ambition in this thesis has been to 
construct a 'tailor-made' interpretative analytical framework consistent with 
the epistemological perspective outlined above and to draw on the extensive 
contributions of Ronald Dworkin and Norman Fairclough. The model 
developed has allowed me to conduct a discourse analysis of employment
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tribunal judgements in an individual and challenging manner. Again, I have 
sought to adapt an inclusive approach to ideas, incorporating perspectives 
from more than one discipline, and make a methodological contribution with 
this fresh perspective.
Attempting to harness Dworkin's interpretative concept of justice and 
Fairclough's interest in discourse as a broader social issue has represented a 
considerable challenge and I recognise that I cannot do justice to their 
respective contributions to knowledge. I have only scratched the surface here, 
but I am left reassured that their work has allowed me to synthesise some of 
their ideas and to construct a model which goes some way to matching my 
ambition of providing some overlap between legal and social interpretative 
analysis. In essence, to consider how interpretations of particular instances -  
employment tribunal cases -  can have a social consequence through 
employment relations activity. To do so, in the arena of an employment 
tribunal -  an arena that trespasses into both domains -  might just aid our 
understanding.
Having established that my 'research engine' seems to have some 
potential to run, the question of how productively is the subject of the next 
section.
Key findings from themed analysis
Recognising the aim of bridging the gap between research and practice 
implicit in the DBA endeavour, I now turn to an understanding of the 
relationships between my research considerations, the data itself and the 
themes emerging from my analysis. The drawing together of these strands is 
represented graphically at Figure 11.1. I will summarise my key findings from 
the analysis recorded in Chapters 8-10 in the next few paragraphs.
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Figure 11.1 Research considerations, research data and research themes
The focus in Chapter 8 was on an examination of the role of inference in 
the determination of employment cases. The analysis confirmed the drawing of 
inferences as a key concept within discrimination law and one frequently relied 
upon in the absence of proven facts. The analysis also revealed regular 
attempts by the appellant courts to clarify what merits a justifiable inference 
and to provide guidance to employment tribunals. Such concentration on a
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subjective concept seems to me to undermine the idea of employment tribunals 
as a legal arena for the determination of employment matters according to legal 
rules and their perceived status as an 'objective industrial court'. By 
implication, a responsibility is placed on personnel professionals to gain an 
understanding of inferences and their implications in order to follow the 
dynamic storyline generated by legislation and case law. Without such an 
understanding, employment policy and practice may run into difficulty and 
impact adversely on the employment relationship. The sort of reflexive 
discourse analysis conducted in this study allows a deeper understanding of 
legal and social considerations in employment to emerge and helps us to see 
how discrimination law impacts as an organisational discourse.
The analysis in Chapter 9 examined the notions of common sense and 
reasonableness in employment tribunal texts and revealed a propensity to rely 
on these informal theories to make sense of complex legal issues. This approach 
appears particularly evident when employment tribunals or the appellant 
courts are seeking to explain why one party has lost a discrimination case. As 
in the previous discussion around the role of inference in discrimination cases, 
we are confronted with two subjective constructions -  common sense and 
reasonableness -  at the heart of employment casework decision making. My 
work has highlighted the importance of a deeper reading of legal texts to 
identify the relationship between informal social theories and more formal legal 
theories as a route to a better understanding of the employment relationship.
My third emergent theme draws further on the idea of the 'clash' 
between subjective thought processes and the rule-bound legal environment in 
which they operate by considering legal solutions to social issues. The analysis 
conducted in Chapter 10 reveals a considerable tension between emotion and 
reason in employment casework. As a result, unintended consequences 
emerge. For example, managers are seen to adopt a more defensive stance to 
employment relations, particularly if a tribunal claim is threatened, whilst 
employers and employees alike perceive legal interpretations as detached from
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the emotion and context of the original relationship breakdown. This apparent 
distance between the legal and the social is exacerbated by the use of complex 
language which reinforces the structural authority of the employment law 
apparatus. To my mind, it is important to penetrate this shell if we are to 
witness emancipatory change through the discrimination law discourse and 
move us closer to the stated objective of easy access to an 'industrial jury'.
At the level of the popular personnel press, there appears to be little 
doubt about the stifling effect of employment law and the down trodden state 
of the personnel profession:
"But hang on a moment, what is that noise? Is it the sound of thousands 
of happy feet skipping to work, where they will help the people attached 
to them to perform a well-rehearsed work-life balancing act? Is it hell. 
It's the march of a well-drilled battalion of staff off to assert their 
employment rights. And there is only one thing standing in their way - 
the personnel department. This is the reality of HR in the new 
millennium. It is a department sinking under ever-increasing amounts 
of employment legislation and corporate regulation." (Millar, 2007)
I have tried to illustrate a rather more complex relationship between 
discrimination law, the employment relationship and the legal and personnel 
professions, but the basic message above is difficult to refute. Perhaps more 
worryingly, my analysis points towards a lack of depth and understanding 
about the hidden meanings and implications of the employment discourse.
In terms of my specific research considerations and research themes, I 
have sought to establish a degree of synergy between the two dimensions. My 
analysis of employment tribunal determinations as responses to workplace 
conflict issues reflects the closeness of the legal and personnel professions and 
the difficulty of isolating legal decisions from this social context. In my view, 
this convergence has implications for the learning and development 
programmes associated with the respective professional bodies. My analysis 
has also revealed the value of close reading of texts and their subtleties if one is
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to follow the 'story'. The drawing of inferences, notions of common sense and 
reasonableness demand analytic attention to understand the discourse as it 
develops and matures. Finally, I am left in little doubt about the influence of 
employment law on employment relations and the consequent absorption of 
employment law considerations within the psychological contract. I am less 
convinced that discrimination law has always had an emancipatory effect. In 
some ways it has taken employment relations away from the workplace and 
helped to create the defensive positions often adopted by workers and 
managers alike. Personnel professionals ignore these points at their peril.
Implications for professional practice
At the point of entry to this research project, I was aware that 
discrimination law featured ever more frequently in my working life as a 
personnel professional and that regular additions or amendments to the law 
influenced our professional policy and practice. I was equally aware of the 
potential media exposure in cases likely to whet the appetite of public interest. 
On the other hand, I was relatively blind to the messages and nuances 
contained within employment tribunal judgements and their association with 
organisations and society more broadly. I had not detected the storylines of 
inference drawing, common sense interpretations and legal responses to social 
issues or made the connection with our every day sense making. I may have 
naively claimed the title of 'reflective practitioner', but I was a considerable 
distance from any reflexive insights that might promote new ways of acting 
and thinking.
I claim now to be somewhat closer to my ambition of a better 
understanding of discrimination law as an influential organisational discourse 
and as a potential force for emancipatory change. I have alreaciy outlined how 
a broad conceptual approach and a fresh methodological design can offer new 
insights. I claim to have disturbed the image of discrimination law as a sealed 
and singular phenomenon which can be examined in isolation and outside the
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contexts in which it functions. Discrimination law contributes to the 
construction and operation of organisational life and what goes on in societies, 
including the workplace environment, contributes to the construction and 
operation of discrimination law. Rather belatedly, I realise that complex legal 
issues are, more often than not, distilled down to common sense theories to 
help our understanding and to provide pragmatic meaning in our lives. We 
should not be surprised when these sense making theories do not always 
resonate with organisational hierarchies or the legal establishment. 
Unsurprisingly, some of these findings have created personal dilemmas for me 
in role as a professional and senior manager. I will return to this point shortly.
Reflections on my role as a professional leader
The thought that the drag effect of employment legislation has resulted 
in less risk taking and flexibility in an epoch dominated by the managerialist 
agenda which purports to demand the opposite is somewhat ironic. A thought 
which also leads me into reflections on the personal dilemmas surfaced during 
the course of this work. I am, of course, a player in this managerialist agenda; a 
professional senior manager in a large public sector organisation. To continue 
to operate in such an environment -  one heavily influenced by hierarchical 
structures, hierarchical distribution of knowledge and the use of command and 
control language -  and, at the same time, to retain my sceptical standing, has 
forced me to think about my engagement with my profession and my 
colleagues. At the cognitive level, I intuitively question the taken for granted 
and I am suspicious of the 'obvious solution'. Whilst I accept that at the 
practical level, the need to contribute to the strategy of the organisation and to 
deliver a professional HR service, my epistemological stance surfaces in debate 
about how we reach an agreed position. As a result, I have found it possible to 
engage voices beyond the top table and to question 'the way we do things 
around here' whilst remaining a 'company player'. I may have stopped short of 
the 'rebel without a cause' label favoured by some at the harder edge of the
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subjectivist spectrum, but I am comfortable that my reflexive approach has 
added a richness to our corporate thinking.
Beyond the cognitive, the ethical and emotional ramifications of holding 
a subjectivist epistemological stance and holding a senior position in a 
hierarchical organisation also merit comment. Whether I am labelled critical 
theorist or soft postmodernist matters little to colleagues in my working life. 
What matters is that I can articulate my perspective, share my concerns and 
contribute to a more thoughtful dialogue. As a researcher, I need to be more 
careful with the recognition and the maintenance of my epistemological 
standpoint, but I find this invigorating rather than constraining. Indeed, 
reflexivity itself allows me to think through what might appear to some as 
irreconcilable dilemmas. I would argue that ethical and emotional responses 
are not frustrated by my subjectivism, rather, when applied in context, can 
disturb the surface in a very liberating manner. Berg (1989:213) reminded us 
that "postmodern thinking fiercely resists the very idea of representing a 
particular school of management" and "... the very concept of management 
runs counter to the deconstructive principles that appear to underline a 
postmodern discourse". He does not say that postmodern thinking cannot be 
applied in organisations to promote change and influence the direction of 
travel. Similarly, Alvesson and Willmott (1992) question the overwhelming 
power of management in the rational dimension and offer critical theory 
perspectives as a means to challenge restrictive practices and communications. 
My stance is that it is epistemologically sustainable to challenge from within 
organisations as well as from the outside, notwithstanding the nature of the 
organisation. Rather than retreating to the position of distant or sardonic 
professional, it seems to me that personal ethical and emotional dilemmas need 
to be surfaced in the interests of developing our reflexive thinking capacity, 
broadening our understanding and shaping shared actions.
Finally in this section and building on the point at the end of the last 
paragraph, I return to the discussion in Chapter 2 about the development of HR
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roles within organisations. I argued that the labelling of roles promoted by 
Ulrich and Brockbank (2005) carried implicit risks associated with a focus on 
structural authority and the potential for stifled career development 
opportunities. Whilst sharing the reluctance of these authors of a return to 
what they term 'a cacophony of HR roles', I would like to see the managerialist 
cloak discarded in favour of the sort of critical approach I have advocated 
throughout this thesis. Further, I am suggesting that a subjectivist debate 
'within the objectivist model' should be encouraged with the aim of giving a 
degree of shared responsibility and 'operational bite' to our reflexive thinking. 
Shipton and McAuley (1993) provided an alternative aspect on HR role 
definition and extended the debate to include power relationships and 
organisational integration. The caution expressed by Shipton and McAuley 
about too close an alignment of HR professionals with senior management 
provides an interesting twist on the personal dilemmas expressed in this 
section. In substantial part, my critical voice at the table is allowing me to 
overcome the potential difficulties of too intimate a relationship with other 
senior managers whilst allowing me to maintain my position as an influential 
leader of the business. Perhaps there is a new synthesis of roles here for the 
reflexive HR leader; a role which might appear somewhat schizophrenic, but a 
role with the potential to make a more insightful contribution.
In sum, and as I have said earlier in this narrative, I have reached an 
epistemological standpoint secured by reflexivity and hermeneutic 
understanding which makes sense to me. Furthermore, my working life as a 
senior professional in a large, bureaucratic organisation and my role as a 
researcher within the objectivist, legal domain have been enriched by an 
instinctive desire to investigate what is hidden. I may still be in the minority in 
my professional community, but as McAuley et al (2007:341) remark, more 
widespread buy-in may not be a forlorn hope "... the growth of concepts in 
recent years such as emotional intelligence and emotional capability suggest 
that there is hope for reflexive organisations".
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Personal reflections on the research journey
No research journey would be complete without the indulgence of some 
personal reflections on learning and the experience as a whole. I allowed 
myself a little space towards the end of chapter five to 'clear my mind' before 
engaging substantively with my research material and I ask the reader to view 
that short section and what follows here as two parts of the same story.
Most importantly, I have enjoyed myself from day one and relished the 
freedom of doctorate level study. The relatively straightforward concept of 
'challenging the taken for granted' has really appealed to my inquisitive nature 
and made a difference not just to the way I approach my learning, but also to 
my professional working life. I have tried to stay true to the various disciplines 
and sub-disciplines that I have encountered along the way, but not be 
constrained where I have believed that multi-disciplinary angles would add 
value to my work. For example, I have followed one of Norman Fairclough's 
central arguments that discourse analysis alone is not enough and that the 
analysis needs to be seen in its relationship with its social environment (Phillips 
and Jorgensen, 2002). I recognise that this approach will not satisfy many of the 
proponents of alternative approaches to critical discourse analysis who have 
been quick to criticise Fairclough in the past. I also recognise that I may have 
been over ambitious in my research project in trying to go beyond linking 
analysis to one social context by attempting to embrace two social environments 
at the same time -  the organisation and the tribunal. However, the challenge is 
there to be taken on and, in my view, merits further exploration.
At a more basic level, I have learned to value the seemingly endless 
flexibility of the 'post it' note and the value of translating my thinking into a 
picture that I can share with colleagues at work and, in the context of my 
research, produce the clarity to debate my thoughts with myself and the texts 
from which they are drawn. I have resorted to this technique consistently as I 
have tried to make sense of my version of a critical perspective and translate
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this into an interpretative framework that I could reasonably use to analyse my 
data. To me, it has provided a mechanism to move between complexity and 
simple, elegant designs that allow me to move forward.
I sense that I have always enjoyed a reflective tendency without really 
understanding what this meant and how I could turn this to advantage in my 
professional practice. To move beyond this to a reflexive approach -  thinking 
about my thinking - has broadened my perspective immeasurably. For this, I 
will always be grateful to those who have influenced me in this direction.
Future directions
My research project comes to a close at a time when the world of work is 
facing up to a new and far-reaching piece of discrimination law. Age 
discrimination legislation which came into force on 1 October 2006 and has 
been widely touted as payback time for the 'male, pale and stale' (Smethurst, 
2006). With a degree of anxiety, I note that in the same article the CBI are 
saying that it is 'essential that tribunals take a commonsense approach'. We 
have seen earlier in this narrative that common sense interpretation in the 
employment tribunal arena does not always translate as intended when the 
decision is 'returned' to the workplace. Age legislation, and more importantly 
the case law which flows from it, will test this premise further.
From a policy perspective, the impact has already been considerable. 
Organisations -  my own included -  have revised their recruitment policies, 
examined the wording of job advertisements and adjusted retirement ages in an 
attempt to second guess employment tribunal determinations. Professionally, 
we do not want to be the test case. Secretly, many of us would relish the 
intellectual challenge of 'making history' -  albeit temporary in nature.
Looking forward, the Department for Communities and Local 
Government (DCLG) launched a review of discrimination law in 2005 and this,
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together with an Equalities Review which reported in early 2007, is now part of 
a wider consultation document. We have also seen in Chapter 2, the European 
Commission is looking hard at modernising labour law to meet the demands of 
a more fluid employment market. In addition, the new Commission for 
Equality and Human Rights opens its doors for business in Autumn 2007. All 
in all, there are few signs that the legal elements of the employment relationship 
are close to anything resembling a stable state.
The re-examination of discrimination law mentioned at the top of the 
previous paragraph seeks to provide a 'framework for fairness' and 'proposals 
for a Single Equality Bill' (DCLG, 2007). The report also contains the sort of 
emancipatory aspiration that I have frequently touched upon in this narrative:
" to consider the opportunities for creating a clearer and more streamlined 
discrimination legislative framework which produces better outcomes for those 
who currently experience disadvantage" (DCLG, 2007:4). An aspiration which, 
in my view, contains an admission that the potential for emancipatory change, 
highlighted in my research issue as an important social consequence of 
discrimination law to be considered, remains firmly on the agenda. The 
formulation of a Single Equality Act is designed to make discrimination law 
more accessible for those who need to understand it and to simplify the 
legislation wherever possible. From my own perspective as a personnel 
professional coming to the close of my research project, I note with some 
satisfaction that the review will seek to address some of the dilemmas I have 
sought to expose:
"In simplifying the law, we want to make sure that:
• we do not erode existing levels of protection against discrimination;
• we adopt a common approach wherever we can;
• we have practical law which takes account of the realities of people's 
everyday lives and the way businesses and other organisations 
operate;
• we address real problems in a common sense way; and
• British discrimination law meets the requirements of European law" 
(DCLG, 2007:13).
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The opportunities for further research on the basis of what I have uncovered so 
far, and in the context of a fresh look at discrimination law, represent attractive 
avenues for study.
From a wider social research perspective, I claim to have constructed an 
interpretative framework for analysis drawing heavily on the established work 
of Ronald Dworkin and Norman Fairclough and to have put the framework to 
use as a tool for discourse analysis. I accept that my research analysis was 
confined to a sample of employment tribunal texts and that the framework 
would benefit from wider exposure to alternative contexts, particularly with 
social and legal dimensions. Refinement of the model would undoubtedly 
follow alongside further development of a distinctive methodology for 
researching the two disciplines in a synergetic manner. I suggest that such 
endeavour has the potential to illuminate our understanding of the interaction 
between social and legal discourse.
In addition to developing the methodological aspects of my research, 
there seems to me to be considerable opportunity to extend our understanding 
of subjective interpretations reached in environments constrained by structure, 
legislation based rules and elitist language. It would be interesting to see how 
the notions of inference, common sense and reasonableness examined in this 
narrative are created, reinforced and changed in other social contexts. We need 
to look beyond our individual and everyday use of these informal theories to 
see how they are deployed to control and influence in our organisations.
Closing observations
My final observation is reserved for two organisational theorists who 
have had a significant influence on my work, John McAuley and Phil Johnson. 
They, together with co-author Jo Duberley published the result of considerable 
enterprise just a few months before this thesis was submitted. They conclude 
by offering thoughts on the future direction for organisation theory endeavour
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and I take some heart from the fact that in this narrative I have been working in 
the domain of two of their recommendations:
"Critical approaches to organization theory have recently increased in 
popularity in organization theory. This raises an important issue: how 
can organization theory become and remain an arena in which those 
typically marginalized in organizations or who lack voice become visible 
and in which power asymmetries are removed and democratic 
agendas pursued?" (McAuley et al, 2007: 460)
and
"There have been a number of calls to develop organization theory into a 
more transdisciplinary subject so that theorists and students can benefit 
from knowledge held in other disciplines. How should organization 
theorists engage in transdiciplinary research -  or as Burrell calls it, 'neo- 
disciplinary' research -  that brings in ideas from other disciplines?" 
(McAuley et al, 2007: 460)
Well, almost my final observation! This is my thesis after all. I sense that 
I have raised many more questions than I have been able to answer, but I make 
this admission in the knowledge that I have tried to answer some big questions. 
Questions about the impact of employment law on the employment 
relationship and questions about designing and operating an interpretative 
model informed by legal theory and discourse analysis. I trust that I have made 
a small contribution to the knowledge base in my chosen research arena. I have 
certainly enjoyed the venture.
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APPENDIX 1
King (appellant) v The Great Britain-China Centre (respondent) -  Court of
Appeal -1 1  October 1991.
Case
In November 1987, the Great Britain -  China Centre -  a government sponsored 
organisation -  advertised the vacancy of Deputy Director. Miss King applied 
for the post on 7 December 1987 and was sent an application form and job 
description by return. On 15 December 1987, the Director of the Great Britain -  
China Centre wrote to Miss King informing her that the post 'had now been 
filled from a very strong range of applicants'. Miss King responded the 
following day expressing surprise that she had not even been given an 
interview and raised the question of possible racial bias. A reply by the 
Director of the Great Britain -  China Centre on 21 December 1987 did not 
satisfy her concerns and, as a result, she initiated an industrial tribunal 
application on 23 February 1988 claiming racial discrimination.
Decisions
An industrial (employment) tribunal hearing held between 9 May and 27 June 
1988 found that the respondent had unlawfully discriminated against the 
applicant on the ground of her race when it failed to short-list her for interview 
for a vacant position in the respondent organisation. It should be noted that 
this was a majority conclusion of the industrial tribunal and the chairman 
explained the grounds for his contrary conclusion to the majority as follows:
"  the respondent organisation has presented evidence sufficient to
persuade me that they have satisfactorily and adequately explained why the 
applicant was not called forward for interview."
The Great Britain -  China Centre appealed against the finding of the majority
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arguing that the majority had erred in law by placing the burden of proof on 
the respondent to disprove what they found to be a prima facie case that the 
applicant had not been shortlisted on the grounds of her race.
Following a hearing held on 12 January 1990, the appeal from the Great Britain- 
China Centre was allowed by the Employment Appeal Tribunal and the case 
remitted to a different employment tribunal for a rehearing. Miss King 
appealed against the decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal that the 
majority of the Industrial Tribunal had erred in law. Following a Court of 
Appeal Hearing held on 11 October 1991, the Court of Appeal allowed the 
further appeal by Miss King and restored the order of the industrial tribunal.
Comment
Significantly in this judgement, the Court of Appeal set out principles and 
guidance around the burden of proof in discrimination cases which were to 
become one of the most cited references in discrimination law. It was widely 
accepted that the law of the day had been clarified in this text. The guidance
included the statement:
"It is unnecessary and unhelpful to introduce a shifting evidential burden of
proof".
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APPENDIX 2
Zafar (appellant) v Glasgow City Council (respondent) -  House of Lords -  27
November 1997
Case
Mr Zafar was employed by Strathclyde Regional Council as a social worker 
from 1969. He was dismissed in March 1989 following allegations that he had 
been involved in incidents of sexual harassment. Mr Zafar submitted an 
industrial tribunal application claiming unfair dismissal and discrimination in 
respect of the dismissal and failure to secure promotion.
Decisions
An industrial (employment) tribunal hearing found that the respondents had 
unfairly dismissed and unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the 
ground of his race when it failed to adopt a fair procedure in respect of his 
dismissal on disciplinary grounds. It rejected the complaint relating to 
promotion. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the employers7 
appeal against the finding of race discrimination and unfair dismissal. The 
employers further appealed the finding of race discrimination to the Court of 
Session and their appeal was allowed on the grounds that the industrial 
tribunal had erred in finding that he had been treated less favourably than 
others and in making an inference of discrimination on racial grounds. Mr 
Zafar appealed to the House of Lords who dismissed the appeal in a decision
given on 27 November 1997.
Comment
Much like King v The Great Britain -  China Centre, this judgement has been 
much cited in subsequent case law. Not only because it endorses the guidance 
set out in the King case, but also because it deals specifically with the point
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about what inferences can be drawn in a discrimination case from an 
employer's unreasonable behaviour:
"it cannot be inferred... .only from the fact that the employer acted 
unreasonably towards one employee that he would have acted reasonable if he 
had been dealing with another in the same circumstances."
"Unreasonable behaviour, in itself, does not equate to discriminatory 
behaviour, but unreasonable behaviour towards a person of one race compared 
with reasonable behaviour towards a person of a different race in similar 
circumstances should be regarded as raising a case to be explained."
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APPENDIX 3
Barton (appellant) v Investec Henderson Crosthwaite Securities Ltd 
(respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal -  3 April 2003
Case
Ms Barton was employed by Investec in June 1990 and had reached the position 
of Research Director by the late 1990s. By early 1991, Ms Barton became aware 
of the possible disparities of salary between herself and a male colleague, Mr 
Horsman. Investec raised Ms Barton's salary to match Mr Horsman, but did 
not inform her of the disparity in relation to other elements of the remuneration 
package. In the Spring of 2001, Mr Horsman and another male colleague, Mr 
Savage, were awarded higher bonuses than Ms Barton. Ms Barton submitted 
an equal pay claim -  based on comparison with Mr Horsman -  and a sex 
discrimination claim -  based on comparison with Mr Savage.
Decisions
An employment tribunal found that the respondent had made out a genuine 
material factor defence in respect of the equal pay claim. They also judged that 
Investec had not unlawfully discriminated against the applicant on the ground 
of her sex when it paid a male comparator a higher bonus payment than Ms 
Barton. In a decision given on 3 April 2003, the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
allowed the appeal in respect of the equal pay claim and remitted the case to a 
differently constituted employment tribunal.
Comment
This is a significant case because it involves the Employment Appeal Tribunal 
engaging with the Burden of Proof Regulations (introduced 12 October 2001)
for the first time.
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The case also attracted considerable media interest as it involved city traders 
and the payment of substantial bonuses. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
made this comment, clearly designed to impact on the workplace:
"no tribunal should be seen to condone a City bonus culture involving secrecy 
and / or lack of transparency because of the potentially large amounts involved, 
as a reason for avoiding equal pay obligations."
The Employment Appeal Tribunal also produced guidance on the application 
of the new regulations in respect of discharging the burden of proof and 
included this important statement:
"it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that 
the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex, since 'no 
discrimination whatsoever' is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive..."
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APPENDIX 4
University of Huddersfield (appellant) v Wolff (respondent) -  Employment
Appeal Tribunal -1 6  July 2003
Case
Dr Wolff, a senior lecturer at the University of Huddersfield, applied for 
promotion to principal lecturer in Summer 2000. Dr Wolff was put forward to 
the selection body as the preferred candidate of her parent school. Dr Roberts -  
a male candidate -  was also put forward to the selection body. The promotion 
process involved a numerical marking system and resulted in Dr Roberts 
gaining promotion. Dr Wolff scored below the cut-off point for promotion. Dr 
Wolff submitted an employment tribunal application claiming unlawful sex
discrimination.
Decisions
An employment tribunal upheld Dr W olffs complaint based on a finding of 
less favourable treatment and a difference of sex. The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal -  in a decision given on 16 July 2003 -  allowed an appeal by the 
University of Huddersfield on the basis that:
" .. .although the tribunal found that the applicant had been less favourable 
treated and that there was a difference of sex, at no point did the tribunal 
conclude that prima facie the less favourable treatment was on the grounds of
sex."
As a result of this error in law, the case was remitted to the employment
tribunal for rehearing.
Comment
The importance of this case lies in the Employment Appeal Tribunal's direction
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that less favourable treatment and a difference of sex is, in itself, insufficient to 
support a move of the burden of proof from the applicant to the respondent. A 
deeper analysis is required to establish a causation between the less favourable
treatment and a difference of sex:
"the burden moves where the applicant has proved facts from which inferences 
could be drawn that the respondents have treated the applicant less favourable
on the grounds of sex."
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APPENDIX 5 
Chamberlain Solicitors and another (appellant) v Emokpae (respondent) -  
Employment Appeal Tribunal -  15 June 2004 
Case
Ms Emokpae was employed as a part-time legal assistant from 29 November 
2002 until she was dismissed on poor performance grounds on 3 February 2003 
Ms Emokpae claimed unlawful sex discrimination against her employer and 
her manager, Mr Emezie. Her claim suggested that the real reason for her 
dismissal was because of rumours of an affair between Mr Emezie and herself.
Decisions
An employment tribunal upheld Ms Emokpae's complaint. They were not 
convinced that Ms Emokpae's dismissal was on poor performance grounds and 
considered that there was sufficient evidence to prove that she could have been 
dismissed unlawfully. The tribunal found that the burden of proof moved to 
the employer and that the latter had been unable to prove that "the treatment 
was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex." In a decision given on 15 
June 2004, the Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the appeal stating that 
the employment tribunal had correctly applied the law and the 'Barton
guidelines'.
Comment
The significance of this decision is to illustrate the remaining uncertainty 
around the burden of proof and to note a change to the 'Barton guidelines'. 
Perhaps best summarised in the following extract from the judgement:
"The guidance on the burden of proof in a sex discrimination case laid down in 
Barton, with the addition of the rider provided by the EAT in University of
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Huddersfield v Wolff, remains good law, subject to adjustment of one guideline 
so as to provide that, on transfer of the burden, a respondent's duty is to prove 
gender had no significant influence on the outcome. Guideline 10 in Barton, 
which suggested that to discharge the burden of proof "it is necessary for the 
respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the treatment was in 
no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex, since 'no discrimination 
whatsoever' is compatible with the Burden of Proof Directive", misconstrued 
the use of the words "no discrimination whatsoever"....Accordingly, guideline 
10 in Barton should be adjusted to read as follows: "To discharge that burden it 
is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, that the 
treatment was not significantly influenced as defined in Nagarajan v London 
Regional Transport (1999) IRLR 572, by grounds of sex."
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APPENDIX 6
Sinclair Roche and Temperley and others (appellants) v Heard and another 
(respondent) -  Employment Appeal Tribunal -  22 July 2004
Case
Sian Heard and Sian Fellows were solicitors with Sinclair Roche and Temperley. 
Both became junior equity partners in May 1999, but did not progress to senior 
equity partner status alongside 2 male comparators, Mr Cawley and Mr Addis- 
Jones. As a result, Ms Heard and Ms Fellows claimed unlawful sex 
discrimination against their employer and 4 individual partners.
Decisions
The employment tribunal upheld their complaint finding that they had been 
impeded in reaching higher partnership level. The main progression criteria 
was the amount of prospective partners' billings and they had been unable to 
achieve the same levels as their male colleagues because they had not been 
given the same level of referrals. The tribunal also found in favour of Ms 
Fellows in her complaint about a request to work part-time. The appeal to the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal was against the decision of an employment 
tribunal that the two junior partners in the law firm were discriminated against 
on grounds of sex by not being promoted to senior equity partners, the finding 
of indirect discrimination in respect of the part-time issue, the finding against 
the 4 individual partners for "knowingly aiding the discrimination" and the 
compensation award. The applicants cross-appealed on the issue of the date 
that the discrimination commenced. The Employment Appeal Tribunal 
overruled the decision of the employment tribunal, allowed the appeal and 
remitted the case to the same employment tribunal. The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal's direction was based on a failure to identify the specific unfavourable 
treatment and to properly address the respondents explanations.
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Comment
In another well publicised case, this time involving a city law firm, the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal emphasises the need for employment tribunals 
to set out clearly their conclusions as to the nature and extent of the 
unfavourable treatment and to carefully consider the explanations of the 
employer. As an aside, this case attracted further attention by setting out 
guidance on whether successful appeals should be remitted to the same 
employment tribunal or a differently constituted one.
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A P P E N D IX  7
W eb ster  (ap p ellan t) v  B ru n ei U n iv e r s ity  (resp on d en t) -  E m p lo y m e n t A p p e a l
T rib u n a l -  14 D ec e m b er  2004
C ase
Ms Webster claimed racial discrimination and victimisation in respect of her 
employment with Brunei University.
D e c is io n s
In a decision given on 2 August 2004, an employment tribunal dismissed all 6 of 
Ms Webster's race discrimination and victimisation allegations on the grounds 
that she had failed to establish that the person complained of was an employee. 
Ms Webster appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal against the dismissal 
of only one of her claims: the circumstances surrounding a telephone 
conversation on 27 May 2003. The allegation being that the telephone 
conversation was part of an unjustified series of complaints against Ms 
Webster. In allowing the appeal, the Employment Appeal Tribunal remitted 
the case to a fresh Employment tribunal to examine: what precisely occurred 
on 27 May 2003: was there a prima facie case of unfavourable treatment by the 
respondent; if so, and the burden of proof moved to the respondent, was an 
adequate explanation provided; if a finding were to be made against the 
respondent, would the statutory defence under Section 32 of the Sex
Discrimination Act apply.
C o m m en t
Although not having the same impact on the burden of proof in discrimination 
debate as most of the other cases included in this series, it does decide what the 
Employment Appeal Tribunal term a 'novel point' on the shifting of the burden 
of proof in discrimination cases. The claimant was unable to prove that a
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person she overheard was an employee of the respondent organisation and, 
therefore, the burden of proof did not move to the respondent to disprove
unlawful discrimination.
Additionally, as the employment law commentator Daniel Barnett points out:
"Helpfully, the decision reviews all the recent cases on the shifting burden of 
proof -  and so should become a key case when dealing with this tricky issue."
(Barnett, 2005)
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A P P E N D IX  8
B ah l (ap p ellan t) v  T h e L aw  S o c ie ty  an d  o th ers (resp o n d en ts) -  C ourt o f
A p p e a l -  30 Ju ly  2004
C ase
Ms Bahl was appointed Deputy Vice President of the Law Society in 1998 
having previously held the post of chair of the Equal Opportunities 
Commission between 1993 and 1998. Over the next 2 years, a number of 
complaints were made about Ms Bahl's 'humiliating and bullying' behaviour. 
Lord Griffiths was appointed to investigate the allegations and his report in 
March 2000 resulted in Ms Bahl's censure and suspension. In consequence, Ms 
Bahl resigned her position and submitted an employment tribunal application 
claiming sex and race discrimination.
D e c is io n s
An employment tribunal found that the applicant (Dr Bahl) had been 
unlawfully discriminated against in some respects, but rejected many of her 
allegations. The Law Society and two individuals named as respondents 
appealed to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. Dr Bahl cross-appealed. The 
Employment Appeal Tribunal allowed the appeal and held that the 
employment tribunal had failed to take account of the obvious non- 
discriminatory treatment. The Employment Appeal Tribunal dismissed the 
cross-appeal. Dr Bahl appealed to the Court of Appeal and her appeal was 
dismissed. The Court of Appeal confirming the findings of the Employment
Appeal Tribunal.
C om m en t
A number of cases in this series attracted media attention, but none more so 
than this one. The Employment Appeal Tribunal's decision contains a lengthy
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analysis of proof of discrimination case law, but was immediately undermined 
because it failed to take account of the Burden of Proof Regulations 2001. 
Perhaps the main contribution to the professional debate was contained in this
comment from the judgement:
"all unlawful discriminatory treatment is unreasonable, but not all 
unreasonable treatment is discriminatory".
At the Court of Appeal Stage, Ms Bahl's appeal -  on 9 grounds -  was dismissed 
in all respects despite "Mr de Mello's (Ms Bahl's counsel) valiant and courteous 
attempts to get this appeal on its feet".
On the issue of unreasonable treatment, the Court of Appeal made a further
contribution:
"Racial or sex discrimination may be inferred if there is no explanation for 
unreasonable treatment. However, this is not an inference from unreasonable 
treatment itself but from the absence of any explanation for it".
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A P P E N D IX  9
Ig e n  Ltd. an d  o th ers (a p p e lla n ts) v  M s W o n g  (resp on d en t) an d  C h am b erla in  
S o lic ito rs  an d  an oth er  (ap p ellan t) v  M s E m ok p ae  (resp o n d en t) an d  B ru n ei 
U n iv e r s ity  (ap p ellan t) v . M s W eb ster  (resp on d en t) -  C ourt o f  A p p e a l - 1 8
February 2005.
C ase
Two of the 3 cases heard together by the Court of Appeal -  Chamberlain 
Solicitors and another v Ms Emokpae and Brunei University v Ms Webster -  
have been summarised in appendices 5 and 7 respectively. By way of reminder, 
Ms Emokpae claimed unlawful sex discrimination in that she believed she had 
been dismissed on the basis of rumours about a relationship with her manager, 
rather than poor performance. Ms Webster claimed unlawful race 
discrimination on the basis of racist comments. In the third case, Ms Wong 
claimed unlawful race discrimination, harassment and victimisation on the 
basis that she had not been allowed to attend a course, an unduly critical 
performance review and unfair disciplinary proceedings. Although the 
circumstances of the 3 cases differ widely, they all raise questions about the 
shifting of the burden of proof in discrimination cases. All 3 appellants were 
appealing employment tribunal decisions and the subsequent endorsement of 
the decisions by the Employment Appeal Tribunal. The Equal Opportunities 
Commission, the Commission for Racial Equality and the Disability Rights 
Commission were allowed to jointly intervene, recognising the importance of 
clarifying the effect of the changes to the burden of proof in discrimination
cases.
D e c is io n s
The appeal by Igen Ltd. was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. 
Acknowledging that whilst the employment tribunal hearing the case may have 
reached conclusions that other employment tribunals may not have reached,
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the Court of Appeal confirmed that they were entitled to use their industrial 
expertise to guide their conclusions. The Court of Appeal also found no error in 
law. On the contrary, they were quite clear that "it (the employment tribunal) 
has directed itself on the law impeccably." The Court of Appeal considered 
that Ms Emokpae's complaint of unlawful sex discrimination failed at the first 
stage because she had not established that her dismissal was on the grounds of
her sex.
In the words of the Court of Appeal, "she is the innocent victim of an unfair 
dismissal, but, unfortunately for her, because she was employed for such a 
short period she cannot obtain redress for this from the employment tribunal".
Finally, in respect of Ms Webster's claim of unlawful sex discrimination, the 
Court of Appeal found that the Employment Appeal Tribunal did err in its 
interpretation of the Race Relations Act, preferring the conclusions reached by 
the employment tribunal. As the result, Ms Webster's appeal was allowed, the 
order of the Employment Appeal Tribunal set aside and the decision of the
employment tribunal restored.
C om m en t
In setting out to address inconsistencies in the legal authorities around the 
application of the Burden of Proof Regulations, the Court of Appeal makes a 
number of important points. First, it confirmed that the new regulations alter -  
rather than merely codify -  the existing law and determines that the statutory 
amendments require employment tribunals to go through a 2-stage process:
> first stage requires the complainant to prove facts from which the 
tribunal could conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation, that 
the respondent has committed the unlawful act of discrimination.
> if the requirements of the first stage are met, the second stage requires
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the respondent to prove that he did not commit the unlawful act.
The Court of Appeal goes on to say that:
"  if the second stage is reached, and the respondent's explanation is
inadequate, it will be not merely legitimate, but also necessary for the tribunal 
to conclude that the complaint should be upheld." (Rubenstein 2005: 226)).
Second, the Court of Appeal returned to the Barton guidelines and particularly 
guideline 10 which states that to discharge the burden of proof, once a prima 
facie case of discrimination has been established:
"... .it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the balance of probabilities, 
that the treatment was in no sense whatsoever on the grounds of sex."
(Rubenstein (2005: 226)).
This was subsequently amended by the Employment Appeal Tribunal in 
Chamberlain Solicitors v Emokpae (2004) IRLR 592 EAT as follows:
"to discharge that burden it is necessary for the respondent to prove, on the 
balance of probabilities, that the treatment was not significantly influenced....by 
grounds of sex." (Rubenstein (2005: 226)).
The Court of Appeal confirmed their preference for the wording in the Barton 
judgement and, in so doing provided some clarity around the second stage of 
the process outlined above. Conversely, attention may well now turn to stage 
one of the decision making process and the debate that will be required to 
establish a prima facie case and place the burden of proof on the employer.
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A P P E N D IX  10
M ad arassy  (ap p ellan t) v  N o m u ra  In tern a tion a l P ic (resp on d en t) -  C ourt o f  A p p ea l
-  26 January 2007
C ase
On 14 December 2001, Ms Madarassy submitted an employment tribunal application 
claiming unlawful sex discrimination, victimisation and unfair dismissal. Her further 
particulars include 33 separate allegations of unlawful sex discrimination during her 
period of employment with Nomura International Pic. The following extract from 
the Court of Appeal decision provides a useful illustration of the extent and
complexity of the case:
"At a hearing lasting 21 days in November and December 2002 the tribunal heard 38 
witnesses. 32 of them attended for cross examination. Ms Madarassy gave evidence 
for 7 days. Mr Michael Boardman, who was her line manager at Nomura, was cross 
examined for 4 days. There were 21 lever arch files of documents. Litigation on this 
scale is now typical of the increasing numbers of sex and race discrimination claims 
by senior members of staff against financial institutions, professional firms and public
authorities."
D e c is io n s
The employment tribunal found in favour of Ms Madarassy on only one of the 33 sex 
discrimination allegations and dismissed the victimisation and unfair dismissal 
claims. The Employment Appeal Tribunal was confined to the unlawful sex 
discrimination claims and the hearing lasted a further 4 days. They dismissed the 
claim on all bar 2 of the points dismissed by the employment tribunal and remitted 
these 2 matters back to the original employment tribunal. The Employment Appeal 
Tribunal allowed Nomura's cross appeal against the one finding against them in 
employment tribunal. Ms Madarassy's appeal against the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal order (including that of the award of costs against Ms Madarassy) was
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determined as follows:
"I (we) would dismiss the appeal on the ground, first that there was no error of law 
in the decision of the employment tribunal on any of the many aspects of its decision 
which were appealed to this court, and, secondly, there was no error of law in the 
decision of the Employment Appeal Tribunal to remit three of the allegations for 
review by the same employment tribunal or to make the £2000 costs order against Ms
Madarassy/'
C o m m en t
The first point to note about the Madarassy decision is that it confirms the approach 
taken in Igen v Wong, particularly around what the claimant is required to establish 
to progress from the first to the second stage of the process. A difference of sex or 
race -  for example -  and a difference of treatment is not sufficient. The employment 
tribunal needs to satisfy itself that it "could conclude that, as the balance of 
probabilities, the respondent has committed an act of unlawful discrimination". The 
Court of Appeal provides further guidance on the proposition "could conclude" with 
the statement that "could conclude" must mean that "a reasonable tribunal could
properly conclude from the evidence".
Perhaps the most significant and interesting facet of this judgement is that having put 
an emphasis on what moves the case from stage one to stage two of the process, the 
Court of Appeal attempt to illustrate what evidence from the respondent is relevant 
at this first stage. In other words, even though the burden of proof lies with the 
claimant to establish a prima facie case, the respondents' evidence may come in to 
play before the burden of proof switches to the respondent to rebut the case.
According to Rubenstein (2007), this determination:
"totally blurs the distinction between refutation and explanation", 
and, as a result, it is hard to see how the two-stage approach set out in Igen, which 
follows the statutes and the European Union directives on which they are based, can
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be reconciled with a two-stage approach which allows evidence as to the reason for
the treatment at stage 1.
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APPENDIX 11
Burden of Proof Directive
2001 No. 2660
SEX DISCRIMINATION
The Sex Discrimination (Indirect Discrimination and Burden o f Proof)
Regulations 2001
The Secretary of State, being a Minister designated for the purposes of section 2(2) of 
the European Communities Act 1972[i] in relation to measures relating to sex 
discrimination in matters of employment, self-employment and vocational training[2], 
hereby makes the following regulations in exercise of the powers conferred by that 
section.
Citation, interpretation and extent
1. - (1) These regulations may be cited as the Sex Discrimination (Indirect 
Discrimination and Burden of Proof) Regulations 2001.
(2) In these regulations "the 1975 Act" means the Sex Discrimination Act 1975[3].
(3) These regulations shall extend to Great Britain only.
Commencement and transitional provisions
2. - (1) These regulations shall come into force on 12th October 2001 (in this 
regulation referred to as "the commencement date").
(2) Regulations 5 and 6 apply in relation to proceedings instituted before the 
commencement date, as well as those instituted on or after that date, but do not affect 
any case in which proceedings in the employment tribunal, county court or sheriff court 
were determined before the commencement date.
Sex discrimination
3. For section 1 of the 1975 Act there is substituted -
" Direct and indirect discrimination against women
1. - (1) In any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of 
this Act, other than a provision to which subsection (2) applies, a person 
discriminates against a woman if -
Made
Laid before Parliament 
Coming into force
20th July 2001 
20th July 2001 
12th October 2001
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(a) on the ground of her sex he treats her less favourably than he treats or 
would treat a man, or
(b) he applies to her a requirement or condition which he applies or 
would apply equally to a man but -
(i) which is such that the proportion of women who can comply 
with it is considerably smaller than the proportion of men who 
can comply with it, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex 
of the person to whom it is applied, and
(iii) which is to her detriment because she cannot comply with it.
(2) In any circumstances relevant for the purposes of a provision to which this 
subsection applies, a person discriminates against a woman if -
(a) on the ground of her sex, he treats her less favourably than he treats 
or would treat a man, or
(b) he applies to her a provision, criterion or practice which he applies or 
would apply equally to a man, but -
(i) which is such that it would be to the detriment of a 
considerably larger proportion of women than of men, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the sex 
of the person to whom it is applied, and
(iii) which is to her detriment.
(3) Subsection (2) applies to -
(a) any provision of Part 2,
(b) sections 35A and 35B[4], and
(c) any other provision of Part 3, so far as it applies to vocational 
training.
(4) If a person treats or would treat a man differently according to the man's 
marital status, his treatment of a woman is for the purposes of subsection (l)(a) 
or (2)(a) to be compared to his treatment of a man having the like marital 
status."
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Discrimination against married persons
4. For section 3 of the 1975 Act there is substituted -
" Direct and indirect discrimination against married persons in 
employment field
3. - (1) In any circumstances relevant for the purposes of any provision of 
Part 2, a person discriminates against a married person of either sex if -
(a) on the ground of his or her marital status he treats that person less 
favourably than he treats or would treat an unmarried person of the same 
sex, or
(b) he applies to that person a provision, criterion or practice which he 
applies or would apply equally to an unmarried person, but -
(i) which is such that it would be to the detriment of a 
considerably larger proportion of married persons than of 
unmarried persons of the same sex, and
(ii) which he cannot show to be justifiable irrespective of the 
marital status of the person to whom it is applied, and
(iii) which is to that person's detriment.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1), a provision of Part 2 framed with 
reference to discrimination against women shall be treated as applying equally to 
the treatment of men, and for that purpose shall have effect with such 
modifications as are requisite."
Burden of proof: employment tribunals
5. After section 63 of the 1975 Act there is inserted -
" Burden of proof: employment tribunals
63A. - (1) This section applies to any complaint presented under section 63 
to an employment tribunal.
(2) Where, on the hearing of the complaint, the complainant proves facts from 
which the tribunal could, apart from this section, conclude in the absence of an 
adequate explanation that the respondent -
(a) has committed an act of discrimination against the complainant 
which is unlawful by virtue of Part 2, or
(b) is by virtue of section 41 or 42 to be treated as having committed 
such an act of discrimination against the complainant,
the tribunal shall uphold the complaint unless the respondent proves that he did 
not commit, or, as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that 
act."
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Burden of proof: county and sheriff courts
6. After section 66 of the 1975 Act there is inserted -
" Burden of proof: county and sheriff courts
66A. - (1) This section applies to any claim brought under section 66(1) in a 
county court in England and Wales or a sheriff court in Scotland.
(2) Where, on the hearing of the claim, the claimant proves facts from which 
the court could, apart from this section, conclude in the absence of an adequate 
explanation that the respondent -
(a) has committed an act of discrimination against the claimant which is 
unlawful by virtue of -
(i) section 35A or 35B, or
(ii) any other provision of Part 3 so far as it applies to vocational 
training, or
(b) is by virtue of section 41 or 42 to be treated as having committed 
such an act of discrimination against the claimant,
the court shall uphold the claim unless the respondent proves that he did not 
commit, or, as the case may be, is not to be treated as having committed, that 
act."
Claims under Part 3 of the 1975 Act so far as it applies to vocational training
7. After section 66(3) of the 1975 Act there is inserted -
" (3 A) Subsection (3) does not affect the award of damages in respect of an 
unlawful act of discrimination falling within section l(2)(b)."
Consequential amendments of 1975 Act
8. - (1) In section 5(3)[5] of the 1975 Act, for "section 1(1)" there is substituted 
"section 1(1) or (2)".
(2) In section 37 of the 1975 Act, for subsection (1) there is substituted -
" (1) In this section "discriminatory practice" means -
(a) the application of a provision, criterion or practice which results in 
an act of discrimination which is unlawful by virtue of any provision 
of Part 2 or 3 taken with section l(2)(b) or 3(1 )(b) or which would 
be likely to result in such an act of discrimination if the persons to 
whom it is applied were not all of one sex, or
(b) the application of a requirement or condition which results in an 
act of discrimination which is unlawful by virtue of any provision of 
Part 3 taken with section 1(1 )(b) or which would be likely to result 
in such an act of discrimination if the persons to whom it is applied 
were not all of one sex."
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(3) In section 65(1 B)[6] of the 1975 Act -
(a) for "section l(l)(b)" there is substituted "section l(2)(b)", and
(b) for "requirement or condition" there is substituted "provision, criterion or 
practice".
(4) In section 82(1) of the 1975 Act, after the definition of "proprietor" there is 
inserted -
" "provision, criterion or practice" includes "requirement or condition;".".
Amendment of Employment Act 1989
9. In section 1 of the Employment Act 1989[7] (overriding of statutory requirements 
which conflict with certain provisions of the 1975 Act), in subsection (3) -
(a) for "requirement or condition", wherever occurring, there is substituted 
"provision, criterion or practice",
(b) for "subsection (l)(b)(i) of section 1 or 3" there is substituted "section 
l(2)(b)(i) or 3(l)(b)(i)",
(c) in paragraph (a), for "subsection (l)(b)(ii) of that section" there is substituted 
"section l(2)(b)(ii) or 3(1 )(b)(ii) of that Act", and
(d) in paragraph (b), for "subsection (l)(b)(ii)" there is substituted "section 
l(2)(b)(ii) or 3(l)(b)(ii)".
Patricia Hewitt
Secretary of State, Department of Trade and Industry 
20th July 2001
EXPLANATORY NOTE
(This note is not part o f the Regulations)
These Regulations, which are made under section 2(2) of the European Communities 
Act 1972, implement (in Great Britain) Article 2 and Article 4(1) of Council Directive 
97/80/EC of 15th December 1997 ("the Directive") concerning the burden of proof in 
cases of discrimination based on sex (OJ LI 4, 20.1.1998, p.6). The Directive has effect 
in relation to the United Kingdom by virtue of Council Directive 98/52/EC of 13th July
1998 (OJ L.205, 22.7.1998, p.66).
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Article 2(1) of the Directive defines "the principle of equal treatment for men and 
women" for the purposes of Article 141 (formerly Article 119) of the EC Treaty and
other Community legislation relating to sex discrimination, including in particular 
Directive 76/207/EEC of 9th February 1976 on the implementation of the principle of 
equal treatment for men and women as regards access to employment, vocational 
training and promotion and working conditions (OJ L39, 14.3.1976, p.40).
Article 2(2) of the Directive sets out the definition of indirect discrimination for the 
purposes of the principle of equal treatment referred to in Article 2(1).
Article 4 requires every Member State to take such measures as are necessary, in 
accordance with their national judicial systems, to ensure that in complaints of sex 
discrimination, before a court or other competent authority, the burden is on the 
complainant initially to establish facts from which the court or competent authority may 
presume there has been direct or indirect discrimination.
Thereafter, the burden shifts to the person who has allegedly discriminated against the 
complainant, the respondent, to prove that there has been no such discrimination.
The Directive is only applicable to situations concerning equal treatment of men and 
women as regards employment and vocational training.
The Regulations amend the Sex Discrimination Act 1975 ("the 1975 Act") and the 
Employment Act 1989 ("the 1989 Act") in order to reflect the provisions of the 
Directive. The amendments come into force on 12th October 2001, subject to 
transitional provisions (see regulation 2).
Regulation 3 provides for the substitution of section 1 of the 1975 Act. The sole change 
made to subsection (1) is that it will now apply only in respect of the provisions of the 
Act other than -
• Part 2 (discrimination in the employment field),
• sections 35A and 35B (discrimination in relation to barristers and advocates), or
• any other provision of Part 3, so far as it relates to vocational training.
The new subsection (2) (as substituted by regulation 3) sets out what constitutes direct 
and indirect discrimination for the purposes of the following provisions of the 1975 
Act -
• Part 2,
• sections 35A and 35B, and
• any other provision of Part 3, so far as it relates to vocational training.
Under new subsection (2)(a), direct discrimination will occur when a person treats a 
woman less favourably than he treats or would treat a man on the ground of her sex.
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This is identical to the new subsection (l)(a) (and to the old subsection (l)(a) which 
regulation 3 replaces). Subsection (2)(b) provides that in circumstances relevant for the 
purposes of a provision to which the new subsection applies, indirect discrimination will 
occur where a person applies an apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice to the 
disadvantage of a woman and to a substantially higher proportion of women than men, 
unless that provision, criterion or practice can be justified by objective factors unrelated 
to sex.
Regulation 4 substitutes a new section 3 in the 1975 Act (discrimination against married 
persons in the employment field). The only change of substance is in subsection (l)(b) 
(which relates to indirect discrimination). This reflects the provisions of new section 
l(2)(b) (as substituted by regulation 3).
Regulations 5 and 6 insert two new sections into the 1975 Act. These sections provide 
that the burden of proof will shift from the complainant to the respondent if the 
complainant can prove facts from which the tribunal could, apart from the section, 
conclude in the absence of an adequate explanation that discrimination has occurred. In 
those circumstances the burden of proof shifts to the respondent to prove that no such 
discrimination occurred. This only applies to proceedings by virtue of -
• Part 2,
• Sections 35A or 35B,
• any other provision of Part 3, so far as it relates to vocational training.
Regulation 7 inserts a new subsection (3 A) into section 66 of the 1975 Act. The 
amendment makes it clear that a county court or sheriff court has power to award 
damages in respect of an unlawful act of discrimination which relates to vocational 
training and falls within the new section l(2)(b), (as substituted by regulation 3), 
whether or not the discrimination is intentional.
Regulation 8 makes consequential amendments to other provisions of the 1975 Act. 
Regulation 9 makes a consequential amendment to section 1 of the 1989 Act.
A copy of the Regulatory Impact Assessment relating to these Regulations has been 
placed in the libraries of both Houses of Parliament and can be obtained from the 
Women and Equality Unit, Cabinet Office, Second Floor, 10 Great George Street,
London SW1P 3AE.
Notes:
[1] 1972 c. 68.back
[2] See the European Communities (Designation) (No. 3) Order 1999 (S.I. 
1999/2788). back
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[3] 1975 c. 65.back
[4] Sections 35A and 35B were inserted by the Courts and Legal Services Act 1990 (c. 
41), sections 64 and 65.back
[5] Section 5(3) was inserted by the Sex Discrimination (Gender Reassignment) 
Regulations 1999 (S.I. 1999/1102), reg2(2).back
[6] Section 65(1B) was inserted by the Sex Discrimination and Equal Pay 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) Regulations 1996 (S.I. 1996/438), regulation 2(2).back
[7] 1989 c. 38.back
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